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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR 
  
This has been a year of immense hardship and tragedy. Police brutality, systemic racism, and the 
COVID-19 pandemic have upended the lives of citizens across the globe. During times like these 
where togetherness is so badly needed, it is all the more painful that we have spent so much of 
our time in isolation. Now more than ever, a platform for sharing ideas and diverse perspectives 
with students and faculty across the country is incredibly valuable. Although we have missed out 
on so much of the human connection on which we thrive, the staff of DUJPEW is grateful for the 
opportunity to listen, read, and collaborate with our peers in the national undergraduate 
community. 
  
Despite the trials of these polarizing and contentious times, we cannot shy away from discourse 
and conversation. Ideas must be shared with others, interrogated by listeners, and adapted when 
new information becomes available. Common ground cannot be reached if we do not look 
outside ourselves, and publications that amplify the voices of a wide body of undergraduate 
scholars are an invaluable tool for civil discussion. Dartmouth founder Eleazer Wheelock 
assigned our motto of “Vox Clamantis in Deserto,” or “a voice crying out in the wilderness.” He 
envisioned Dartmouth as an intellectual beacon in the woods, whose students would critically 
engage with and question difficult subjects and curiosities. DUJPEW’s aims are just that. 
Technology has enabled us to interface with students at a plethora of institutions, and our 
publication can serve as a vehicle for those voices to cry out from the wilderness. 
  
We would like to thank the entire DUJPEW editorial staff for their dedication to, and enthusiasm 
for, launching this year’s issue. We are elated that you were all so willing to adapt to the remote 
format and keep DUJPEW alive. On behalf of the graduating seniors, Noah and Jonathan would 
also like to thank Addison for his critical work this year and we wish him the best of luck 
transitioning it back to an on-campus publication. 
  
Additionally, we want to thank the entire staff of associate editors — your work was 
indispensable. We must also thank the many supportive professors, friends, and readers who 
continue to engage with and connect to the scholarship that we at DUJPEW bring to print. 
Finally, we must express my profound appreciation and admiration for the authors that provided 
the eight fantastic pieces of writing that comprise this year’s publication. We are so happy to 
provide a platform for your work, and we cannot wait to see what great things you will certainly 
accomplish in the future. 
  
Noah Freundlich ‘21, Editor-in-Chief 
Jonathan Briffault ‘21, President 





Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue III 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021








5 The Cost of Subway Delays: A Counterfactual Welfare Analysis of Boston’s T 
Adam Dean, Brandeis University 
 
23 Tracking the Tracing: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of 
COVID-19 
Jessie Miller, Claremont McKenna College 
 
53 The Great Swedish Experiment 
Xiofan Gong & Michael Ratzkin, Cornell University 
 
91 The Radicalization of the Far Right in Germany and Regional Disparities in 
Support 
Sophia Winograd, Princeton University 
 
106 Understanding the Unique Spatial Relationships and Power Dynamics of 
China’s Urban Villages 
Kaitlyn Zhao, Cornell University 
 
119 Sexual Violence and Sex Trafficking: An Observation of Developing 
International Law and Its Implementation 
Hannah Kate Albach, Pepperdine University  
 
135 Weakening of the Nation-State by Climate Change: Water Weaponization by 
ISIL 
Annika Cole, Elon College  
 
157 Minority Representation on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Do Foreign-Born Judges 
Influence Immigration Case Outcomes? 
Bianca Ortiz-Miskimen, Princeton University 
 
4
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/9
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 1 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
The Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics, and World Affairs 
Volume. I, Issue. III, 5-23, June 2021 
 






Brandeis University  
 
ABSTRACT: Boston’s subway system, the T, is an important artery for transportation in and 
around the city. However, it is the oldest subway system in the United States, and, as a result, is in 
dire need of upgrades. This paper employs a welfare analysis to calculate the economic cost of the 
T’s lack of reliability, while also comparing the T’s reliability rate to other transit systems around 
the world. With a counterfactual estimate of a 95 percent reliability rate versus the pre-pandemic 
88.47 percent reliability rate, the difference in welfare is found to be between $54 million and $163 
million annually. Thus, long overdue improvements to the T would have a significant impact on 




In 2019, President Donald Trump and Democratic congressional leaders Chuck Schumer 
and Nancy Pelosi agreed to pursue a $2 trillion infrastructure plan1. The display of bipartisanship 
illustrated the widespread agreement from across the political spectrum that America’s 
deteriorating infrastructure was in need of an upgrade. But like most infrastructure talk in recent 
years, the proposal failed to gain traction as lawmakers felt uneasy about the large costs and finding 
potential funding sources. State and federal legislators currently remain in stalemate about who 
will foot the bill for upcoming infrastructure projects across the country.  
Boston’s subway, the T, is the oldest subway system in North America, thus making it a 
prime candidate for an infrastructure upgrade2. In 2019, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) released a 25-year investment plan that would modernize the regional 
transportation system, including the T, to best serve the needs of the region in the future. Like most 
transit agencies in the US, the MBTA cannot cover its costs, so shortfalls are financed by the state 
government. During the winter of 2015, brutal storms slammed the northeast, causing massive 
delays and even the complete suspension of certain transit lines for days. The poor performance 
brought public attention to MBTA’s issues. For example, at the time, almost one-fourth of the 
MBTA budget went towards servicing debt, with billions of dollars in infrastructure backlog. 
Following the 2015 winter disaster, the Governor of Massachusetts created a special panel to get 
the “MBTA Back on Track.” The panel successfully recommended a state-funded capital program 
to begin working through the billion-dollar backlog. However, with the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, ridership has been decimated, threatening to impact the solvency of the agency3. As a 
result, funds have been shifted away from capital projects towards the immediate budget shortfall.  
5
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The pandemic will push back the day when the MBTA works through its infrastructure 
backlog and starts modernizing the T for the future. This will result in a continuance of the status 
quo costs even when ridership returns to normal. Policymakers and the MBTA have many cost-
benefit analyses that explain the impacts of potential projects available to them. But being 
presented with just the costs and benefits of a particular project can allow policymakers to overlook 
the present costs delays. For every year policymakers avoid solutions to fix reliability problems, 
riders continue to deal with delays, which have real economic costs.            
In this paper, I calculate the welfare difference between the pre-pandemic T and a 
hypothetical T with an improved reliability rate. This paper is a lower bound for the economic cost 
of subway delays because I only analyze the short-term welfare implications to consumers. In the 
conclusion, I will briefly explain why the long-term welfare effects are likely to be larger. I also 
do not explore the impact on road traffic from displaced riders nor what improved reliability would 
mean for employers. Additionally, I do not analyze how a more reliable public transit system 
would impact the environment and social equity.  
In my estimate, I employ the consumer choice logit model, as created by Daniel McFadden, 
to estimate welfare differences. To construct my utility function, I use ridership, reliability, and 
line-specific data from the MBTA. With a counterfactual estimate of 95 percent reliability versus 
the pre-pandemic figure of 88.47 percent, I estimate the difference in the market’s welfare to be 
between $54 million and $163 million annually. This figure is meant to be used as the beginning 
of a welfare discussion because I estimate welfare implications only for      consumers and not for 
the several other parties that are impacted by delays. Furthermore, these findings are not meant to 
advocate for immediate infrastructure funding, but rather to remind policymakers of the cost of 
maintaining the status quo.  
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 provides background on public transit, the 
MBTA, and the use of consumer surplus as a welfare metric. Section 3 provides a literature review 
which summarizes existing studies on this topic. Section 4 shows where the data comes from and 
the limitations of the data. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy which employs the logit 





Benefits of Public Transit  
Public transit is an important asset for urban areas. This is because it is seen as beneficial 
to the economy, society, and environment. According to a 2020 report from the American Public 
Transportation Association, robust public transit allows consumers to save on vehicle ownership 
and maintenance, reduces traffic congestion and needed space for parking, and allows businesses 
access to a larger labor market. Further, effective public transit allows a variety of people access 
to the job market, schooling, healthcare, and leisure activities. Because they do not need to spend 
on a car, public transit provides individuals across the socioeconomic spectrum access to moving 
across a city. This benefit can also be extended to disabled people who are unable to drive, in cases 
where public transit is accessible. Lastly, public transportation’s efficient use of resources benefits 
the environment. Hundreds of countries across the world are trying to reduce their carbon dioxide 
emissions to limit the impacts of climate change. Public transit’s ability to move hundreds of 
people within a single subway car is a highly efficient use of resources. Fewer cars lead to reduced 
pollution.  
6
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The T  
The MBTA is the fifth-largest public transportation system in the United States. It is also 
the oldest. Its divisions include rapid transit (the T), a bus system, the commuter rail, and a ferry. 
In 2019, weekday ridership of all MBTA services averaged 1.3 million people. The transit 
authority is a state entity that falls under the control of the Massachusetts Department of 
Transportation (MassDOT) and ultimately is overseen by the Governor.  
The subway stretches across the Boston metropolitan area, including stations at Fenway 
Park, Logan International Airport, Harvard University, and Braintree, the suburb south of the city. 
The commuter rail feeds into North and South Stations in Boston and provides transfer points to 
the subway. The most ridden lines in order from greatest to least are the: Red Line, Orange Line, 
Green Line, and Blue Line. The system has had an 88.47 percent reliability rate since 2016. The 
clear laggard in reliability is the Green Line, as seen in Table 1.   
The Green Line traces its origins back to the late 19th century when streetcars crisscrossed 
Boston in the same area the Green Line does today. The streetcars were first designated as a 
subway in 1897, when the Tremont Street tunnel was created and part of the streetcars’ route was 
put underground. The Green Line vehicles are still essentially streetcars, traveling above and below 
the streets. In contrast, the Red, Orange, and Blue Line vehicles are exclusively heavy rail, meaning 
that they are heavier trains that operate on devoted right-of-way tracks. It seems that the Green 
Line’s reliability issues are in part due to two main factors: above-ground traffic and tunnel entry 
and exit. Projected arrival and departure times include the knowledge that the Green Line may 
have to stop for traffic, yet delays remain substantial. Further discussion about reliability and its 
calculation is later in this paper.  
At least every five years, the MBTA is required by the federal government to conduct a 
systemwide survey that gathers demographic, travel, and fare data. Among the pertinent findings 
to this paper from the 2015-17 survey were purpose and substitution data4. Home-based work and 
home-based school trips made up 71.6 percent and 5.7 percent of trips, respectively. There are also 
data about alternative transportation options for people whose first choice was the T. If they were 
unable to take the T, most would opt for another MBTA service (~45%), while the second-most 
popular choice was driving alone (~24%).  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of The T’s Lines 










Red 90.09% 237,000 34% 45 ~54 1912 
Orange 91.95% 207,000 30% 22 ~40 1901 
Green 77.05% 177,000 26% 46 ~59 1897 
Blue 94.70% 71,000 10% 12 ~23 1904 
Source: MBTA Blue Book Open Data Portal  
 
The State of the MBTA 
In April 2015, the special assessment panel commissioned by Governor Charlie Baker 
released its report calling the “catastrophic winter breakdowns symptomatic of structural problems 
that require fundamental change in virtually all aspects of the MBTA.” The executive report 
exposed the shortcomings of the organization’s unsustainable operating budget, instability, and 
7
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lack of customer focus. The report also revealed interesting insights about the MBTA’s 
infrastructure issues. 
 A factor in the MBTA’s rising operational costs comes from the aging infrastructure. 
Across seven peer transit organizations across the country studied by the panel’s report, the MBTA 
had the oldest fleet of train cars. For example, the Red Line still uses vehicles made in the 1960s.  
 Repeated capital underinvestment was one of the nine major findings in the report. While 
additional funding from the state, and potentially the federal government, will be needed to finance 
large capital projects, the MBTA has a history of diverting funds allocated to capital to operating 
expenses. In 2015, the public transit authority spent $66.5 million earmarked for capital projects 
on employee salaries instead. The commission found that from 2009 to 2015, the MBTA spent 
only $2.3 billion of the $4.5 billion it had planned to spend on capital construction. Billions of 
dollars in missing capital spending over just this six-year span helps to explain why the MBTA 
faces such a substantial infrastructure backlog.  
 The ramifications of reallocating capital funds can be seen in the MBTA’s capital backlog. 
The backlog is likely incomplete due to an inventory system that is not up to date or 
comprehensive. Nonetheless, in 2015, the MBTA said it had a service backlog of $6.7 billion to 
bring the equipment back to a State of Good Repair (SGR), a rating metric threshold for equipment 
quality. The report notes that due to the inadequate inventory system and underestimation of 
expenses, the       backlog total is “unquestionably” higher. Items that directly impact reliability —
such as vehicles, bridge signals, stations, track, and power—make up 85 percent of the backlog.      
 Another finding of the report was that when the MBTA does spend money on capital 
projects, it faces an elongated timeline. A recent morale boost for riders has been the occasional 
sighting of new train cars on the Red and Orange Lines. But the process behind the procurement 
of these vehicles illustrates the inefficiencies experienced by the MBTA. In 1994, 74 Red Line 
cars were due for retirement, and in 2004, 120 Orange Line cars were due for retirement. Despite 
having this information, the MBTA did not submit its first draft for buying new cars until 2008. It 
took another six years for the board to approve a builder for the cars. In 2020, the first non-test 
vehicle was supposed to be deployed, and in 2022, the MBTA should have the last car in its order 
delivered. If there are no further       delays, it would mark 28 years from when the Red Line cars 
were supposed to be retired to when the old vehicles will be completely replaced. This lack of 
initiative to keep up with infrastructure maintenance is part of the reason why the T is in 
disarray.         
 The report recommended that all board members of the MBTA resign.      Six of the seven 
ultimately did. But the resignation of past leadership and the implementation of new oversight 
have not been an instant fix for the organization. In 2018, three years after the report’s publication, 
the MBTA re-calculated a $10.1 billion figure for the maintenance and modernization of capital, 
a $3.4 billion increase from the initial estimate.  
 
Consumer Surplus  
An increase in reliability of the T would not directly put money in the pockets of the 
residents of the Boston metro region, but it would benefit them nonetheless.      Consumer surplus 
is an economic principle that attempts to quantify this benefit, and this paper relies heavily on 
evaluating consumer surplus. The definition of consumer surplus is the difference between what 
consumers would be willing to pay for a product and what they actually pay. For example, if the 
price of a product decreased, with no changes in other factors, the consumer surplus would rise. 
Alternatively, if the quality of a product improved and the price stayed the same, the consumer 
8
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would likely be willing to pay more for the product than before; this would also increase consumer 
surplus. The latter example is what this paper sets out to estimate.  
 
Literature Review  
The literature of consumer discrete choice begins with the work of Daniel McFadden, the 
2000 co-laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics. The Measurement of Urban Travel Demand 
(1974) is where McFadden created the logit model to empirically analyze consumer behavior in 
BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit). I use McFadden’s model, as described by Kenneth Train’s 
textbook, to make my consumer surplus estimates for the T.  
 Outside of McFadden’s work, much of the economic literature falls short of actually 
estimating costs to consumers from delays or subpar access. Instead, most economic studies focus 
on different components of a large-scale welfare calculation. 
Van Oort (2016) is one of the few papers that quantifies the costs to passengers. By 
studying a new tram line in Utrecht, Netherlands, the paper found benefits resulting from reliability 
increases accounted for two-thirds of total benefits. The estimate was done through simulating a 
counterfactual estimation but did not use a logit model. The analysis also claimed its findings were 
important to convince policymakers to support the project.  
 There are various papers that study the relationship between general welfare, public 
transportation, and transit efficiency. Benezech and Coulombel (2013) calculated the marginal 
effect of reliability on expected travel costs due to changes in wait times, schedule delays, and 
congestion. Baum-Snow and Khan (2005) evaluated the extent to which urban rail network 
expansions in US cities have spurred new ridership and estimated partial welfare gains that came 
from traffic reduction and savings in car ownership. Lobo and Couto (2015) analyze the 
operational performance of European metro systems and determine what factors contribute to good 
transit performance. Another study5 calculated welfare losses not from reliability changes, but 
from fare hikes on the Madrid Metro. Fare hikes resulted in a welfare loss of 3.66% in income for 
low- and medium-income households, while the richest suffered a 1.5% reduction in welfare. 
 The New York City Comptroller (2017) released a rudimentary calculation that estimated 
large-scale economic costs from delays with extensive data. By looking at ridership, magnitude of 
delays, and assuming a $34 hourly average wage, the report put the city’s losses in 2016 in the 
range of $170 million to $389 million. The costs were justified because of lost productivity for 
businesses and lost wages for workers. Economic loss estimates were also given for each line of 
the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA).  
 There is substantial literature for estimating welfare gains from social media through the 
use of the logit model and willingness-to-accept      experiments: Alcott et al. (2018), Brynjolfsson 
et al. (2019), Corrigan et al. (2018), Mosquera et al. (2018), and Sunstein (2019). One study found 
the welfare difference in the US between not having Facebook in 2003 to having it in 2017 was 
$231 billion6.  
There have been several transportation-delay welfare studies in the airline industry as well. 
One paper found that flight delays on airlines negatively affect consumer demand and increase 
average fares7. The study found that a 10 percent reduction in delays would yield a consumer 
surplus gain of $1.48 per passenger; a 20 percent reduction in delays would yield $3.06 per 
passenger. The paper was not completely comprehensive, however, as it was a partial equilibrium 
analysis. Welfare could change as passengers shift from other transportations sectors, like cars. 
Yimga (2017) found that on average, the welfare costs of airline delays to consumers at their final 
destination to be $1.38, $1.07 and $0.91 per minute in short-, mid- and long-haul markets, 
9
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respectively. Several studies also look at the relationship between airline delays and consumer 




MBTA Data  
Nearly all of the data I use in this paper come from the MBTA Open Data Portal,      created 
in 2015 in response to the winter disaster. The first dataset I analyze       concerns reliability, which 
includes specific figures on reliability, date, line, and a peak indicator. In a partnership with MIT, 
the MBTA developed an Origin-Destination-Transfer (ODX) model that estimates reliability by 
analyzing Charlie Card (the T’s subway pass) data. Predicating the origin of a rider is simple as it 
is where a Charlie Card is first swiped. But since the T does not require swipes to exit a station, 
the destination is predicted by identifying the next location where the same Charlie Card is swiped. 
Transfers are predicted using a similar methodology with spatial and logical checks. From the 
sample of Charlie Cards that it analyzes, the model extrapolates the reliability metric for riders 
across the system.  
 The reliability metric is calculated as the number of people unaffected by delays divided 
by the number of total riders. For example, if 900 people out of 1,000 were unaffected by delays, 
then the reliability of that line would be 90 percent for the given time period.  
There is criticism about who qualifies as being unaffected by delays9. Subway trains arrive 
on scheduled intervals, or headways. If a subway train is supposed to arrive every five minutes, it 
is said to have a five-minute headway. A common understanding of subway delays would classify 
any train that arrives after its scheduled time as being delayed and the passengers boarding that 
train as having been affected. But the MBTA measures the unaffected portion of reliability as the 
number of riders that board a train within the scheduled headway time starting when they enter the 
station. This interpretation means that a person could board a delayed train and be counted as being 
unaffected by delays.  
 Figure 1 illustrates this counting phenomenon. Suppose a train had a five-minute headway, 
but it came to a station two minutes late, making the headway seven minutes. In a typical 
interpretation of delays, no matter when a rider arrived at the station, anyone boarding the late train 
would be deemed affected. However, the MBTA would not include every rider as having faced a 
delay and would opt instead to analyze when riders arrived at the station to determine if they were 
impacted. Suppose for the same five-minute headway train that arrived two minutes late, there 
were two riders who entered the station planning to ride the train. Rider 1 arrived at the one-minute 
mark of the five-minute headway interval, and Rider 2 arrived at the three-minute point. Since the 
train arrived two minutes late, Riders 1 and 2 will have waited six and four minutes for the train, 
respectively. Rider 1 will be counted as having been affected by delays, but not Rider 2, even 
though they both ultimately board on a train that was late to the station. Yes, Rider 2 does wait 
less than the scheduled headway time of five minutes. But had the train been on time, Rider 2 
would have saved two minutes in wait time. The criticism of the metric is that it underestimates 
delays because it does not count everyone who would have saved time if a given train arrived as 
scheduled.  
A second issue from the MBTA definition of reliability is that the model assumes that 
everyone who waits for a train during rush hour is able to get on one. Due to overcrowding, this is 
not always true.       
10
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However, despite the shortcomings of the metric, the reliability metric still gives valuable 
insight about the performance of the T.  
Figure 1: MBTA Reliability Definition  
 
Source: MBTA Data Blog 
Two other data sets from the MBTA that I employ are the gated entries and monthly 
ridership data. The ridership data is at the monthly level because the MBTA gathers data through 
multiple sources (passenger counters, fare collection, counts, etc.) and adjusts the tally at the end 
of the month to account for fare evaders and system errors. Because my reliability data is at the 
daily level, this created a data mismatch. To solve this problem, I used gated entry data, which is 
also at the daily level. The proportionality of the gated entry data did not align with the share of 
ridership for each line at the monthly level because the green line does not collect gated entries at 
overground stations. To address this issue, I generated a new daily ridership variable that adhered 
to the proportionality of the ridership data at the monthly level and included the day-to-day 
fluctuations in magnitude from the gated entry data. This daily ridership variable is not precisely 
what ridership was on that day, but it is close enough that no integrity issues exist.  
 
Other Subways’ Reliabilities  
As previously mentioned, the reliability of the T is 88.47 percent, with the Red, Orange, 
Green, and Blue Lines having reliabilities of 90.09, 91.95, 77.05, and 94.70 percent, respectively. 
To estimate a counterfactual in reliability, I wanted to place its reliability rates in context with 
other systems around the world. Two difficulties emerged: many subway systems do not easily 
share performance data and reliability definitions can vary by system. Nonetheless, I was able to 
procure figures for a handful of subway systems that had similar definitions of reliability. In the 
results section, I will discuss why I choose to focus on a counterfactual reliability of 95 percent. 
 
  
Table 2: Reliability Rates of International Subway Systems 
Urban Area Average Weekday Ridership Reliability Rate (%) 
Boston 692,000 88.6 
Berlin 1,500,000 96.3 
Glasgow  52,000 95.0 
Hong Kong 4,962,000 99.9 
New York City 5,700,000 84.0 
Paris 4,160,000 98.2* 
São Paulo 5,300,000 99.3* 
Seoul 13,000,000 99.9 
11
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Singapore 7,035,000 98.5 
 
Additional Data and Notes  
Later in this paper, I discuss instrumenting for reliability because of endogeneity issues in 
my regression. One of the instruments I use for this is weather data (precipitation levels and 
average temperatures) from the National Weather Service.  
 The period for all data starts in 2016 and continues to the present. However, due to the 
pandemic, the last month in the data is February 2020. The analysis excludes weekend data to 
allow for certain regression controls and to simplify the analysis.  
 To calculate utility, I needed to determine the T’s market share. To do this, I had to produce 
an estimate of the market size for potential T riders. The US Census has done analyses that estimate 
the daytime populations of Suffolk County (the county that Boston resides) and Somerville (a 
suburb of Boston). The 2010 analyses found that Suffolk Country grows around 33 percent during 
the day and the neighboring suburbs decrease by a similar factor. I collected population data for 
Suffolk County and Boston’s surrounding cities that are not in Suffolk County but still have easy 
access to the T (Cambridge, Somerville, Brookline, Newton, Medford, Malden, Everett). Lastly, I 
transformed these populations by the proportions found by the US Census analyses and added the 
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Variables Summary Statistics  
  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 10,254 2.256627 0.0794851 2.1 2.4 
Precipitation 10,254 0.1238268 0.2967151 0 2.68 
TempAvg 10,254 52.3741 17.26458 0 90 
      
Reliability      
Blue Line 2,602 0.9470299 0.0324076 0.4745002 0.9962027 
Green Line 2,563 0.7705131 0.0444417 0.428605 0.8695235 
Orange Line 2,561 0.9195957 0.0470082 0.3962716 0.9908824 
Red Line 2,528 0.9009723 0.0543583 0.1541655 0.9720004 
Aggregate 10,254 0.8847025 0.0815763 0.1541655 0.9962027 
      
Ridership      
Blue Line 2,602 67,909.36 12,892.55 6,515.416 147,666.6 
Green Line 2,563 188,382.5 43,356.02 16,767.78 449,132 
Orange Line 2,561 199,585.4 39,657.03 10,112.37 293,992.2 
Red Line 2,528 239,053.1 48,087.32 13,141.93 323,482.5 
Aggregate 10,254 173,102.1 74,757.27 6,515.416 449,132 
 
Table 4: Reliability Instruments Correlation Matrix 
      
Variable Reliability Precipitation Temp Avg Previous Day Inverse Reliability 
Reliability  1     
Precipitation -0.0188 1    
Temp Avg -0.006 -0.001 1   
Previous Day 0.0873 0.0439 0.0004 1  
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I employ Daniel McFadden’s logit model, as advocated by Kenneth Train in Discrete 
Choice Models in Simulation, to estimate the consumer surplus gain from improved reliability on 
the T. The logit model is useful in situations where consumers make a discrete choice (i.e. only 
choose one item out of several alternatives). For this context, I am looking at the probability of 
consumers choosing to ride the T versus all other alternatives, such as driving a car or even another 
MBTA service. 
 In the model, a person, n, chooses among alternatives, j. The conditional indirect mean 
utility, excluding the i.i.d. (identically independently distributed) error term, obtained from 
alternative choice j is represented by V in equation 1. V includes factors that I am able to observe 
such as the impact of prices, reliability, and weather. The error term, 𝜀, contains unobservable 
factors that affect utility and it is treated as random.   
 
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗𝑡 (1)      
 
Train describes the logit choice possibilities, as derived by Daniel McFadden, in equation 
2. The equation represents the possibility that decision maker n chooses alternative i over all other 
choices j. The equation states that the probability the decision maker chooses choice i is the 
probability that the utility yielded by i is greater than that of j. Through further derivation and 
substitution, Train rewrites the probability of decision maker n choosing alternative i over all other 
choices j in equation 3. Equation 3 includes the outside good, whose mean utility is normalized to 
0.  
 
𝑃𝑛𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖 >  𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗)   (2) 
14
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/9
The Cost of Subway Delays 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 1 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
15 




  = 
𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑡
1+𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑡
                        (3) 
 
 Consumer surplus is utility expressed in dollars. In this logit model, this is the dollar value 
of the decision that maximizes utility for consumers. Equation 4 shows that the expected consumer 
surplus for a decision maker, n, is equal to the expected value of the maximizing utility choice 
divided by𝛼, the marginal utility of income (the change in a person’s utility resulting from a one-











 From this logit framework, it is quite simple to calculate the consumer surplus using the 
log-sum term, according to Train. The log-sum term is the log of the denominator of equation 3. 
Thus, the logit model allows me to estimate the change in consumer surplus between the status 
quo of the T and a more reliable counterfactual by calculating the two utilities and their log-sums. 
The difference between the two log-sums is the consumer surplus currently lost by consumers as 
the T remains behind on maintenance and technological upgrades. This consumer surplus is just 
for one person, an aggregate number is calculated by multiplying individual consumer surplus by 
the market size.    
 From the data provided by the MBTA open data portal, I am able to estimate a regression 
that predicts the utility that is needed for the logit model. The model is as follows:  
 
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑡 +   𝛾(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑡  +  𝜉𝑡  
  
where utility is the natural log of the market share minus the natural log of the outside share (market 
share plus outside share is equal to 1)10, price is the price of a subway ticket without a pass, 
reliability is the value produced by the MBTA’s ODX model, peak is an indicator equal to 1 if it 
is peak time, and 𝛾 represents the various controls used. In every regression, I use time-fixed 
effects at the day, week, and year level and fixed effects by line. There is an endogeneity issue 
with this model because ridership is thought to have an effect on reliability. For example, larger 
crowds can create door-closing delays. To account for this problem, I instrument for reliability 
using several different variables. These include precipitation levels, average temperature, the 
reliability of the previous day, and the reliability of the inverse peak period.  
 
Results and Discussion  
In this section, I review the results of my logit model regression and the consumer surplus 
calculation. Table 1 presents the results of the three regressions, which are differentiated based on 
what instruments are included for reliability. 
 Initially, I included an interaction variable of reliability and peak to account for the 
difference in reliability during peak and nonpeak hours. But after further investigation, the 
statistical variation between reliability during on- and off-peak hours was near zero. This appeared 
odd, as one would think that increased ridership during peak hours would put extra stress on a 
subway system.      However, peak hours only represent a small portion of operating hours for the 
T, while the off-peak period makes up the majority of the day. It is likely that the high incidence 
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of delays during the peak period is matched by the length of the off-peak period in terms of total 
delays. This understanding seems to be further supported by the lack of statistical significance for 
the peak variable in all three regressions.  
 Because none of the four instruments employed are strong, regressions 1 and 2 differ on 
the magnitude of the variable effects. Table 5 shows reliability regressed on the instruments. 
Despite all of the instruments having a theoretical case for being strong, inverse reliability is the 
only statistically significant, nonzero instrument. But since reliability does not have significant 
statistical variation between peak and non-peak periods, inverse reliability is highly correlated with 
reliability. This makes inverse reliability a poor instrument as well.   
Although regressions 1 and 2 differ on the magnitude of their coefficients, they both have 
similar effects for the variables. As expected, the results show an increase in reliability would have 
a positive effect on utility. The reliability coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level.  
 From 2016 to 2019, the T had two fare increases. The three different price levels during 
the period of the study allow the model to take into account the effect of price on the market share 
interaction. Typical endogeneity issues are unlikely to exist because fare hikes were planned and 
announced far in advance. For both regressions, price has a negative effect on utility and those 
findings are statistically significant. The peak variable has a slight negative effect in the 
regressions, but it is not statistically significant. This could be because of the previously discussed 
disproportionate lengths of the peak and off-peak periods. 
It is unclear which regression is closer to the true values of the utility function. regression 
2 has similar effects to regression 3, which does not include any instrumentals. But a strong 
instrument might yield effects closer to regression 1. Thus, I use both regressions to create my 
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Table 5: Logit Model Utility Regression 
 Dependent Variable: Utility 






















Day of Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 








Observations 10,524 10,524 10,524 
𝑅2  0.0531 0.0041 .0039 
Instruments    
Temperature Yes No No 
Precipitation Yes No No 
previous day Yes No No 
inverse reliability No Yes No 
 
Note: Line fixed effects are controlled for in the panel selection of the regression. 
 
 
Table 6: Instrument Test  
Dependent Variable: Reliability  
Variable Coefficient t F-Statistic 
Precipitation -0.0052141 -1.92 3.69 
Temp Average  -0.0000369 -0.79 0.63 
Previous Day  0.000013 7.09 50.25 







Table 7: Consumer Surplus Calculations for Different Potential Reliabilities   
Regression Counterfactual Reliability Consumer Surplus (annually) 
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1 95% $163,439,990 
2 95% $54,177,113 
1 98% $331,271,700 
2 98% $80,097,196 
 
Table 2 shows the consumer surplus calculations for four variations: two variations for 
regressions 1 and 2, and two variations for different counterfactual estimates. The consumer 
surplus calculation is described earlier in Empirical Strategy. The figures shown in the table are 
the yearly difference in consumer surplus between the status quo and a counterfactual reality. This 
consumer surplus gain is not just for current riders, but also for non-riders who theoretically switch 
over to the T from enhanced utility.   
I focus on a counterfactual reliability of 95 percent for a few reasons. The T’s current 
reliability is at 88.47 percent, so an increase to 95 percent would represent a significant 6.6 
percentage point increase. Additionally, this does not seem completely unreasonable given the 
MBTA’s documented level of underinvestment and the growing infrastructure backlog. The Blue 
Line has a reliability of 94.7 percent, for example. It is the newest line, so it has the smallest 
infrastructure backlog and makes the 95 percent target more realistic. Comparatively, the Red Line 
still uses train cars that were supposed to be retired over two decades ago, and has other outdated 
equipment in other parts of the system. If the T were able to work through its backlog and start 
modernizing its equipment, that would yield increased reliability as well.  
Further, in Table 2, all of the international systems listed have a reliability of over 95 
percent, with most of them close to 99 percent. It is unfair to make a direct comparison to 
international systems given the US’s historical reliance on cars and a large lack of funding given 
to public transit compared to other countries. Nonetheless, the international systems demonstrate 
that near-perfect reliability is not impossible, especially given that most of those systems carry 
more passengers than the T.  
The subway systems of Asia are much newer than the T and are considered the best in the 
world. Thus, a comparison to the T cannot be made. However, the European systems trace their 
origins back to the late 19th or early 20th century, the same period as the establishment of the T. 
Given that these systems have reliability rates above 95 percent and that the T’s Blue Line itself is 
very close to that figure, 95 percent does represent a reasonable figure. Even still, I include a 98 
percent counterfactual reliability to serve as a thought experiment, but it is a threshold that is 
unrealistic for the T given its current circumstances.  
 Using regression 1, I find that lost consumer surplus due to substandard reliability costs 
Boston metro residents over $160 million annually. If counterfactual reliability were upped to 98 
percent, that figure rises to over $330 million. Using regression 2, I find a $54 million loss in 
welfare at a 95 percent counterfactual, and an $80 million loss for a 98 percent reliability rate. 
Using the 95 percent reliability level, from 2016 to 2019, the welfare loss to residents is between 





This paper uses a logit model to estimate the welfare loss of residents of the Boston 
metropolitan area due to the unreliability of Boston’s subway, the T. By finding the difference in 
18
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/9
The Cost of Subway Delays 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 1 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
19 
consumer surplus between the status quo and a counterfactual reality of improved reliability, I 
estimate the annual welfare losses to be in the range of $54 million to $163 million.   
This estimate is a lower bound for a few reasons. The consumer choice logit model predicts 
short-term welfare changes as reliability shifts day to day. In the long run, consumer welfare losses 
to poor reliability are likely higher. If a rider is dissatisfied with reliability during a given week, 
they are unlikely to go out and buy a car the next. But if reliability issues persist over months, they 
have more time to switch to other transportation alternatives. If the T is someone’s first choice 
transportation method, then transitioning to another method, such as       buying a car or bike, 
reduces their welfare.  
This estimate also does not consider the effects on third parties. It does not evaluate what 
the benefits of reduced road congestion would be. The commuter rail is the primary public 
transportation option for people that live in suburbs further from the city; they drive cars at higher 
rates than people that live within the immediate urban area of Boston. But, the commuter rail feeds 
into two stations in central Boston, where many commuters transfer to the T to get to their final 
destination. Thus, the reliability of the T still has effects on commuter rail riders. Lastly, there are 
accessibility, social equity, and environmental benefits from improved reliability that are not 
within the scope of this paper.  
  These consumer surplus estimates should not be used alone to advocate for upgrading the 
T because cost-benefit analyses are beneficial for understanding a broad sense of the effects of a 
specific project. However, my analysis should be considered in the cost side of the cost-benefit 
analyses read by policymakers. By having a substandard subway system in 2019, the Boston metro 
area lost tens of millions of dollars, if not hundreds of millions. Unless policymakers choose to let 
the system run without upgrades and essentially dissolve, large infrastructure upgrades will 
eventually happen. Every year until those infrastructure upgrades begin to improve service, the 
public will absorb the costs of unreliability. The pandemic has reduced ridership and has even 
made cutting subway service an option for meeting budget shortfalls. The losses of 2019 will not 
be the same as 2020 because of the pandemic. Nonetheless, the underlying principle of this paper 
will have relevance when the pandemic ends and ridership begins to return to more normal levels.  
 This paper may even be more relevant at the end of the pandemic when the economy begins 
to recover. Infrastructure spending may again be thrust into political discussions as a way of 
delivering stimulus to the economy. Ultimately, however, it will be up to policymakers to work 
through political obstacles that have held up large-scale infrastructure spending in recent years. If 
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ABSTRACT: As the COVID-19 pandemic tore through the globe, policymakers grappled with 
two key questions. First, to what extent could new tools to collect and analyze data on a massive 
scale help limit the virus’s spread and, second, how would the collection of that data impact the 
privacy rights of individuals? This paper examines both questions and reveals how nation-specific 
traditions, values, and leaders shaped the delicate balance between the right to privacy and the 
protection of the population from COVID-19. An exploration of the surveillance techniques 
developed in response to the SARS and HIV pandemics reveals the growing consensus around 
the importance of accurate data collection and analysis. Next, this paper examines the COVID-19 
response in 6 areas (China, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, the United States, and the European 
Union) to demonstrate the diverse array of responses to the pandemic. Different attitudes toward 
privacy and government control in each country led to dramatically different outcomes. Finally, 
this paper examines the role of regime type, leadership, experience with pandemics, and privacy 
norms in a comparison between China and the United Kingdom. This paper concludes by arguing 
that the balance between privacy and health can be successfully maintained by ensuring 
government transparency, reasonable scope and duration of implemented measures, and 
optimized use of technology to reduce excess data collection.  
 
 
Section I: Introduction  
As COVID-19 spread throughout the world, causing shutdowns and disruptions to modern 
society on an unprecedented scale, the threat of pandemics became painfully clear. The failure of 
governments and international organizations to prevent and mitigate the dangers of a global 
pandemic such as COVID-19 has left many desperate for the creation of new policies, norms, 
and infrastructure. The scientific community, alongside policy experts, demands the utilization of 
data that are mass collected in the 21st century to respond to pandemics. While this may be 
effective, if not vital, in the fight against COVID-19, one would be remiss to ignore the privacy 
implications of tracking the disease and its human carriers.  
This paper will examine the privacy implications and efficacy of a data-driven tracking 
approach, with its scope limited to the first six months (March through August 2020) of the 
pandemic. Focusing on the early months of the pandemic provides insight into governments’ 
immediate responses, and allows investigation into policymakers’ first instincts when they are 
faced with crises. This paper also contains two sections of cross-country comparison; the first 
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details the strategy, efficacy, and privacy implications of pandemic response from a diverse 
subset of nations, while the second explores how regime type and leadership impacted nations’ 
pandemic response in China and the United Kingdom.     
 
Section II: A Fundamental Review of Relevant International Pandemic Response Policy  
Recent history lends an important perspective on the pandemic response. With our 
technological capabilities increasing at breakneck speed, pandemics such as Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) provide the most applicable insight into technologically-
assisted responses to pandemics, as governments’ utilized digitally-assisted tracking systems and 
developed surveillance databases. SARS is relevant to study because it, like COVID-19, is 
caused by a coronavirus. Reflecting on the response to HIV/AIDS is also of interest because, as 
will be further discussed below, it had the most significant privacy implications of any recent 
pandemic or epidemic.   
SARS is often referred to as the first pandemic of the 21st century. The disease is thought 
to have first emerged in the Chinese province of Guangdong and quickly spread throughout 
many countries, killing hundreds. Knowledge of the disease spread internationally when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) sent out a worldwide alert on March 12, 2003, describing a 
“severe respiratory illness of undetermined cause that was rapidly spreading among hospital staff 
in Hong Kong.”1 Within months, many nations implemented new policies and responses to 
combat the spread.  
One common approach included setting up measures to track persons who were 
suspected to be infected. For example, the United States implemented a tracking system in an 
attempt to contain the spread. Soon after the WHO announcement on March 12th, 2002, the 
United States developed a case form to track and collect demographic data about the spread. 
Healthcare providers were requested (though not required) to report all suspected cases of SARS 
to the CDC and data on possible carriers was collected and added to a national “line list.” It is 
unclear whether patient permission was expressly requested before personal information was 
added to the list. This method of tracing was technologically limited in the sense that the 
collection of information was paper-based, though the CDC did keep epidemiologic data in an 
electronic database.2 To evaluate the effectiveness of such a response, it is helpful to analyze the 
surveillance system sensitivity, which is the measurement of the proportion SARS found through 
the surveillance system implemented in the United States. Since there were eight confirmed 
SARS cases, and all had been identified as “probable cases,” the sensitivity was an impressive 
100%.3 
Canada took a similar approach to combating SARS. The nation created a SARS hotline 
which was tasked with identifying potential SARS cases and contacts of infected individuals. 
People voluntarily called the line to report symptoms and exposure to SARS, and to ask 
questions about the disease. Additionally, a case reporting telephone system was developed to 
help hospitals report cases with ease. Furthermore, a Case Management team was established to 
investigate reports of potential SARS cases and determine if they met the criterion to be 
classified as a suspect case. Through these methods, Canada conducted 2,000 case investigations, 
identified 23,300 possible contacts, and placed 13,374 individuals in quarantine.4 This method 
was relatively effective, since the outbreak was able to be contained within populations such as 
hospital staff, patients and their visitors, and household members of known cases.5  
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Other countries opted to go beyond reporting and tracing to screening individuals in 
public places and at points of travel in ways that had little cause for privacy concerns. For 
example, in Singapore, many public buildings, offices, and residential spaces required a 
temperature check upon entry.6 At Singapore’s Changi Airport, travelers were met with infrared 
scanners that screened body temperature; Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Taiwan also followed suit in screening passengers’ temperatures.7 The screenings do not appear 
to have been recorded, added to any database, or shared among any nations. Accordingly, such 
airport screenings did not result in any accusations of privacy invasion. The screenings appear to 
be moderately effective. Before the implementation of screening policies, transmission of the 
disease occurred on five flights that infected individuals onboard. After its implementation, 
which was recommended by WHO in March 2003, no additional flight transmissions were 
identified.8 
The myriad of international SARS policies raised many questions about the legality and 
rights implications of health surveillance. Tracking an individual’s contacts, movements, and 
health data in the name of public health posed threats to privacy. Individuals’ health data is 
widely considered sensitive information, and is treated with an expectation of confidentiality. 
Furthermore, in the haste to respond swiftly to the threat of SARS, legal professionals and courts 
had little say in the health policies and mitigation efforts of their respective nations. A legal 
review undertaken by Leslie Jacobs of York University examined legal consciousness during 
SARS in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto. Jacobs found that legal actors such as judges and 
lawyers were uninvolved in the public health efforts to reduce the spread of SARS.9 The 
exclusion of legal actors was problematic because the very parties that are tasked with the 
protection of and advocacy for rights were cut off from forming responses that had rights 
implications.  
The response policies’ disconnect with legal considerations disregarded the priorities and 
concerns of many citizens. A survey conducted by Shanghai Academy of the Social Sciences as 
part of the Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project shows that individuals in Singapore and 
Toronto did not approve of their governments disregarding rights during times of health crisis.10 
Of the approximately 200 Toronto residents who were surveyed, only 19% of respondents gave 
the highest importance to the government having the right to do whatever it judged necessary to 
prevent the spread of the disease. This shows that individuals are not willing or comfortable with 
sacrificing their privacy and freedom of movement in the name of public health. 
Furthermore, a survey taken by 634 residents of Singapore reflects concerns about their 
government’s response to the pandemic in terms of privacy violations. Almost two-thirds of 
respondents protested against the broadcast of names to the public of those who were under 
quarantine orders, and 33.1% of the total respondents were against the hypothetical installation 
of web cameras and tag surveillance of those under home quarantine orders. In the case of public 
health responses aimed at preventing the spread of SARS, there is clear evidence of privacy 
concerns. 
Similar concerns about the right to privacy concerns emerged during the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Many of the first recognized cases of AIDS emerged in 1981 in the United States, 
though the virus soon spread globally. Transmitted through sexual contact, blood contamination, 
needles, and from mothers to infants, tracking carriers of the disease quickly was a common 
policy. However, challenged by privacy concerns and the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS 
infections, nations faced a struggle between protecting the confidentiality of infected individuals 
while also effectively preventing the spread of the disease. Some nations prioritized prevention 
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over confidentiality, using name-based tracking of infected individuals. Other countries were 
more conscientious of privacy concerns, and developed alternative tracking measures that 
protected infected individuals’ identities to varying degrees. It is imperative to recognize that 
homophobia and a lack of information about HIV/AIDS shaped both policy design and outcome.  
One of the nations that is well known for robust HIV/AIDS surveillance is Cuba. 
Favoring prevention over confidentiality, Cuba developed strong testing and tracking measures. 
For example, by February 1988, Cuba had the capacity to test 25% of its sexually-active 
population; this was accomplished through mandatory testing of blood donors, pregnant women, 
those with other sexually transmitted infections, all hospital admissions, and sexual contacts of 
infected individuals.11 Tracing and notifying the sexual contacts of individuals who have tested 
positive was a controversial aspect of Cuba’s HIV/AIDS policy. Many concerns about protecting 
infected individual’s identities to protect them from social stigmatization arose. Although Cuba 
has faced criticism for its response, as it violated the privacy of infected persons and endangered 
their safety, the country has touted the effectiveness of its HIV/AIDS policy. As of 2008, Cuba 
claimed the highest level of AIDS treatment and the lowest rate of HIV infection out of the entire 
Caribbean region.12 
 Other countries worked to find alternative, less invasive, methods of tracking the disease 
and its carriers. Two such countries were Canada and (within certain states) the United States. 
Canada implemented a compulsory case reporting system in which medical providers entered 
information on their patient’s birth dates, gender, and risk behaviors into a database that was 
maintained by the Massachusetts General Hospital Utility Multi-Programming System 
(MUMPS). This was done in an effort to provide some measure of protection for infected 
patients’ identities, while also enabling public health officials to identify trends such as higher 
HIV rates among injection drug users and native British Columbians.13 
Both Maryland and Texas took initiative and separately attempted to develop their own 
state surveillance systems that utilized non-name unique identifiers (UI) in the early 1990s. The 
UI codes were comprised of the last four digits of the patient's Social Security number, six-digit 
date of birth, one-digit code for race/ethnicity, and one-digit code for sex.14 These codes were 
then entered into a surveillance database, which the CDC planned to later evaluate. Although 
there was cooperation between state and federal authorities, the UI systems in Maryland and 
Texas were developed as a result of the states’ own prerogatives. Unfortunately, these systems 
faced problems such as attaining the data elements to construct a UI (e.g. failing to collect Social 
Security Numbers) and the issue of duplicate tests interfering with the accuracy of collected 
data.15 The UI system also made it difficult to follow-up with those who had tested positive; only 
60% of reports could later be matched to client records.16 As a result, Maryland and Texas 
deemed the system to be “unworkable” and abandoned it in favor of name-based reporting.17 
 In light of the failed attempts made by Maryland and Texas to adopt a UI system, many 
states overlooked confidentiality concerns and adopted name-based tracking systems. In fact, 31 
states were conducting name-based HIV surveillance as of January 1998.18 This was bolstered by 
a 1999 policy by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) that required states to adopt a system of 
HIV case reporting that encouraged (though did not require) the use of names. The shift towards 
name-reporting reflects many Americans’ beliefs that previous AIDS responses had been 
inadequate and unaggressive.19 Most AIDS-service organizations continued to support UI and 
oppose name reporting, though the CDC found that “such an approach would simply impede the 
adoption of an effective system of surveillance.” 20 The divergence of opinions on UI by AIDS-
service organizations and the CDC highlights underlying biases that inform government policy. 
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Service organizations worked first-hand with infected individuals, and thus were more 
sympathetic towards the privacy concerns of persons living with HIV/AIDS.        
Internationally, a common method of global surveillance included the use of unlinked 
anonymous testing (UAT). UAT involves screening blood specimens that were taken for 
purposes besides HIV testing and stripping them of personal identifiers without informed consent 
of the patient. This was done in an attempt to gather data for public health officials to analyze 
that would not be tainted by selection or participation bias.21 This response policy faced backlash 
from ethicists, policymakers, and academics for a multitude of reasons; the failure to obtain 
consent from the patients raised ethical questions and also prevented medical practitioners from 
notifying those who had tested positive. The tides turned most dramatically against UAT when 
the United States developed guidance for AIDS surveillance as a part of the President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This plan dictated that the default position was 
non-UAT-based surveillance and that “a waiver should be submitted to conduct UAT 
surveillance.”22 As a result of these shortcomings and public opposition, most countries have 
since abandoned this method. 
Privacy considerations are of particular import when it comes to examining HIV/AIDS 
response policies. In 1987 as many as 90% of AIDS cases in North America were in people who 
are homosexual, bisexual, hemophiliac, and/or those exposed through intravenous drug abuse or 
contaminated blood products.23 This is significant because a large proportion of infected 
individuals come from groups that are marginalized, and as a result stigma around HIV/AIDS 
itself has developed. The need for confidentiality in the handling of identifying and tracking 
those infected individuals is therefore of the utmost importance.  
Problematically, there are often breaches of confidentiality when it comes to handling 
sensitive health information. There have been many instances of disclosure of such information, 
leading to a sense of distrust and fear from those who are affected by HIV/AIDS.24 For example, 
in 1991 a doctor at Pacific Oaks Medical Group (a clinic specializing in AIDS treatment) 
disclosed the information of infected patients to a fellow doctor looking to solicit supporters for 
homosexual candidate who was running for office.25 This is merely one example of an 
unquantifiable number of unwarranted disclosures that led affected populations to believe 
disclosures were common.26 
 Disclosures are damaging to HIV/AIDS public health responses because “in the context 
of the intense concerns of gay men about government intentions and the severe consequences of 
disclosure of HIV status, the guarantee of confidentiality was a prerequisite to encouraging 
affected populations to access the health care system.”27 Inadequate privacy protections can deter 
high-risk populations from seeking essential care and can hinder effective tracking that can 
mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS. As a result, confidentiality should be prioritized when 
designing and implementing any public health strategies. 
If the difficult experience responding to SARS and HIV/AIDS has taught us anything, it 
is that there is a delicate balance between designing effective (and often intrusive) public health 
strategies and preserving the rights of those who are affected by pandemics. These issues existed 
before and throughout the development of the technology that exists today; as a result the 
effectiveness and intrusiveness of health surveillance has exponentially increased. Although 
nations such as Cuba have claimed great success in preventing the spread of a disease such as 
AIDS, they have not done so without threatening the ability to maintain necessary 
confidentiality. On the other hand, states such as Maryland and Texas learned the hard way that 
protecting the privacy of infected individuals can impede the effectiveness of a public health 
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strategy. Strategies developed in response to COVID-19 should keep in mind the lessons of past 
pandemics and work to find a balance between privacy and efficacy.   
 
Section III: Background on COVID-19 and its Privacy Implications 
 COVID-19, commonly referred to as coronavirus, originated in Wuhan, China in 2019. 
Though the origins of the disease are disputed, it is thought that it likely emerged in the Hunan 
seafood market in Wuhan and quickly spread to more than 50 individuals.28 The disease is spread 
from human to the human and is highly transmissible and deadly. As a result, it has spread to 
nearly every country and has claimed millions of lives. Nations across the globe have rushed to 
find different solutions to combat this growing crisis. Yet in their haste to develop effective 
public health strategies, concerns about rights and privacy have been oft left unconsidered.  
 Rights protection plays an important role in determining the efficacy of any response. In 
order for any contact tracing to be effective, public trust and enthusiasm is a must.29 This is 
especially important for any voluntary solutions; if concerns over privacy exist, there is little to 
no chance of adoption being widespread. A study conducted in April 2020 by the University of 
Washington surveyed the opinions and preferences of 100 individuals.30 The study found that 
while 72% of those surveyed were open to downloading a contact tracing app that “protected 
their data perfectly,” that number decreased as they were asked about an app with less 
protections. For example, when respondents were asked about an app that knew their location but 
claimed not to share it, only 19% of respondents said they would be extremely likely to 
download it. In addition, only 49% of respondents felt that it was somewhat likely that they 
would download an app that shared their location with their government. Public trust and privacy 
protections are important to consider in designing any public health measure. If public trust is 
undermined, people will be less likely to follow other public health advice (such as wearing 
masks or social distancing) that could help prevent the spread of the virus.31 
 Concerns about the diminution of privacy rights are not limited to the short-term 
implications of COVID-19 public health strategies. In fact, there are many long-term concerns 
about the permanence of emergency measures. If countries spend lots of money and effort 
developing strong surveillance measures, they may be unwilling to dismantle them after the 
crisis has passed. This was seen in the United States after the terror attacks on 9/11. In response 
to these attacks, the United States government developed the Patriot Act and other anti-terror 
measures that continued to be used for purposes outside of their initial design.32 In the 
aforementioned survey conducted by researchers at the University of Washington, respondents 
were unsupportive of governments collecting and utilizing location data.33 Specifically, 
respondents felt that they did not trust their governments to use collected data solely for COVID-
19 mitigation efforts and 72% of respondents reported that they felt it was “extremely unlikely” 
that collected data would be deleted after the threat of COVID-19 subsided. In addition, more 
than half of respondents were concerned that sharing their data would “bring harm to themselves 
or their community.”34 When designing measures to combat the spread of COVID-19, caution 
surrounding their permanence and scope must be employed. 
 Another emerging issue involves the growing power and influence of the tech industry 
during the pandemic. As these companies work to promote a better public image during the 
crisis, they also hope to increase their influence on politics. During COVID-19, tech companies 
have increased their lobbying efforts in order to precipitate favorable policies and weak 
regulation of their behavior. This has led to concerns that privacy protections will be dismantled 
to support the interests of technology companies as a result of their ‘good behavior’ during the 
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pandemic.35 As nations turn to technology to enable and promote societal recovery from 
COVID-19, resources and power will be handed over to a limited number of private players in 
the technology sector.36 These companies face countless accusations of privacy infringement as 
they amass large amounts of personal data from their consumers. As a result, their empowerment 
during the COVID-19 crisis raises concerns about their ability to dismantle privacy protections 
in the future.  
 The global privacy issues that have arisen during COVID-19 will not fade even if a cure 
or vaccine is produced. As experts predict increasing incidents of serious pandemics, the rights 
issues that they pose become greater threats.37 The increase in pandemic frequency, coupled with 
rapid technological advancements, makes it imperative to consider and design adequate policy 
measures that balance public safety and individual privacy.  
 
Section V:  A Review of International COVID Policies, Their Effectiveness, And Their 
Privacy Implications  
 This section explores the diverse COVID-19 response policies implemented in China, 
South Korea, Singapore, Israel, the United States, and the European Union. For each country, the 
policies are identified, and their efficacy and privacy implications are explored. These countries 
were selected because they each utilized unique approaches that provide insight into the diverse 
array of possible public health measures.   
China: 
 Following the devastating 2003 SARS outbreak in China, the government drafted the 
“Regulations on Preparedness for the Response to Emergent Public Health Hazards” in order to 
create an emergency response plan for future epidemics.38 As a result, at the outset of the 
outbreak, China enacted measures such as closing transportation in Wuhan, canceling New Year 
celebrations and other large gatherings, enacting self-quarantine orders, and closing public 
spaces like schools and restaurants.39  
Additionally, the implementation of contact tracing apps has become widespread, often in 
the form of digital applications such as software on smartphones.40 China integrated one such 
software, dubbed “Health Code,” into the popular wallet app Alipay that has over 900 million 
users.41 Reports indicate that usage of the app is, in essence, mandatory for all kinds of 
movement within China; to use services such as public transportation or to enter a supermarket, 
one must display their status on the app.42 Those who use the app are given color-coded QR 
codes depending on their COVID-19 risk. Those who have not been exposed to an infected 
individual should display a green QR code, while those who may have come in contact with the 
virus or a carrier display yellow or red codes. China has also developed Artificial Intelligence 
applications such as chatbots or automated callers that review individuals’ travel histories in an 
attempt to identify and combat disease hotspots.43 Many companies require employees to submit 
a “travel verification report” upon return to work. Telecom providers formulate these reports 
which contain all the locations that an individual has traveled to for the past 14 days, as well as 
provide a recommended quarantine period based on the travel history. 
Although skepticism surrounds the COVID-19 infection and death statistics that China 
has reported, independent reports suggest that many of their measures are effective. An 
investigation published in Science explores China’s transmission control measures during the 
early stages of the outbreak in China suggests that the nation’s policies at least somewhat 
delayed the growth of the epidemic and reduced the number of cases.44 The investigation 
quantifies that without the national response and Wuhan travel ban, there would have been 
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744,000 confirmed cases in China by the February 19th, 2020; in the presence of these measures, 
there were only 29,839 confirmed cases reported as of February 2020, which is 96% fewer than 
there would have been without interventions.45  
China’s technology-assisted system of contact tracing has also had success in limiting the 
spread. A retrospective cohort study conducted by Qifang Bi of John Hopkins University, 
Yongsheng Wu of the Shenzhen Department of Public Health Information, Shujiang Mei of the 
Shenzhen Department of Communicable Diseases Control and Prevention, and Chenfei Ye of 
Harbin Institute of Technology at Shenzhen sampled 391 Chinese COVID-19 patients and their 
1,286 close contacts to investigate the efficacy of contact tracing control measures.46 The study 
found that, of the 379 confirmed cases who had a known mode of detection, 77% were detected 
via “symptom-based surveillance.”47 The study also found that contact tracing enabled quicker 
detection of COVID-19 cases. While COVID-19 takes on average 4.9 days to detect with 
symptom-based surveillance, contact tracing reduced the time to 2.7 days.48 Overall, the authors 
of the study said that they believe their research provides evidence that contact tracing is an 
effective measure.  
Despite the claimed successes of China’s COVID-19 response, many concerns about the 
government’s policies have emerged. For example, Alipay’s Health Code does not have a 
transparent system for deciding who is allowed in public spaces and who is designated to 
quarantine.49 Individuals have expressed frustrations about the lack of provided rationale for 
their rating; the app, which updates your contagion risk status in real-time, can change your 
status from green to red and any point and stay that way for an unspecified amount of time.50 In 
addition, breaches of confidentiality have occurred in regard to the identity of infected persons. 
For example, a Chinese telecom company, Chinese Mobile, recently sent texts to media outlets 
with infected individuals’ detailed travel history.51 This is clearly a violation of the individuals’ 
privacy rights, and merits apprehension. 
Furthermore, the Alipay’s Health Code appears to share information with the police, 
which has raised concerns about it being a “new form of automated social control.”52 A New 
York Times analysis of the software code found that “as soon as a user grants the software access 
to personal data, a piece of the program labeled ‘reportInfoAndLocationToPolice’ sends the 
person’s location, city name and an identifying code number to a server.”53 Additionally the 
analysis discovered that every time a person scans their code (an occurrence that happens 
numerous times as one travels about their city), their location is uploaded to the system’s servers, 
enabling authorities to in essence track individuals locations. The analysis concludes that “The 
sharing of personal data with the authorities further erodes the thin line separating China’s tech 
titans from the Communist Party government.”54 An additional fear is that these measures are not 
temporary or limited to the time of COVID-19, but rather that they are a calculated and 
permanent addition to China’s already advanced state surveillance system. 
 
South Korea: 
 During the worst of the COVID-19 outbreak, South Korea relied heavily on a 
combination of high-tech solutions and widespread testing. Working in tandem with private 
sector partners, the South Korean government built numerous high-capacity screening clinics. At 
the height of the outbreak, there were around 600 testing sites that completed up to 20,000 tests 
per day.55 This non-technological aspect of their response has garnered praise from the 
international community for its facilitation of timely testing. 
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South Korea also utilized GPS tracking and IT solutions to trace the spread of the disease. 
One GPS location-based tracking app, Corona 100m, is downloaded on a volunteer basis. The 
app has been reported to be wildly popular and was downloaded one million times within just 17 
days of its launch in February 2020.56 The app uses data provided by telecommunication 
companies and notifies users who are near (within 100 meters) to any location that an infected 
person has frequented.57 There are a variety of websites that are publicly available that track and 
show infection hotspots.58 One such website is Coronamap, which illustrates the travel histories 
of individuals who have been confirmed as COVID-19 carriers.59  
Additionally, South Korea has developed a mandatory app that uses GPS to track infected 
patients in quarantine and set off an alarm if they venture outside.60 Anyone who may have come 
into contact with these confirmed carriers is also put under mandatory quarantine; to enforce this 
the South Korean government has developed a “geo-fencing” system that relies on calls, home 
visits, and the voluntary use of a government quarantine app.61 Mobile testing teams from 
agencies such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) and Korea Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (KCDC) use location data, immigration records, CCTV footage, credit 
and debit card transactions, transit pass records, personal identification information, and 
prescription/medical records to track infected and potentially infected individuals.62 This 
collection is extensive, and has the potential to deeply infringe upon citizens’ privacy rights. 
South Korea promptly mitigated the spread of COVID-19 without taking severe measures 
such as closing many businesses or issuing widespread stay-at-home orders.63 In April, mere 
months after original concerns about the epidemic in South Korea emerged, there had only been 
10,708 cases with 240 deaths.64 Since mid-March, there have only been “a handful of new cases 
per day.”65 An article written by Sangchul Park of the University of Chicago, Gina Jeehyun Choi 
of the Korea Law Center, and Haksoo Ko of Seoul National University claims that South 
Koreans’ use of advanced information technology systems deserves credit for flattening the 
curve of new COVID-19 cases and deaths.66 
Nevertheless, South Korea’s use of technology has major privacy implications for its 
citizens. Though the availability of data may be useful for tracing efforts, it also enables 
problematic trends such as identifying COVID-19 carriers publicly.67 The collected and shared 
data includes information such as infection paths, hospitals of infected persons, the health of 
individuals who have had contact with infected persons, sex, nationality, and age (though names 
are not revealed).68 This level of detailed data makes it easy to identify and publicize the identity 
of infected individuals. This identification has led to profiling, unveiling of embarrassing 
personal details, public disdain, and loss of business for infected owners of restaurants, shops, 
and other businesses.69 Despite these negative impacts, the South Korean citizens do not 
necessarily disapprove of their government’s actions. In an unpublished survey of South Koreans 
conducted by Youngkee Ju of Hollym University and Myoungsoon You of Seoul National 
University between the months of February and April 2020,  the majority of respondents (68.2% 
) said that they would be willing to sacrifice their individual privacy rights in order to continue 
information-sharing practices with their government.70 This willingness likely stems from 
cultural factors; South Koreans are accustomed to sharing personal data with their government 
because it was a common practice in their nation even before the spread of COVID-19.71 
Importantly, in the aforementioned article written by Park, Choi, and Ko, the authors 
claim that the level of public data sharing in South Korea is unnecessary for effective COVID-19 
tracking and containment efforts.72 While acknowledging the importance of tracing the location 
and movement of infected individuals for epidemiologic purposes, these authors contend that 
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rather than revealing personal information to the public, it could be used to inform officials 
where to focus public health measures. The authors also suggest that the sharing of less precise 
location data could help to preserve the privacy of infected individuals. 
 
Singapore: 
 Singapore has also relied heavily on technology during the spread of COVID-19, and has 
found moderate success. One critical aspect of their approach is the government-developed 
TraceTogether app. This app utilizes Bluetooth technology in order to track the proximity of 
users’ phones to each other. If any individual is later diagnosed with COVID-19, the owners of 
phones that have been in proximity to the infected user’s phone can be notified to quarantine. 
While the Singaporean government claims that health officials “ask” to view and release the data 
from their phones, failing to assist the Ministry of Health to track movement is actually a crime 
in Singapore. The data taken from the phones are only stored for 21 days. Singapore has also 
enacted surveillance measures for infected patients. These measures consist of daily phone 
check-ins, randomized SMS messages including links to check location, and the requirement that 
infected patients send images of their surroundings to verify that they are in quarantine.73 Those 
who do not comply can face detainment, isolation, and be forced to be tracked with RFID 
technology.74 
 The TraceTogether app is unique in that it is voluntarily downloaded by users. This 
aspect of the app originally hindered its efficacy; as of April, only 16% of the population 
downloaded TraceTogether.75 Nevertheless, as the severity of the virus and knowledge of its 
spread increases, so did citizens’ willingness to utilize the app. Currently, the app has 2.3 million 
users76; for context, the country had a population of 5.7 million as of June 2019.77 The app’s 
efficacy aside, Singapore has generally done well during COVID-19 despite its close proximity 
to and involvement with China. The COVID-19 infection spread in Singapore is one of the 
slowest in the world, and the COVID-19 death rate is also very low.78 Overall, Singapore has 
successfully managed the virus. 
Many privacy concerns have emerged regarding the TraceTogether app. While it 
succeeds in protecting the identity of users from each other, it does not afford the same 
protections from the government. Any diagnosed individual must give the list of locations they 
have visited (compiled in the TraceTogether app) to the Ministry of Health. The Ministry in turn 
collects the cell phone numbers that the infected individuals’ phone has come into contact with.79 
While there is no indication that this information is being abused, its collection is nonetheless 
concerning because the identity of infected individuals and those they have physically come into 
contact with is not protected from the government in any way. Furthermore, the government’s 
creation of a database that contains location information connected to individuals numbers 
presents the possibility of the government tracking the locations of its individuals.80 Though 




 Although countries in the EU by no means acted uniformly in their responses to COVID-
19, there are certainly observable trends. For example, a report published by the Hague Center 
for Strategic Studies identifies two prominent trends of technologically-assisted responses that 
were implemented throughout the European Union.81 The first trend consisted of enacting 
anonymized phone location tracking. Utilizing connections to cellular businesses, the 
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governments of Belgium, Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and 
Spain utilized data provided from companies such as Orange S.A., Tele2, A1, Deutsche 
Telekom, Vodafone, and LMT to track individuals’ movements and the spread of the virus.82 In 
total, at least 13 countries in the EU have confirmed access to their citizens’ anonymized location 
data.83 The uses of this data varies, and includes aiding with insight on movement trends and 
checking compliance with lockdown orders. The second observed trend was the widespread 
government implementation of contact tracing apps. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, 
Ireland, and Croatia all have contact tracing apps and projects in use or development.84  
 Notably, countries within the European Union are cooperating to find solutions. For 
example, Germany is spearheading collaborations with the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving 
Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) project.85 A concerned group of scientists and technologists from 
more than eight European nations have taken on this project in the hopes of proposing solutions 
that are both effective and conscious of privacy issues. The EU has supported such efforts and 
recommends the implementation of a coordinated approach towards mobile tracing 
applications.86 This aligns with the EU’s stance that requires member states to share the 
information that they collect regarding contact-tracing with other nations in the EU via the 
electronic Early Warning and Response System.87 This information includes personal and health 
data such as health status and travel history of infected individuals.88 
Countries utilizing anonymized phone location data have seen moderate successes. These 
successes include insight into population movement and trends during the pandemic. For 
example, the telecom company Orange (in partnership with the French Government), had 
sufficient information to find that 17% of Parisians moved away from the French capital.89 
Additionally, countries have used collected information to shape their policy decisions. In Italy, 
the government used telecom reports to inform their decision to bolster lockdown measures after 
finding that their citizens were still moving about.90 Furthermore in Latvia, the telecom company 
LMT has asserted that the data they share could be used to inform law enforcement of large, 
illegal gatherings.91 It is clear that countries in the EU are not merely collecting anonymized 
phone location data, but instead analyzing it to make informed decisions for effective public 
health measures. 
Contract tracing in the EU has faced some setbacks that limit efficacy. First, there is the 
universal problem with the contact tracing: it relies on high-risk groups such as children and 
senior citizens to have sufficient technology and knowledge of its use.92 In addition, academics 
have warned that apps can lead to a false sense of security which can cause individuals to forgo 
compliance with other measures.93 This problem is compounded by issues with the actual 
reliability and accuracy of contact tracing apps. While widespread contact tracing certainly has 
its merits, it seems unwise to solely rely on it to curb the spread of the virus. 
Concern for privacy rights in the EU is certainly present in the time of COVID-19. While 
a survey of individuals in the EU residents found that 83% of respondents approved of fining 
those who violate quarantine, banning of public gatherings, and closing borders, 23% of 
respondents disapproved of using mobile phone data for tracking purposes.94 In fact, the survey 
found that the issue that was most polarizing among respondents was governments’ use of 
cellphone data for COVID-19 tracking.95 The EU has some of the world’s strongest digital 
privacy protections, which were bolstered in 2018 by the implementation of the General Data 
Protection Regulation. As a result, governments and telecom companies have taken steps to put 
privacy-related fears to rest. For example, telecom providers work to anonymize and aggregate 
data before it is shared. Specifically, when aggregating data the companies use groups of at least 
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30 users to prevent identification of individuals from their data.96 This anonymization is legally 
necessary for countries hoping to share their data with other nations in the EU without the 
consent of users.97 Sharing data across the EU has faced vocal criticism; Hannah van 
Kolfschooten and Anniek de Ruijter of Amsterdam Law School argue that in mandating data 
sharing, the “European Commission has implicitly decided that the protection of public health 
outweighs the importance of the right to privacy in case of serious cross border threats to 
health.”98 The plethora of concerns and criticisms by citizens and academics in the EU give 
evidence that further privacy considerations for COVID-19 measures are necessary. 
 
United States: 
 The United States’ approach to combating COVID-19 consists of a very decentralized 
system of response. The federal government took actions such as suspending travel from China 
in February and from 26 European countries in March. Furthermore, institutions such as the 
CDC and many US embassies made statements discouraging non-essential travel. While travel 
certainly decreased within the United States, it remains unclear whether this was a result of these 
warnings or other factors. The individual states within the nation largely made their own unique 
policies and responses during the pandemic. As of August 2020, there is no centralized or 
widespread method of contact tracing in the United States. The development of contact tracing 
measures has largely been left up to states rather than the federal government. This has led to a 
lag in tracing, leaving the US far behind its international peers. While states such as California, 
Washington, and Massachusetts have invested significant resources in hopes of developing large-
scale contact tracing measures, many other states have implemented little in the way of contact 
tracing.99  
The United States’ infection and mortality rates reflect the efficacy of the nations’ 
response to COVID-19. In August 2020, at least 5,140,300 Americans were infected and at least 
164,000 had died.100 In addition, the United States leads the world in both cases and deaths. 
Some experts, such as Adriane Casalotti, chief of government and public affairs at the National 
Association of County and City Health, blame the concerning rates of infection and spread on 
insufficient contact tracing measures.101 It is clear that the United States’ public health measures 
during COVID-19 are largely insufficient and ineffective. 
The failure to enact comprehensive public health measures coincides with the 
prioritization and protection of privacy in the United States. Culturally, this can be 
contextualized with the general emphasis on individual freedoms and rights within the nation. 
Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains that, “For countries in 
the West still suffering from the virus, political leaders struggle over the tradeoff between 
privacy rights and the use of smartphone app-tracking technology for contact tracing.”102 
Interestingly, while the American people tend to be adamantly opposed to government 
infringement upon their privacy, they allow big tech to access and collect enormous amounts of 
their data. This raises fundamental questions about how privacy is conceptualized by the 
American people.  
Furthermore, recent issues with data privacy in America have led policymakers to be 
cautious about technological strategies. Although the White House did meet with the leaders of 
big tech during COVID-19, conversations surrounding mobile tracing and location technologies 
were reportedly avoided.103 Another factor that may influence American’s aversion to more 
intrusive public health measures is the nation's experience (or lack thereof) with SARS, MERS, 
and Ebola. The United States faces a mere 27 cases of SARS, 2 cases of MERS, and 11 cases of 
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Ebola. While nations that were more affected by these diseases put in place precautionary public 
health measures, the United States remained unprepared for a pandemic such as COVID-19.104  
 
Israel: 
The Israeli government has taken one of the most extreme approaches to curtailing the 
spread of COVID-19. At first, the government worked to stop flights into the country, create 
social distancing guidelines, close schools, and impose curfews.105 To add to these measures, the 
Israeli Health Ministry has created a voluntary app, entitled “HaMagen,” which uses cellular 
location data over 14 days to check for contact with infected individuals.106 Additionally, the 
Israeli government has relied on Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, to help with tracing 
and identifying COVID-19 carriers using cell phone location data.107 In order to do this, the 
Health Ministry is required to share the names, ID numbers, and cell phone numbers of infected 
individuals. Shin Bet then uses a classified database dubbed “the Tool” to retrieve cell phone 
data from cellular providers which enables them to identify anyone who has been within two feet 
of an infected individual for more than 15 minutes.108 Once the information is collected, Shin Bet 
notifies the Health Ministry, which in turn attempts to reach potentially infected contacts and 
instruct them to quarantine. There have also been reports that Shin Bet has used the collected 
information to inform police on defiance of quarantine orders.109  
The data collected by Shin Bet is incredibly detailed, and includes information on 
location, voice calls and text messages (their occurrence but not their content), and website 
visitation.110 The intrusive nature of these measures has caused concern about the privacy and 
rights of Israeli citizens. As a result, the measures have faced challenges in the courts. In late 
April, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that “explicit statutory authority” rather than executive 
authorization was necessary to continue the program in the case Ben Meir v. Prime Minister.111 
Despite this challenge, the program will seemingly prevail as recent legislation has passed that 
authorizes Shin Bet to extend the practice of its measures for at least another six months.112 
Although Israel initially had success in preventing the spread of COVID-19, rising 
infection and mortality rates in July and August have set back the nations’ progress. In the early 
days of the pandemic, Israel’s public health measures caused the rates of infection to plummet to 
10-20 new cases per day.113 To the world, it appeared that Israel was making all the right 
moves.114 Unfortunately, in late June and early July, the number of cases began to rise again. 
Citizens are blaming the increase in infections on the government’s reopening of schools and 
permitting large gatherings such as weddings.115 On July 15th, Israel reported 42,813 cases and 
375 deaths.116 Furthermore, on July 21st, Israel faced over 1,500 new coronavirus cases daily.117 
This infection rate is more than twice as high as it was during March and April.118 The initial 
successes of Israel have given way to a concerning second wave as restrictions were hastily and 
prematurely loosened. 
Taking one of the most intrusive approaches to disease control, Israel has significantly 
infringed on its citizens’ privacy rights. In utilizing its domestic security service for 
implementation of COVID-19 measures, Israel has made clear that this problem, as well as most 
others the nation faces, is one of national security.119 As such, Israel has created an opportunity 
for its national surveillance to extend to areas besides public health.120 The Israeli government 
justifies these measures with a host of explanations: contact-tracing is ineffective as individuals’ 
memories are fallible, the large Orthodox community does not own cell phones, and the 
impossibility of otherwise tracing the contact of individuals in crowded places.121 Despite these 
rationales, it still appears that unnecessarily invasive and stringent measures are being put into 
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place. For example, there is no form of appeal for those who may be incorrectly classified as a 
potential contact.122 Furthermore, Israel’s aforementioned use of “the Tool” operates with no 
judicial oversight. Its use is generally classified and the contents, storage length, and protection 
of collected data are largely unknown.123 Israel’s approach to COVID-19 - shrouded in secrecy 
and heavily reliant on intrusive surveillance - certainly poses threats to the long-term privacy 
rights of its citizens. 
 
Taiwan: 
 Taiwan, known for its technological prowess, has predictably relied heavily on data 
collection and technology for its COVID-19 mitigations efforts. One of the main control 
measures being employed is the border quarantine: those who return to Taiwan must either 
quarantine in a hotel or return to their own residences and undergo intense digital surveillance 
for a 14-day period.124 The surveillance measures include digital fencing, which consists of using 
an electronic fence or perimeter, enabled by cell tower triangulation from telecom providers, that 
sets a boundary that a quarantined individual must stay within.125 In order to ensure that 
individuals do not simply leave their phones at home and travel as they wish, officials video call 
multiple times a day to check in and failure to answer one of these check ins results in heavy 
fines. Furthermore if a quarantined individual’s cellular device runs out of battery or is turned 
off, the police will report to their house.126 During the 14-day mandatory quarantine, each 
individual received a $33 per day stipend. If at any time an individual breaks the quarantine, they 
are forced to pay back one thousand times the stipend received.127  
Taiwan also employed a variety of datasets to supplement its surveillance efforts. For 
example, the National Health Insurance database has been merged with the immigrations and 
customs dataset in order to ensure individuals had undergone health screenings and disclosed 
their travel history.128 In addition, Taiwan has implemented forms of contact tracing. The first 
100 confirmed COVID-19 cases were all extensively tracked.129 An outbreak investigation team, 
led by the Taiwan CDC, thoroughly investigates cases and possible contacts.130 It is important to 
note that since Taiwan has seen relatively few cases (numbering less than 1,000), contact tracing 
may be a less important measure than in other nations where the spread is far more prevalent. 
Taiwan’s response has generally been very effective and has helped curtail both the 
spread of COVID-19 and the resulting deaths in the nation. As of August 17, 2020, the nation 
had only 500 cases and a mere seven deaths.131 Taiwan’s successes come even in the face of 
significant challenges such as proximity to mainland China and frequent travel between the two 
neighbors.132 The technological aspects of Taiwan’s response have been credited for these 
strikingly low statistics.133 Technology plays an important role in shaping Taiwan’s culture and 
identity. As a result, citizens have enthusiastically engaged in both the use and production of 
virus-mitigation technologies. Jaron Lanier and E. Glen Weyl of Microsoft explain that “bottom-
up information sharing, public-private partnerships, ‘hacktivism’ (activism through the building 
of quick-and-dirty but effective proofs of concept for online public services), and participatory 
collective action have been central to the country’s success in coordinating a consensual and 
transparent set of responses to the coronavirus.”134  
Though some of Taiwan’s measures such as digital fencing may seem invasive, the 
general widespread trust in the government and transparency of officials’ actions have helped to 
ease fears of privacy intrusion. Examples of government officials’ transparency include daily 
briefings from political leaders and scientific experts as well as the broadcasting of all of Digital 
Minister Tang’s meetings.135 This communication has helped maintain citizens’ confidence 
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despite the curtailment of privacy rights.136 The Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation conducted a 
survey of 1079 Taiwanese citizens in order to assess their opinions of their government’s actions. 
80% of those surveyed approved of the Minister of Health and Welfare’s handling of COVID-19 
and 70% approved of the president and the premier’s work.137 The government's empowerment 
of previously mentioned “hacktivists” likely has to do with these high approval ratings. By 
allowing citizens to shape and produce the very measures they are subject to, the Taiwanese 
government has created a form of ‘“participatory self-surveillance.”138 One example of this is 
Taiwanese citizens who, in collaboration with their government, created an online tool that 
aggregated data on the availability and location of face masks. As Andreas Kluth of Bloomberg 
explains, “by involving people in the solutions, rather than just dictating policies to them, the 
process is transparent and inspires trust, even civic pride.”139 It seems as though Taiwan has 




The diverse array of public health measures implemented by different nations enable 
meaningful and informative comparisons. The failures of both the intensely invasive approaches 
of countries like Israel and China, and the astonishingly weak effort by the U.S. reveal the 
dangers of living on either extreme of the privacy spectrum. The experiences of the countries in 
between these extremes provide guidance for future policymakers.   
China’s extreme secrecy enabled the virus to spread far beyond its borders; although this 
failure may not have had domestic health implications, it should certainly be considered when 
measuring the success of the nations’ measures. Israel’s measures have also proven to be 
somewhat unsuccessful; the nation’s burgeoning second wave undermines the government’s 
claims that stringent surveillance is the best response to COVID-19.  
On the other side of the spectrum, the United States’ approach has been an arguably 
worse catastrophe. The United States, ever concerned with the protection of individual liberties, 
has struggled to create effective measures that can coexist with the utmost protection of rights. 
The unwillingness of Americans to sacrifice even limited rights for the larger societal good has 
led to unthinkable rates of infection and mortality. In addition, the Trump administration’s 
sluggish and insufficient attempts to address the disease played a large role in the nation’s 
ultimate failure. Lacking an efficient federal strategy, the United States has failed to use any 
widespread data collection or contact tracing measures to curtail the spread. Though Americans 
are averse to rights infringements, the absence of any meaningful attempts to track the spread 
with contact tracing measures makes it hard to discern whether the problem lies with American 
cultural norms or with the Trump administration itself. What is clear, however, is that both 
overreaction and inaction are problematic as governments grapple with COVID-19. 
Although South Korea has low infection and mortality rates, the nation has by no means 
found a tenable balance between privacy and public health. Its health successes are tainted by the 
unnecessary disclosure of personal information that has enabled reidentification and 
ostracization. While South Korea has developed solid tracing and prevention infrastructure, it 
needs to do far better in the protection of privacy to be considered a true success story.  
Nations in the EU are struggling to find a unified approach, which is reflected in the 
infection and mortality rates. As of August, a second wave of COVID-19 threatens most of 
Europe.140 This has led to the shuttering of borders and increase in testing throughout the EU. 
Still, the EU deserves recognition for mitigating the first wave after a devastating March and 
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April in Italy. Furthermore, there are valiant attempts at considering privacy throughout the EU. 
The coalition entitled Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing has worked to 
provide suggestions for “privacy-friendly contact tracing apps.”141 While the EU has not been 
ultimately successful in battling COVID-19, it is at least attempting a balance between privacy 
and public health.  
Singapore and Taiwan have found the most success in the balancing of priorities. 
Singapore’s TraceTogether app, while initially facing challenges with voluntary adoption, has 
now grown into a global success story. TraceTogether is effective in tracking the movement of 
the virus while also protecting privacy with limited 21-day data storage and protection of users' 
identities from fellow users. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies labeled TraceTogether’s use 
of Bluetooth technology as the “least intrusive” option among mobile tracing applications.142 
Singapore’s approach appears to be moderately effective as well, with the country boasting very 
low mortality rates. In addition, Taiwan’s measures have had wild success rates. With only 7 
reported deaths in a population of nearly 24 million citizens, it is clear that the Taiwanese 
government is utilizing the country’s technology savvy to its benefit. Furthermore, Taiwan’s 
transparency and inclusion of its citizens in developing public health measures has helped 
mitigate fears of privacy infringement. Taiwan’s triumph proves that governments can indeed 
use technology to fight COVID-19 without foregoing the protection of privacy rights.  
 
Section V: Factors that Influence Response Type - A Case Study of China and the United 
Kingdom  
While it is important to consider how nations differ in their responses, it is also vital to 
consider why they have chosen distinct approaches. Factors such as regime type, leadership, 
national pandemic history, and privacy norms play an important role in shaping a nation’s 
response. The importance of these factors emerges clearly when comparing the starkly divergent 
responses of two very different countries: China and the United Kingdom. China’s regime type, 
which has become increasingly totalitarian, empowers it to forcefully enact strict shutdowns and 
contact tracing measures while simultaneously stymying the necessary flow of information via 
state censorship. China’s leader, Xi Jinping has played an important role in charting China’s 
response, as he has utilized his strongman rule to create and enforce effective public health 
measures. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has struggled to control the virus for almost 
its entire duration, and is currently in the midst of a devastating second wave. This can partly be 
attributed to the United Kingdom’s regime type, parliamentary democracy, which constrains the 
country from enacting intense surveillance methods as in China, and requires the government to 
respond to the demands of the general population. Furthermore, Boris Johnson’s populist 
leadership and disconnect with science has led the nation to greatly suffer. 
 China’s powerful centralized government allows it to implement highly invasive policies 
that would not be permitted in democracies because of their intrusiveness. For example, the 
aforementioned Chinese app “Health Code” tracks the movements of users and controls their 
quarantine status to an extreme degree by dictating if a person can access public spaces. While 
Democratic countries such as Taiwan and South Korea have also implemented COVID-19 
tracing efforts, those governments' responses have been far more transparent and much less 
intrusive than China’s efforts.143 As discussed in the previous section, in Taiwan location-based 
tracking is generally confined to those who have recently entered the country. In South Korea, 
the download of the most popular contact tracing app, Corona 100m, is done on an entirely 
volunteer basis.144 In contrast to these responses, China’s app is, in essence, mandatory for all 
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individuals wishing to function in society, and its implementation has been overwhelmingly non-
transparent. The government’s opacity is evident in its decision to secretly embed the Health 
Code application feature that sends the collected location information directly to the police.145 
While democratic countries can certainly implement tracing efforts, the scope of their 
invasiveness is generally limited by citizen pushback and partisan politicking. Totalitarian 
regimes, on the other hand, may infringe upon citizens’ privacy with greater ease as they blur the 
line between state and society.   
Although the increasingly totalitarian regime in China allows for invasive but effective 
public health measures to be implemented, their style of centralized government has also faced 
difficulties in mitigating the harms of the pandemic. The government aims to have a high degree 
of control over the flow of information, frequently engaging in state censorship. This can 
backfire, however, as critical intelligence can be muffled in the effort to constrain 
communications. The failure of information to flow both up to policymakers in the Politburo and 
down to citizens on the street could be a possible explanation for China's delayed response. If the 
Chinese government was unaware of the extent of the virus due to censorship, it may have been 
unable to adequately and promptly address the situation and quickly develop public health 
measures. While one cannot know for certain the extent and timeline of the government’s 
knowledge of COVID-19, another issue that almost certainly impacted the Chinese response was 
the population’s lack of information about the virus early on. When doctor Li Wenliang spoke 
out about the virus, he was interrogated and silenced by the government, and eventually perished 
from COVID-19.146 Because the government attempted to control COVID-19 information during 
the early days of the pandemic, citizens were unable to take necessary precautionary measures or 
adequately protect themselves from the disease. China’s inability to quickly address the 
pandemic due to issues with information flow had serious implications; A simulation done by 
researchers at the University of Southampton concluded that had China implemented its control 
measures a mere week earlier, it could have prevented 67% of its cases.147 
China’s leadership is another critical factor in the country’s response. President Xi 
Jinping has centralized power under himself and become a personalistic strongman. President 
Xi’s willingness to employ “draconian” and “repressive” means, such as swiftly quarantining the 
11 million people of Wuhan, are a result of his strongman rule.148 Insulated from particularist 
pressures and firmly in control of internal security, the military, the police, the National Security 
Commission, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), President Xi has been able to implement 
policies that a less secure political figure likely could not. President Xi has been active in 
purging political rivals and those who speak out against him.149 This massive consolidation of 
power allowed President Xi to not only have the capability to impose China’s extensive 
response, but also the political capital to do so. President Xi’s COVID-19 approach would be 
risky for a politician that is highly prone to the whims of the people or vulnerable to criticisms 
from rivals. The shutdowns so necessary for combating the spread of COVID-19 can certainly 
cause harm to the economy, which in the short term can be very unpopular with the masses. Yet 
President Xi was able to pursue such a policy without fear of immediate backlash. While 
President Xi’s strongman rule may not permanently overpower dissent, in the short term it has 
enabled him to enact necessary but potentially unpopular COVID-19 measures. The success of 
those measures has now bolstered the popularity of President Xi and further cemented his 
strongman rule. 
Another factor to consider when analyzing China’s response is the country’s history with 
confronting pandemics. The Chinese experience with SARS and the resulting “Regulations on 
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Preparedness for the Response to Emergent Public Health Hazards” afforded China some 
preparation for the pandemic. While other countries struggled to consult experts and rapidly 
develop a plan during the first wave of COVID-19, China was able to utilize its existing policy 
infrastructure to address the crisis. Furthermore, Chinese citizens, scarred by the toll of SARS, 
were willing to make sacrifices in the name of public health. Citizens in nations that were less 
affected by SARS, such as the United Kingdom, have demonstrated less willingness to make 
sacrifices such as quarantining and wearing masks for the broader good of public health. China’s 
SARS experience has thus worked to increase compliance of the citizenry with public health 
measures and overall improved COVID-19 outcomes in China.   
The United Kingdom has been far less successful in managing the spread of COVID-19, 
and has the second-highest coronavirus death toll of the world's wealthiest nations.150 The United 
Kingdom, like China, had a slow start to its pandemic response. Early on, Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson chose to promote the idea of “herd immunity,” which entailed letting the virus naturally 
spread so that a large portion of the population eventually becomes immune.151 However, in late 
March, the Prime Minister reversed course and implemented a three-month lockdown. Despite 
this lockdown effort in the Spring, the United Kingdom has suffered from a second spike. 
Although the United Kingdom has been credited with increasing the country’s testing capacity, 
the failure of the government to use the collected data or adequately implement robust contact 
tracing has limited the testing’s efficacy. Though the United Kingdom has made steps to combat 
the spread of the virus, they have thus far been much less effective than the Chinese measures. 
The parliamentary democracy within the United Kingdom certainly impacted how the 
government chose to respond. In a democracy where political officials are held accountable to 
the people, the government is inherently responsive to the demands of its citizens. As a result, 
citizens’ discontent about the prolonged lockdown and economic harms of COVID-19 public 
health measures may have stymied the government’s ability to create a more robust response that 
would require greater citizen sacrifice. The government in the United Kingdom faced severe 
political pressure to ease the COVID-19 restrictions because they were thought to suppress the 
economy and limit citizen’s freedoms.152 While politicians being held accountable to the 
citizenry is one of the marked strengths of democracy, in times of crisis where unpopular 
sacrifice is necessary, some democratic regimes may flounder. 
The leader of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Boris Johnson, played a large role in 
shaping the country's COVID-19 response. The Prime Minister has faced great criticism for his 
promotion of “herd immunity,” and was mocked after he became infected with COVID-19 
himself. Many have blamed the Prime Minister’s failed response on his populist leadership style. 
Populist leaders across the globe, such as President Donald Trump in America and President Jair 
Bolsonaro in Brazil, preside over the countries that have been some of the worst affected by 
COVID-19.153 One reason that populist leaders may falter in the face of the pandemic is that 
populism, by nature, often leads to the disparagement of expert knowledge and the propagation 
of anti-elite and anti-scientific attitudes.154 The anti-establishment element of populism presents 
a threat during COVID-19, where reliance and collaboration with established health experts and 
organizations is imperative.  
In Britain, the disconnect between the scientific community and the populist Prime 
Minister has become painfully clear. Sir Patrick Vallance, chosen by Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson to be his chief scientific adviser, has rejected the scientific community's known aversion 
to “herd immunity” and chose to promote it. Sir Patrick Vallance publicly announced that “herd 
immunity” would require 40 million Britons to catch the disease, but failed to mention that an 
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estimated 250,000 would perish.155 Furthermore, a group of senior British scientific advisers, 
who are members of the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE), have found their 
advice blatantly ignored by Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Although SAGE recommended that 
the Prime Minister impose a myriad of restrictions, including banning contact within the home 
and closing all bars, restaurants, and indoor gyms in early September, the Prime Minister opted 
only to advise individuals to work from home if possible.156 The divide between the scientific 
community and populist Prime Minister Johnson may account for the country’s dismal COVID-
19 response. 
In addition, norms surrounding the protection of an individual’s rights may have led to 
bureaucratic delays as a product of privacy concerns. One reason that England’s contact tracing 
program, Test and Trace, has had limited success is because it is highly bureaucratic in its efforts 
to protect patient confidentiality.157 For example, if a known contact resides in the same house as 
an infected individual, their personal information cannot be collected by contact tracers who 
conduct home visits. Instead, the contacts must wait days until the tracers reach out to them. This 
slows the process of contact tracing and hampers the government’s efforts to alert potentially 
infected individuals. A study conducted by Reuter’s found that in England, the Test and Trace 
program has only been able to trace one non-household contact for every two confirmed cases of 
COVID-19.158 To put that in perspective, the Singaporean government can trace, on average, 
twenty contacts for every confirmed case of COVID-19.  
In China, citizens have become accustomed to government surveillance and privacy 
intrusions. As a result, the government could successfully implement its Health Code tracing 
app, which instantly notifies an individual if one of their contacts has tested positive. Such an 
app would likely never be allowed in the United Kingdom, where the Information 
Commissioner's Office is tasked with protecting data privacy for all individuals.159 The stark 
difference in China’s successful Health Code and the United Kingdom’s lackluster Test and 
Trace can be largely attributed to the privacy norms. While the Chinese government has little 
transparency in how the Health Code application functions, what data is being collected by the 
app, and who has access to the data, the United Kingdom is forced to enact heavily bureaucratic 
and inefficient systems in order to ensure that the identity of persons infected with COVID-19 
are protected. The privacy norms that exist in different countries therefore greatly affect the 
nature and efficacy of response measures.  
China, currently boasting staggeringly low rates of daily cases, has emerged as a winner 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.160 It’s response has been lauded for its efficacy, even as the nation 
suffered setbacks at the beginning of the crisis. While the officially reported numbers may seem 
suspect to some, as the Chinese government is known for its use of propaganda and information 
manipulation, China’s response has been generally thought of as a success.161 The United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, has struggled for almost the entire duration of the pandemic. The 
country has failed to get a strong grasp on the spread of the virus, despite the delayed yet lengthy 
shutdowns in the spring. The disparities in the countries’ responses can be attributed to 
innumerable factors, yet some emerge more clearly than others. First, regime type is of the 
utmost importance; while in China, the increasingly totalitarian regime has been able implement 
necessarily stringent public health measures, the democratic British government has struggled to 
enact efficacious but unpopular policies. Individual leaders have also influenced the path of the 
pandemic. President Xi has used his strongman rule to implement drastic yet effective measures, 
while populist Prime Minister Boris Johnson has distanced himself from science with devastating 
consequences. Other factors such as national pandemic history and privacy norms have impacted 
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countries’ response efforts as well. Juxtaposing the vastly different responses of China and the 
United Kingdom may allow other countries and leaders to see where their peers have succeeded 
and failed, and to shape their own responses accordingly. 
 
 
Section VI: Policy Suggestions 
 The use of technology is unavoidable when devising the most effective approach to 
COVID-19. As a result, privacy rights will inevitably be affected by the new and extensive 
public health measures. In order to minimize the privacy implications of responses while also 
maintaining their efficacy, a Bluetooth-based contact tracing app is advisable. Such an app 
would function similarly to Singapore’s TraceTogether; individual’s cellular devices can emit 
signals or “tokens” which are then used to record proximity to other nearby devices and 
individuals. If any individual is later diagnosed as a confirmed COVID-19 case, their contacts 
can be traced and notified. This approach protects the privacy of individuals’ movements since it 
uses data on a person's proximity to other users rather than the location of the user themselves. 
Put simply, such an app could detect the who but not the where of an individual’s contacts. This 
kind of tracking is actually preferable to GPS/location tracking in terms of its efficacy because it 
is generally more accurate and works in a multitude of otherwise difficult situations such as in 
indoor and underground settings or in crowded areas.162 It is also more effective than contact 
tracing that relies solely on the memory that users have of their locations and contacts. 
Another necessary aspect of such an app would be the veiling of individuals’ identities. 
When users’ devices come into contact and exchange “tokens”, they should be immediately 
anonymized to protect all individual’s identities from each other. Later, if a user is a confirmed 
carrier of COVID-19, anyone who received one of their “tokens” can be notified to quarantine. 
They will not, however, be notified of the identity of the individual that is the confirmed case. 
An app that utilizes Bluetooth is well-equipped to anonymize identities and protect the privacy of 
users because “the only information involved is contact tokens, which can be cryptographically 
secured in a way that is less vulnerable to de-anonymization than location histories.”163 
Beyond the design of a contact tracing app, more general guidelines can help shape 
privacy preserving practices. Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena of the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology recommend three insightful data-management practices that help guide an interest-
balancing approach.164 First, the authors explain that the response should be proportional to the 
threat; a common cold would not merit the same data-collection efforts as COVID-19. Their 
second guideline relates to necessity. The least possible amount of data-collection should be 
utilized to achieve necessary efficacy. This guideline would likely address the approaches of 
both Israel and China, whose data collection has been far more extensive than what is likely 
absolutely necessary. The final guideline proposed by the authors addresses the need for 
scientific justification of proposed measures. This guideline could relate to South Korea’s public 
disclosure of the identities of infected individuals in South Korea. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also provided valuable suggestions.165 
The OECD advises that the public remains knowledgeable of their government’s COVID-19 
policies and that the utmost transparency is employed when implementing new approaches. In 
addition, the OECD suggests that the duration of invasive COVID-19 technology use and data 
gathering be limited to what is absolutely necessary to avoid any measures becoming 
unnecessarily permanent. These guidelines can and should extend far beyond the development of 
tracing apps to all public health measures developed during COVID-19. 
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Section VII: Conclusion 
Past pandemics and the recent experience with COVID-19 have revealed the importance 
of rapid and effective responses in order to mitigate the spread of dangerous illnesses. As seen in 
the case of China, a speedy response can spare tens of thousands of lives. One needs only to look 
at America’s experience to see the unthinkable danger of a slow and ineffective approach to 
COVID-19. The virus is a stark reminder of the need to develop detailed, researched, and robust 
response plans in advance of, rather than in response to, future pandemics. 
Nonetheless serious privacy implications can arise that can have pernicious effects on 
citizens. In the case of HIV/AIDS, privacy violations had grave consequences for infected 
individuals, and ultimately discouraged many from seeking vital care. Though COVID-19 may 
not carry the same stigma as HIV/AIDS, the protection of privacy is still fundamental, especially 
in countries that are implementing voluntary tracing and surveillance efforts. Unless people feel 
that their sensitive health and location data will be protected, they will be unlikely to participate 
in such voluntary programs, thus undermining the success of government efforts. The 
anonymization of data through Bluetooth-based tracing apps are a promising example of policy 
measures that ensure both privacy and efficacy. 
Analyzing the disparate responses of countries with different governance systems, 
leadership styles, and attitudes toward privacy reveal possible causes of the varying successes 
and failures of nations faced with COVID-19. Centralized governments with strongman rulers 
are able to quickly enact stringent policy measures, though challenges are likely to arise due to 
the hindered flow of information. On the other hand, democratic governments may struggle to 
enact efficacious yet unpopular policies, but are more likely to respect the privacy of citizens. 
The cases of China and the United Kingdom provide important insight into what factors facilitate 
or impede the ability of nations to respond to pandemics in the future. 
Though the balance between privacy and effective public health measures may be 
precarious, nations can and should strive to find equilibrium. History teaches that pandemics will 
never be a thing of the past; creating norms around the protection of privacy even in the midst of 
health crises is therefore imperative. By employing universal guidelines such as establishing 
transparency of government actions and ensuring reasonable scope and duration of implemented 
measures, nations and their citizens can limit the long-term disruptions that pandemics produce. 
In addition, optimizing the use of technology to both prevent the spread of a disease and protect 
the privacy of users enables rights protections to persist even in the modern world. Singapore’s 
TraceTogether app is a perfect example of how technology can spur both effective public health 
measures and privacy protections. Nonetheless, more should be done to ensure the 
proportionality, necessity, and scientific justification of all implemented policies. As technology 
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The Great Swedish Experiment 
 
 




ABSTRACT: As COVID-19 spread across Europe, many countries chose to implement swift and 
stringent lockdown measures on their populations in March 2020 by shutting down businesses 
and banning large public and private gatherings. Sweden, however, chose to manage the 
pandemic by relying on its citizens to make the best decisions for themselves and their families. 
This paper places Sweden’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic in a political and economic 
context. The paper also analyzes the country’s response and effectiveness in implementing 
voluntary and stepwise actions. Research finds that although measures taken to slow transmission 
while accounting for efforts to preserve the economy did not come close to achieving their 
medical goal, whether refraining from a shutdown was enough to save the economy in a 
significant way is less clear.  
“Of all the words of mice and men, the saddest are, ‘It might have been.’” 




On November 16th, 2020, after months of refusing to legally lockdown the country, 
Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven announced that strict bans on public gatherings of more 
than 8 people would be implemented in response to the dramatic rise in coronavirus cases in the 
fall. Noting that these measures are the most invasive in modern Sweden, Löfven hoped to send a 
clear message to the public on the need for social distancing. “It is a clear and sharp signal to 
every person in our country as to what applies in the future. Don’t go to the gym, don’t go to the 
library, don’t have dinner out, don’t have parties — cancel!” Mr. Löfven told a press 
conference.1 
This new message served as a stark contrast to the attitude that the Swedish government 
and Public Health Agency (PHA) held earlier in the year, when cases were low and Sweden had 
seemingly successfully flattened the curve despite having avoided a shutdown of the country. On 
May 8th, Sweden’s state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell boasted in a webinar held by the 
International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), “The Swedish model is showing you can get very far 
by voluntary measures''.2 The backdrop to this change in tone is the surge of positive coronavirus 
cases Sweden experienced starting mid-October (Exhibit 6).  
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While many countries in Europe chose to implement swift and stringent lockdown 
measures in March 2020 by shutting down businesses and banning large public and private 
gatherings, Sweden chose to manage the pandemic by relying on its citizens to make the best 
decisions for themselves and their families (Exhibit 7). Sweden kept most businesses, schools, 
and workplaces open, and throughout the spring and summer, life in Sweden continued more-or-
less the same way as before. Eight months later, on November 5th, 2020, Sweden reported an 
alarming figure of 4,744 new coronavirus cases, the highest number the country had seen since the 
beginning of the pandemic, and it seems to be trending up.3  
As approval ratings along with confidence in the government dropped, domestic scrutiny 
centered on the Swedish government’s response. Löfven and Tegnell were both forced to publicly 
deny reports in Swedish media of a rift between the government and the PHA.4 Internationally, 
countries around the world stay attuned to Sweden’s pandemic response, waiting to see whether 
its unique approach in balancing public health and the economy worked better strict lockdown 
measures. 
 
Hej! Välkommen till Sverige! 
Covering 528,447 km, Sweden is the fifth largest country in Europe and roughly the same 
size as California in the United States and with a relatively low population density. With a 
population of 10.23 million,5 it is the largest among the countries in Scandinavia and ranks 15th 
in Europe in terms of population. 
The nation of Sweden is one of Europe’s oldest, beginning with its relationship with and 
contribution to the Vikings. The country has on occasion displayed an adversity to the European 
mainstream and is not a stranger to straying from the herd in a global context. Europe, on the 
contrary, is a continent unified both geographically and politically, has a strong big-government 
background. It favors left-wing social and economic policies. When a problem is at hand, the 
continent understands government to be the solution.  
Sweden had instances of breaking from European traditions early and hard. This trend was 
born as were many European trends: in the context of the evolution of Christianity. Martin Luther, 
the father of Protestantism, was a German, but his influence quickly spread around Northern 
Europe. Quickly, a continent defined by Catholicism began to show cracks in its theological 
foundations. At the forefront was Sweden.  “It seems difficult to overstate,” explains Professor 
Inge Jonnson of the University of Stockholm. “Luther’s influence in Swedish social history.” The 
Protestant faith preached and spread by Martin Luther was, at its core, a contradiction to the 
European consensus. This modus operandi only continued. The people of Sweden had no interest 
in joining the European Union for decades after its inception. A famously — or notoriously — 
neutral country, Sweden feared the inherently political organization would diminish its 
independence. Johnson relays, “Swedish membership had been rejected as incompatible with 
neutrality since the 1960s.” It was only during the financial crisis in the 1990s that the country 
finally decided to alter its lonely course. “It is just logical that Sweden is often called ‘the reluctant 
ally’ in EU circles.”6  
 
Swedish Political and Government System  
Sweden’s parliamentary representative constitutional monarchy is led by a prime minister 
and functions at three levels: national, regional, and local. On the national level, the federal 
government is composed of the office of the prime minister as well as a multitude of semi-
autonomous agencies. Sweden’s highest regional level of government is the county council, which 
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is made up of twenty counties. The county council deals with issues such as health care and 
tributary affairs. Stockholm is by far Sweden’s most populous county with 2,377,081 inhabitants 
followed by Västa, Götaland, and Skåne.7 On the local level, Sweden is divided into 290 
municipalities. Each municipality designates its own elected body, tasked with governing over a 
plethora of issues. These elected bodies are responsible for providing many services, including 
housing, schooling, elderly care and childcare.8  
The Riksdag operates as Sweden’s parliamentary legislative body and is composed of 349 
members who are directly elected by citizens. Representatives in the Riksdag come from a handful 
of parties. The left-winged, Social Democratic Party, that of current Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, 
has dominated Swedish politics for over a century.  The next largest party is the Moderate Party 
followed by the Swedish Democrats and the Centre Party.9 Government in Sweden is meant to 
only exercise nominal administrative duties and not to step on the people’s toes. Mass movement 
is protected by the constitution, and the national government is generally restricted from imposing 
sweeping mandates. Policy and administration in Sweden operate under a dualistic relationship, 
whereby those elected to lead place a great deal of responsibility on local government as well as 
civic duty and personal responsibility on the citizens. 
In 2018, Löfven lost a confidence vote to hold a majority in the Riksdag with the Social 
Democrats.  Despite being excluded from the center-right “Alliance” that was formed by the 
opposition parties such as the Moderate Party, the Center Party, the Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats, the Swedish Democrats, a populist, right wing, nationalist party increased its vote 
totals from 12.7% to 17.5%, becoming the third largest party in the Riksdag.  The Christian 
Democrats’ support waned from 31% to 28.4%, the lowest since 1908.10 The “Alliance” was 
dissolved. 
 
Healthcare Governance  
 
Like much else in Sweden, healthcare’s roots come from the legacy of the welfare state 
and is highly decentralized (Exhibit 1). The Health and Medical Service Act requires that regional 
councils provide every resident with good quality health care while the central government is 
responsible for establishing guidelines and principles to inform a national medical agenda. In 
Sweden, the local municipalities are tasked with providing elderly care as well as care for those 
with physical disabilities or psychological disorders.11 The PHA is one of the broadest reaching 
agencies when it comes to medicine in Sweden.     
 
Longstanding Societal and Cultural Values  
Swedish citizens have a rich history of active participation in the framing of the country’s 
values and policy. Civilian action has been responsible for achieving many landmark reforms in 
Sweden’s history.  One of the most prominent ways through which reforms are accomplished is 
through the active involvement of civilians in social movements. Civilian-led social movements 
have been responsible for gains in childcare and equal working conditions through the women’s 
movement, gaining education and public health care. Additionally, ordinary citizens fought for 
environmental protections, labor rights and social due to an ingrained cultural sense of investment 
in the community and trust in achieving change through politics.12 Sweden’s active citizenry 
operates as an amplifier for its democracy.  
Part of the reason citizen involvement in political issues is so strong is because the central 
tenets of Swedish culture and society that emphasize personal responsibility and trust in one 
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another, which allows for individual flexibility. Because Swedes have a deep sense of what they 
ought to do as individuals for their own betterment in tandem with altruistic societal motivations, 
they trust each other to make the right decisions. Sweden consistently ranks the most extreme 
nation in the world in terms of self-expressionist and secular beliefs on the world value survey 
(Exhibit 14). Cultures that hold the individual as more of an independent actor, like Sweden does, 
are more likely to allow for individual flexibility and risk-taking. “National culture in... Sweden 
views the individual as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who comprises a unique 
configuration of internal attributes; thus, [Sweden] encourages individual flexibility and risk-
taking, consistent with these loose cultural values.”13 
For most of the last century, Sweden has consistently taken in refugees, operating as a 
beacon of asylum for those hoping to escape persecution. Jews, Danes and Estonians were allowed 
in during the Second World War. Chilean nationals fleeing the bloody tyranny of Augusto Pinochet 
as well as those fleeing war and genocide in former Yugoslavia found a home with open arms. 
Swedes were happy to distinguish themselves from the trend of tightening borders in Europe 
during the 1990’s and the 2000’s with relatively bipartisan enthusiasm. This tendency to open up 
and extend a helping hand became thought of as a form of Swedish Exceptionalism, following a 
pattern of nationalist sentiments of moral superiority being tied to a policy adopted in Sweden.  
 
Yet during the refugee crisis in 2015, fearing “system collapse” following a pouring in of 
migrants which resulted in a strained welfare system as well as increasing crime, with over 160,000 
asylum applications.  Löfven had lamented then, “It pains me that Sweden is no longer capable of 
receiving asylum seekers at the high level we do today. We simply cannot do any more,” reversing 
his position in just over half a year. This marked what some came to view as the death of Swedish 
Exceptionalism. The far-right nationalist Social Democrats captured the opportunity to posit 
themselves as the one party that had consistently called for restrictions to immigration and gained 
momentum, as the Swedish population became more unified on restricting immigration.14 
Once known for the “Middle Way” between liberalized and controlled markets, Sweden 
has recently engaged in somewhat extreme policy measures, opting to operate from the fringes. 
Sweden went from having one of the most developed welfare states on earth to liberalizing it 
and having one of the most market friendly basic education systems in the world after the 1990’s. 
The trend from one extreme to the next is apparent in the shift in attitude toward migrants from 
welcoming to very strict. 
The word lagom, in Swedish, means “moderately,” and bears great cultural 
significance.  Ikea’s slogan is “Live Lagom,” and the principle of not living too extravagantly is 
one that many Swedes take to heart.  Lagom, tied in with the self-conception of the “Middle Way”, 
may seem at odds with what seems to be somewhat of a radical streak among the 
Swedish.  However, the seemingly docile temperament of Swedes as it feeds into a consensus 
culture actually allows for the political pendulum to shift more dramatically when it does shift as 
Swedes unite on issues.  As sociologist Daniel Lindvall puts it, “Our sense of ourselves as lagom 
makes it much easier to make dramatic change here, as opposed to societies that are more 
contentious. In other words, our extremism is made possible by our culture of consensus. Since we 
find ways to agree, it’s easier to move policies or whole sectors quickly, even abruptly.”15 Lindvall 
refers to it as the “paradox of consensus culture” where individual modesty results in a collective 
extremism. 
As of 2016, single-person households were the most prominent of European households, 
making up 33% of all households.16 Sweden led the other European countries with the greatest 
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proportion, 52%, a decisive majority of households in Sweden being occupied by a single person, 
totaling 1.8 million.  In Sweden, a significant proportion of the working population has the ability 
to work from home.17 As of 2019, 62% of enterprises included people who would work at home 
and roughly a fifth of all Swedes regularly tele-worked.  
 
The Swedish Economy  
Although Sweden is a relatively small country in terms of its population, it is one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world.  Exports account for about one-third of Sweden’s GDP. Most 
Swedish enterprises and businesses are privately owned and market-oriented, although there is a 
large public sector as well. Government spending is also a large fraction of the country’s GDP, 
amounting to 49.7% over the past three years. Budget surpluses have an average of 1.1% of GDP, 
and public debt is equal to 39% of GDP. 18  
 
Trade 
  The Swedish economy is open and heavily dependent on free international trade with about 
one-third of its GDP being made up of exports. Svante Öberg, Deputy Governor of the Swedish 
Central Bank, the Riksbank, remarked in January 2009 in the midst of the financial crisis: “Sweden 
is a small and open economy with extensive foreign trade and a financial market that is well 
integrated with the international markets. Sweden's dependence on the outside world has increased 
over time.”19 Sweden trades heavily with its Scandinavian and European neighbors, with Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, and Denmark account for about two-fifths of Sweden’s 
export market.20  
Swedish manufacturing is export-oriented and produces the bulk of the country’s export 
income. Over the years, the emphasis has shifted from export of raw materials and semi-
manufactured products such as pulp, steel, sawn wood to finished goods, the majority of which is 
dominated by engineering products such as cars, telecommunications equipment, hydroelectric 
power plant equipment, and, increasingly, high technology and chemical and biotechnology.21 
Imports are more diversified than exports, with the top imports being cars, crude and refined 
petroleum, and vehicle parts. Germany is the main supplier of Sweden’s imports. In 2018, good 
exported totaled to $162 billion USD, and goods imported totaled to $160 billion USD.22 
  
Service Sector and the Labor Market   
More than one-third of actively employed Swedes work in the service sector. In 2017, 
Sweden exported $66.3 billion worth of services, the top services being computer and information 
services, business, professional, and technical services, as well as travel services. Services 
imported totaled $60.2 billion, mainly comprising travel, business, professional, and technical 
services.23 Tourism also plays an important role in the Swedish economy, contributing to 2.6% of 
Sweden’s GDP in 2017.24 
Like its neighbor Denmark, Sweden is also highly unionized, with about four-fifths of all 
workers belonging to labor and trade unions. Unions take charge of negotiating agreements that 
cover issues such as fair wages, pensions, insurances, and annual leave days.25 Unemployment 
averaged 6.02% from 1980 until 2020, and was addressed by government investments in education 
and entrepreneurship.26 Notably, a short-time working scheme was introduced by the government 
in 2014 to increase flexibility in the labor market, where employers can reduce their employees’ 
working hours and receive financial support from the central government to compensate for a 
57
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue III 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
Xiaofan Gong and Michael Ratzkin 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 3 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
58 
significant part of the costs for retaining the employee. This measure can only be activated in a 
deep recession.27 In 2019, the labor force participation rate was 73% and the employment rate was 
68%, both of which were both high by international standards. The gender employment gap of 4% 
is also small. The unemployment rate, 6.8%, was close to the European average.28  
Taxation 
  Taxes make up the majority of state revenues, which are used to maintain a high level of 
social services that have virtually eliminated structural poverty in the country. Personal income 
tax – ranging from 30 to 60 percent – are some of the highest in the world, but taxes for business, 
in comparison, are quite moderate.29 The top personal income tax rate is 57 percent, in comparison 
to the top corporate tax rate of 21.4 percent. The overall tax burden is equal to 44 percent of total 
domestic income. Since the late 1990s, there has been a shift away from tax on personal income 
and towards taxing goods and services and social security contributions.30 Social insurance policies 
have been changed to encourage greater participation in the workforce, and pension reforms paid 
into the pension system and the amount disbursed with the overall health of the economy.31  
 
Economic Performance, 2008 - 2019  
As the oldest central bank in the world, Sweden’s Riksbank has an objective of maintaining 
price stability, defined as the maintenance of a low, stable rate of inflation. More precisely, the 
Riksbank's target is to hold inflation in terms of the Consumer Price Index with Fixed Prices 
(CPIF) around 2 percent a year.32 The Riksbank played a pivotal role in navigating the Sweden 
financial markets through the 2008 Financial Crisis as well as the 2010 European Debt Crisis. In 
2008, the Riksbank deployed a number of initiatives to strengthen the fragile financial market and 
stabilize the financial system. These initiatives included general liquidity support measures 
through increasing loans and loan access as well as extending emergency liquidity assistance to 
individual banks, liquidity support to individual institutions to prevent institutions large and small 
from failing, and loan facilities to neighboring countries through swap agreements with central 
banks of several Baltic countries and Iceland.33 As a result, Sweden’s GDP contracted by 5% in 
2009 but bounced back with growth averaging 5% in the following two years.34   
The European Debt Crisis that started in 2010 with Greece’s sovereign debt crisis played 
out in a similar manner in Sweden. The domestic economy weakened in 2012 and 2013 as a result 
of weak economic outlook and development abroad, and inflation levels were lower-than-expected 
in 2013 due to the international economic slowdown and lower import prices.35 This trend 
continued in 2014, leading to the Riksbank adopting an expansionary monetary policy to stabilize 
the home economy.36 As the economy both domestic and abroad began to recover in 2015 and 
2016, the Riksbank continued to carefully monitor the situation, and Sweden has since been 
recuperating slowly.37    
According to annual Swedish Economy Reports by Sweden’s National Institute of 
Economic Research (NIER), coming out of the European Debt Crisis, 2015 saw strong growth in 
the Swedish economy through expansionary government fiscal policies that helped decrease 
unemployment rates,38 a trend that continued into 2016 and 2017, which saw an improvement in 
both business and consumer confidence as well as output and employment.39 However, underlying 
problems for the Swedish economy in the form of continuously weak economic conditions in 
Europe persisted throughout Sweden’s economic recovery, and the growth the economy had 
experienced peaked in the first half of 2018, after which had set into a slowdown phase.40  
By the end of the fiscal year in 2019, the Swedish economy was well settled into its 
slowdown phase, which was worsened by the uncertainty surrounding Brexit and US-China trade 
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disputes. Swedish export of goods saw slow overall growth, and household savings increased.41 
Unemployment was forecasted to slightly rise, and inflation was expected to drop well below 2 
per cent over the next few years. Household and business sector confidence, as well as export 
manufacturing orders, showed decline (Exhibit 4). The NIER noted in its December 2019 report, 
“Our forecast is based on the assumption that there is an orderly Brexit and that the global trade 
conflict does not escalate further. Should these assumptions prove false, there is a considerable 
risk of Swedish output falling well below potential. However, public finances are strong, and there 
is scope to soften any downturn with expansionary fiscal policy.”42  
 
COVID-19: The Pandemic the World Was Unprepared For  
In late December 2019, news from China alerted the world that a new respiratory virus was 
quickly spreading throughout the city of Wuhan in the province of Hubei. Much was unknown 
about the origins, symptoms, spread, and containment of the virus at the time. This was the origin 
of the novel coronavirus, also known as COVID-19. The first case of the coronavirus outside of 
China was confirmed on January 13th, 2020, and has since spread all over the world, presenting 
the world with one of the most challenging and dire public health crises in modern history.43 The 
World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the coronavirus a pandemic on March 11th, 
2020, and countries around the globe quickly implemented nation-wide lockdown measures of 
varying levels of control and strictness shortly thereafter.44 The first case of COVID-19 in Sweden 
was confirmed by the PHA on January 31th, 2020 in a traveler from China. A few weeks thereafter, 
during the second week of March, community spread in Sweden was confirmed.45  
In response to the now-classified pandemic, Sweden adopted the same goals as most other 
countries, working to ‘flatten the curve’ by slowing the rate and volume of transmission so that 
the healthcare system could cope with the disease.46 However, unlike most other countries, much 
of Sweden’s implementation focused on voluntary and stepwise action, rather than legislation and 
compulsory measures.47 The government had relied on the voluntary social distancing and self-
restraint of its citizens, who received daily briefings and instructions concerning self-protection 
techniques from the PHA and press conferences held by state epidemiologists and government 
representatives (Exhibit 3). Recommendations the government published in March included 
avoiding social contact if one was experiencing symptoms of respiratory infection, working from 
home as much as possible, and isolating as much as possible for people over 70 years of age.48 
Higher secondary schools for children over 16 years of age were also encouraged to switch to 
distance learning to curb the spread of the disease.49  
Outside of these recommendations, the government put few hard restrictions in place. One 
restriction was the government’s decision to stop non-essential travel to Sweden from countries 
outside of the EEA and Switzerland. Additionally, visits to elderly care institutions were banned 
on April 1st.50 Public events with a headcount of more than 50 people were disallowed, and public 
spaces such as cafes, restaurants, and bars needed to minimize crowding and provide for physically 
distancing in each venue, which also applied to shops and public transportation.51 
Notably, however, Sweden’s top authorities refrained from recommending the usage of 
face masks,52 and have questioned the effectiveness of mask-wearing as opposed to physical 
distancing. The country also never closed daycare or schools for children under the age of 16.53 
The Swedish government has characterized their overall strategy as a ’common sense’, 
trust-based approach rather than strict measures, such as lockdowns, which they say are 
unsustainable over an extended period of time. Swedish authorities expressed that in their view, 
managing the COVID-19 pandemic would not be a sprint but a marathon—a long-term 
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undertaking.54 Thus, policies need to be designed on a level that is acceptable to the people over a 
long period of time. The government had time and time again emphasized the trust it places in its 
citizens to ‘make the right decision’, underlining the loose cultural values that Swedish citizens 
embody of individuals’ self-responsibility as well as the individual as an independent, self-
contained, and autonomous entity. On March 22th, Löfven gave an address to the nation where he 
emphasized the importance of self-restraint, declaring “Now we all have a great personal 
responsibility. There are a few critical times in life when you must make sacrifices, not just for 
your own sake, but also for those around you, for your fellow human beings, and for our country. 
That time is now. That day has come. And the duty is everyone’s.” (Exhibit 7) 
 
Federal Fiscal Response  
Despite the seemingly lax lockdown measures, the Swedish government devoted a 
substantial amount of capital and resources to help provide an adequate social safety net for 
businesses and people during this time. Total government support in 2020 amounted to 805 billion 
Swedish krona (SEK), equivalent to 16% of GDP and around 96 billion USD, which included SEK 
240 billion in budget measures, SEK 335 billion in liquidity measures, and SEK 230 billion in 
guarantees. In March, the government pushed out a number of measures aimed at cushioning the 
economic impact businesses were soon expected to brace for.55  
Some notable measures include allowing companies to defer three months’ worth of 
payment of employer social security contributions, preliminary tax on salaries, and value added 
tax (VAT) with interest. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were further allowed to defer 
VAT reported annually, including payments of last year's VAT that were due shortly. The 
government issued credit guarantees of up to SEK 5 billion for loans to airlines, SEK 3 billion for 
loans to SMEs, and guarantee 70% of new bank loans to companies experiencing financial 
difficulty due to COVID-19. Moreover, the government allowed for reduction of employers' social 
security contributions to the old age pension, providing relief of up to SEK 5,300 per employee 
per month. Temporary discount for rental costs in vulnerable sectors like consumer goods, hotels, 
and restaurants was additionally covered by the government for up to 50% of the fixed rent 
reduction. Later on, in April, the government announced a SEK 39 billion package to support 
businesses based on loss of turnover.56  
 
Monetary Response  
To help stabilize the economy, Swedish financial institutions also acted to provide relief 
measures. On March 13th, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) lowered its 
countercyclical capital buffer from 2.5% to 0% and postponed all new investigations and on sight 
supervisory activities in order to free up resources at the banks. The FSA further mandated the loss 
of income associated with COVID-19 as qualification for the bank and borrower to reach an 
agreement to reduce or suspend loan amortization payments for a limited period of time. It also 
clarified that it will temporarily allow banks to fall below the liquidity coverage ratio requirements 
to provide relief for liquidity constraints and stressed that it expected credit institutions to stop this 
year's dividend payments and instead, use the earnings to further strengthen their capital.57 
The Riksbank decided to lend up to SEK 500 billion to companies via the banks in order 
to avoid robust companies being knocked out and reduced the lending rate for overnight loans to 
banks from 0.75% to 0.20% above the repo rate while keeping the repo rate at 0%. Banks were 
allowed to borrow an unlimited amount at 3-month's maturity on a weekly basis against collateral 
at an interest rate of 20 basis points above the repo rate, and flexibility was increased on collateral 
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requirements for banks when they borrowed money from the Riksbank. The Riksbank also decided 
to increase purchases of securities by up to SEK 300 billion in 2020. On March 19th, the Riksbank 
and the US Federal Reserve agreed on a swap facility of 60 billion USD, which was extended on 
August 5th until March 31st, 2021.58  
 
Employment, Healthcare, and Social Initiatives 
To save Swedish jobs and ensure that employers and workers did not bear the full impact 
of COVID-19 on the economy, the government announced that employers’ wage costs can be 
halved, and the government would cover a larger share of the costs. This model is similar to short-
time work, but the subsidy level is significantly increased in that the employee receives more than 
90 per cent of their wage. Other measures included allowing workers unable to perform work due 
to sickness and quarantine to be entitled to state disease carrier allowance from the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency (SIA), which allowed workers to receive approximately 80% of their regular 
salary for up to 14 days. This also applied to self-employed workers. However, workers were 
required to submit a medical certificate proving they were infected or were suspected or at risk of 
carrying the disease in order to receive the allowance. A temporary parental allowance was also 
introduced to compensate parents for 90% of their salary in case they need to stay home and look 
after their children due to school closures.59  
 
Bracing for the First Wave  
As the pandemic grew in momentum, cases began rising rapidly in Sweden and on March 
17th, hospitals in the Stockholm area were directed not to admit patients whose age or body mass 
index exceeded 80 and 40, respectively. These patients were viewed as unlikely to be able to make 
a recovery and such was the situation that medical care had to be prioritized.60 
There was substantial domestic support behind the Swedish strategy, but there was also 
significant dissent. Swedes seemed to be divided on how to conceptualize the pandemic, but the 
largest proportion of people deferred to trusting their leaders with their fate. In April, roughly 31% 
of those surveyed believed that the country’s response to COVID-19 was simply not forceful 
enough while 18% were neutral and 51% considered the response to be appropriately forceful. 
Interestingly enough, despite the concerns that the country’s strategy was being executed at the 
expense of the safety of the elderly population, 40% of respondents aged 15-29 viewed the nation’s 
strategy as adequate compared to a higher figure 61% of those over 70. At this point, 49% of 
Swedes approved of Löfven’s handling of the pandemic as well.61 
 
Quarter One Economic Performance  
In the midst of the controversy surrounding its unconventional approach to handling the 
pandemic, the Swedish government released the first quarterly report of the fiscal year. 
Shockingly, Sweden was able to moderate the economic impact at the onset of the crisis, as the 
country’s GDP grew by 0.1% in the first quarter of 2020 from the fourth quarter of 2019. This 
contrasts with the sharp drop in GDP experienced by many other advanced economies indicated 
by the small increase in GDP for the first quarter of 2020 contrary to other advanced economies 
(Exhibit 15). Whereas Sweden experienced a 0.1% increase in GDP, in the Euro area, GDP had 
decreased by 3.7% and in the aggregate of the 27 countries of the EU, GDP decreased by 3.3%.62 
While the rather less restrictive measures helped cushion the immediate impact on the 
economy, exporting industries experienced declines in output as cross-borders value chains were 
disrupted. Durable consumer goods, travel services and capital goods-producing sectors were 
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particularly affected.63 Although exports temporarily increased (Exhibit 10), Sweden’s composite 
purchasing managers’ index (PMI) declined from 55.3 index points in February to 45.6 index 
points in March, with the manufacturing sector being more heavily impacted than the services 
sector (Exhibit 16). Household consumption fell sharply, decreasing 2.5% in quarter one,64 
although this decline is less than other countries as well as the EU aggregate of 3.0%.65   The main 
factors of consumption shrinkage were reduced expenses for transportation and vehicles, as well 
as a substantial decline in purchases abroad.66 Unemployment rose from 7.5% in January to 8.2% 
in February, before dropping to 7.1% in March (Exhibit 5). In comparison, the EU‘s aggregate 
average unemployment rate was 6.4% in March.  
 
The Rising Star of the Public Health Agency   
Responsible in large part for Sweden’s unique approach, the PHA, led by Tegnell, began 
to attract a great deal of attention. Tegnell became famous all over the world for what many deemed 
to be a brazen approach. His press conferences became globally viewed, and Tegnell’s face could 
be seen sported on tattoos and t-shirts in Stockholm as well as in other countries around the world, 
where his method for combating the pandemic was applauded.67 In April, Tegnell expressed 
confidence in Sweden’s tactics, and despite qualifying that herd immunity was not the express goal 
of the nudge approach, he predicted that herd immunity in Stockholm could be mere weeks away. 
Despite being often misrepresented with regards to her immunity, Tegnell maintained that Sweden 
was seeking a way to live long term with the virus, asserting, “We believe herd immunity will of 
course help us in the long run, and we are discussing that, but it's not like we are actively trying to 
achieve it as has been made out (by the press and some scientists). If we wanted to achieve herd 
immunity, we would have done nothing and let coronavirus run rampant through society. We are 
trying to keep the transmission rate as low as we can.” 
Tegnell’s approach was met with a great deal of backlash within the scientific community 
of Sweden.  Starting in April, members of a scientific forum on COVID-19 called Vetenskapsform 
COVID-19 decried Tegnell’s guidelines and measures as irresponsible and highly dangerous. 
Many openly expressed fear and condemnation for Tegnell’s approach as well as for the Swedish 
national government’s inability to take uniform action on a national level and bypass the 
bureaucratic red tape which restricts national mandates.68 Many of the scientists and disease 
specialists who expressed dissent in this way faced backlash and personal threats. 
While almost every other country in the world closed down schools and in-person learning, 
Sweden maintained that all persons 15 years of age or under were required to attend school in-
person. Parents of children with pre-existing conditions that would make them more susceptible 
to a serious case of COVID-19 feared that they may have had their children taken away if they 
didn’t send them to school because the Swedish government did not identify children as a group 
at risk for any sort of serious infection from COVID-19.69 
At the end of May, more than 5,000 people had died in Sweden from COVID-19. Although 
Sweden made it through the first wave with excess deaths per 100,000 lower than numbers reported 
by Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, its numbers far eclipsed its Nordic neighbors of 
Norway, Finland and Denmark who detected no excess death during the first wave.70 
 
In Calm Water, Every Ship Has a Good Captain 
After a rocky first wave, public opinion was a bit shaken in Sweden, with faith in the 
government’s handling of the pandemic falling but many Swedes still backing their nation’s 
approach and feeling vindicated.  The first wave having passed, Sweden experienced low daily 
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infection and daily death figures for most of the summer.  However, even as many hailed Tegnell 
and Sweden for seemingly finding a way around lockdown measures without experiencing 
catastrophic consequences, many were just as unconvinced. Confidence in the nation’s 
undertaking of the pandemic dropped 11 points to 45% from April to June. In June, Löfven’s 
approval rating also fell by 10 points. Tegnell admitted that more should have been done to contain 
the spread of the virus in elderly homes and that a more ideal strategy would have balanced 
Sweden’s approach and the rest of the world’s but reaffirmed that “the basic strategy worked well” 
and “based on the knowledge we had then, we feel we made the appropriate decisions.”  Tegnell 
stuck to the principle that lockdowns were not sustainable long term and violated other central 
components of what public health should do as they could lead to other health problems such as 
mental health issues.71 
Löfven also remained generally unwavering when on his fealty to the country’s 
strategy.  Curiously, some of the most vocal dissent on the pandemic strategy in Sweden, came 
from the far-right Swedish Democrats.  Aside from generally wishing to oppose the measures of a 
left winged government, the Swedish Democrats assert that immigrants and asylum seekers who 
had not complied with guidelines over a lack of understanding exposed elderly people at the care 
homes they worked at.72   
Though a majority of Swedes said that COVID-19 led them to desire greater cooperation 
with the EU, the proportion of Swedes that maintained that claim was less than the proportion of 
any other European country surveyed. As Swede’s looked inward, cynicism infected perspectives 
on domestic and international affairs (Exhibit 19). 
 
Quarter Two Economic Performance 
Unlike the unwavering attitude of the Swedish government, the Swedish economy took a 
hard hit in the second quarter. The impact of the COVID-19 on the Swedish economy was 
extensive in the second quarter. GDP plummeted by 8.3 percent (Exhibit 11), which was the 
largest recorded decline in GDP over the past 40 years.73 This marked a great difference between 
Sweden’s economy in quarter one, which emerged comparably unscathed, and in quarter two, 
which hit a historic low. However, compared to Germany, France, Italy, and Spain individually, 
as well as the aggregate EU GDP percent change, Sweden’s economy performed better overall 
(Exhibit 15). The EU saw a decrease in GDP of 11.4% in the second quarter, while the Euro-area 
saw a decline of 11.8%,74 the largest the EU has experienced since its beginnings in 1995.75 In the 
Nordic neighboring countries, GDP fell less than in Sweden,76 with Denmark reporting 7.4% 
decrease,77 Norway reporting 6.3% decrease,78 and Finland reporting 4.5% decrease.79  
 
This broad downturn in the economy could be attributed to both domestic demand and 
foreign trade falling markedly. The second quarter saw Swedish exports of goods decrease by 16% 
in value and by 15% in volume compared with quarter one, and imports of goods decreased by 
12% in value and 10% in volume from quarter one. Comparatively, the EU 27 exports fell by 21% 
and imports by 19%.80 Sweden’s manufacturing sector was especially impacted by the external 
trade environment. In April, the manufacturing PMI index continued to fall by 6.9 points from 
March to 38.7 points, before slowly increasing by 2.4 points to 41.1 points in May and jumping to 
50.1 points in June. The services sector was less severely affected in Sweden compared to other 
European countries, with PMI remaining well above the EU figures throughout the second quarter 
(Exhibit 16).  
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Household consumption dropped another 7.9% from the first quarter.81 In the EU, 
household consumption dropped 12.3%, the largest decline since 1999.82 However, after Sweden’s 
consumer confidence dropped to 73.6% in April from 89.7% in March, the figure recovered 
throughout the second quarter with May and June reporting 77.9% and 84.5% consumer 
confidence in the economy, respectively.83 Unemployment in the second quarter rose dramatically, 
from 8.2% in April to 9% in May, finishing at 9.8% in June.84 The EU reported an aggregate of 
7.1% unemployment in June.85 As of July 15th, the Swedish manufacturing sector accounted for 
30 percent of all temporary layoffs, although it only provides 15 percent of total employment 
(Exhibit 16). The stock market showed recovery as well, climbing back up to 1600 points in June 
from a low of 1300 points in late-March (Exhibit 12).  
 
Forgetting the Elderly  
  In May, research showed unfavorable results for the public health of the country. The PHA 
predicted that 40 percent of the Stockholm population would have gotten COVID-19 and 
consequently, the antibodies that would protect them by May. However, the agency’s data 
collected in June indicated that only 11.4 percent of people had such antibodies in Stockholm.86 
  The PHA attributed the high COVID-19 death rates in Sweden to the large proportion of 
deaths that occurred in nursing homes, due to shortcomings in elderly care. The high infection rate 
across the country was the underlying factor that led to a high number of those becoming infected 
in care homes. Many sick elderlies were not seen by a doctor because the country’s hospitals were 
implementing a triage system that appeared to have factored in age and predicted prognosis. This 
likely reduced intensive care unit load at the cost of more high-risk patients — like elderly people 
with confirmed infection — dying outside the ICU.87 Only 13% of the elderly residents who died 
with COVID-19 during the spring received hospital care, according to preliminary statistics from 
the National Board of Health and Welfare released in August.88 
 
Mikael Fjällid, a Swedish private consultant in anesthetics and intensive care, says he 
believes "a lot of lives" could have been saved if more patients had been able to access hospital 
treatment, or if care home workers were given increased responsibilities to administer oxygen 
themselves, instead of waiting for specialist COVID-19 response teams or paramedics.87 
 
 
Luck Never Gives; It Only Lends 
After a seemingly reassuring summer, a new tide of infection arrived to rock the Nordic 
nation and send COVID-19 cases soaring with exponential turbulence. Faith in Löfven’s handling 
of the pandemic plummeted as a mere 34% of Swedes approved of the prime minister’s 
efforts.  Following suit, support for the Social Democrats tumbled to 29.4% as citizens grew more 
and more uncharacteristically cynical and uncertain about their futures.88 Even support For 
Tegnell, the once shining poster-boy of the Swedish way, dropped.  
 
Quarter Three Economic Performance:  
The end of September marked the end of the third quarter in the fiscal year. In the third 
quarter, Sweden’s economy seemingly began making a recovery from the hit it experienced in the 
second quarter. GDP increased by 4.9 percent when compared to quarter two (Exhibit 11), mainly 
driven by increased exports of goods and household consumption. In quarter three, export of goods 
and services grew 11.2% and imports of goods and services grew 9.2%.89 In August and 
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September, exports rebounded to pre-pandemic levels.90 Composite PMI scores averaged 55 
points, a slight improvement over quarter two (Exhibit 16).  
Market production increased by 6.7%, with output in goods-producing industries 
increasing by 11.2 percent, in service-producing industries, by 4.5%, and in government 
production, by 1.8% percent.91 Comparatively, the EU experienced higher growth in terms of GDP 
and growth of exports and imports. GDP grew by 11.5% while exports increased by 17.2% and 
imports by 12.9% in the EU.92 Notably, every country Sweden had outperformed in quarter two in 
terms of GDP growth experienced higher performance in this quarter -- Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
France all experienced growth greater than 8%, with France topping the chart at 18.2% (Exhibit 
18). 
Household consumption increased by 6.3%, mostly made up of consumption of transports, 
as well as hotel and restaurant services.93 Although this is a positive improvement for the Swedish 
economy, this figure lagged behind that of the aggregate for the EU. The EU reported a 13.2% 
increase in household consumption.94 Unemployment saw a decrease in Sweden as well, finishing 
at 8.3% compared to quarter two’s 9.8% (Exhibit 5). This figure is slightly higher than the EU’s 
aggregate unemployment rate at 8.3% in quarter three, but shows improvement in the labor sector 
of the Swedish economy.95 Consumer confidence showed a slow but steady increase from 84.5% 
at the end of quarter two to 88% at the end of quarter three.  
 
Tensions Rising at Home  
In the backdrop of an economy healing from the damage done the previous quarter and 
internationally lauded low infection rates from the summer, the Swedish government attempted to 
continue with its previous, calm demeanor. Tegnell reiterated the party’s position that a growing 
death count did mean the strategy was necessarily going wrong, and remained optimistic 
throughout early October that Sweden’s measures had successfully prevented a second wave of 
cases from taking place.96 Other countries in Europe had started to see a substantial second wave 
that Sweden was simply not experiencing.97 Unfortunately for Tegnell, Löfven, and Swedish 
public, this anomaly proved merely to be a delay as Sweden began to rapidly accrue new case 
counts.  
On October 23rd, a record high number of 1,870 daily cases was recorded in Sweden. In 
response to this, the PHA determined the peak infection number during the spring was likely much 
higher but went unrecorded due to the lack of testing at the time. Four days later, on October 27th, 
1,980 new cases were registered, the highest number since the start of the pandemic.98 One week 
later, on November 3rd, that number grew tenfold to 10,177. One more week passed, and the daily 
infection numbers reach 15,779 on November 10th. Amidst international and domestic scrutiny, 
exponential surges in cases, and intensive-care beds almost full in Stockholm hospitals, Löfven 
was forced to walk back the government’s continuously lax attitude and make a second public 
address. 
 
A Departure from the Swedish Way 
On November 22nd, Löfven held for the second time in a calendar year, a most 
unprecedented live national address to the entire country. Both times Löfven spoke about COVID-
19, but in late-November, the message had changed dramatically. Instead of the reassurance that 
there could be a middle path that protected both the economy and the people while circumventing 
national lockdown measures, there was a desperate plea for compliance with social distancing 
guidelines and frantic backpedaling. Löfven announced public gatherings are now capped at eight 
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people, schools are to be shut down, some for the first time, and alcohol sales are to be banned 
after 10 p.m. Institutions that had all been kept open for the duration of the pandemic were now 
closed. The PHA, along with Tegnell, were undermined and had their roles in the decision-making 
process for COVID-19 policy formally diminished.99 After the press conference ended, Löfven 
went as far as tweeting out urgent requests for citizens to refrain from going out to dinner, 
travelling, or going to the gym after the address to deliver his point.  
The aura of calm that Swedes projected was fading. The government had acknowledged 
that the latest COVID-19 flare-up meant the economy will be weaker over the coming months than 
previously thought. Swedish Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson said the pandemic is now 
“just as serious” in Sweden as it was back in March and April. “The transmission we have seen 
recently, and the measures taken here and in other countries, are expected to dampen the economic 
recovery,” she said at a press briefing on Wednesday, November 18th.100 
The PHA also made policy U-turn from before, bowing to critics who have argued it has 
underestimated the potential for asymptomatic transmission of COVID-19. The agency said on 
December 1st that it recommended children who live with somebody infected by coronavirus to 
stay at home, contrary to previous advice that they should go to school or nursery. It follows yet 
another previous reversal in October that led to a recommendation that adults who live with an 
infected person should receive instructions from a doctor, including possibly seven days of 
quarantine rather than go to work as normal.101  
As cases rose in the late autumn at one of the highest rates in the world, those in Sweden 
began to seek to identify who or what might be culpable for the spike. Some blame healthcare 
systems for its shortcomings and the structure of the Swedish government. Some blame experts, 
some blame the politicians. The government’s contemptuous relationship with the PHA that had 
long drawn media attention had also come to a head. In October, it was revealed that there has 
been a lack of written communication between the prime minister and the PHA when one new 
outlet requested all correspondence between the prime minister’s office and the PHA for the period 
of January 1st to September 14th, and the prime minister’s registrar replied that none existed.102 
Furthermore, on December 15th, Löfven appeared to levy the blame on health officials who he 
claimed underestimated the propensity for a heavy new influx of cases.103  
By December 9th, 2020, 99% of Stockholm’s intensive care beds were in use and the local 
health authorities requested staffing assistance from national officials. Instead of continuing on 
with the recommendation-based approach, the government began drafting a piece of legislation 
that would allow the government to circumvent constitutionally codified restrictions on mandating 
lockdowns and fining non-compliers. The bill, which would allow the minority coalition to cut 
shops' opening hours and limit footfall, is due to take effect in March if it makes it through the 
consultation process.104 
 
The Economy Responds  
The consumer confidence indicator in Sweden decreased by 0.9 points from the previous 
month to 89.2 in November 2020, as a second wave of infections and new restriction measures 
weighed on sentiment. Households became more negative about their own finances and about the 
development of the Swedish economy.105 However, the Swedbank Manufacturing PMI for Sweden 
rose to 59.1 in November of 2020 from an upwardly revised 58.3 in the previous month, the 
strongest expansion in factory activity since December of 2017, suggesting a robust recovery from 
the pandemic shock. Sweden's Services PMI rose to 58.6 in November 2020 from an upwardly 
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revised 55.3 in the previous month, pointing to the sixth consecutive expansion in the services 
sector and the strongest since November 2018, driven by business activity and employment.  
 
The newly introduced stricter COVID-19 response measures, while needed to fight the virus, are 
likely to dent economic growth, although the rebound seen during the summer months was stronger 
than expected, meaning it’s not yet clear how much full-year forecasts will need to be adjusted. 
The Swedish Finance Ministry’s latest estimate for 2020 points to a 4.6% contraction.106 
 
Elsewhere in Scandinavia  
 
Denmark 
Denmark, a small country of 5.8 million people and Sweden’s neighbor and “old enemy” 
southwest of the Baltic Sea, was the second European country to implement what was considered 
at the time, exceptionally strict lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 
March 11th, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced the closure of all schools and 
universities across the country, in addition to paid leave for all non-crucial public sector employees 
and encouraged the switch to remote working conditions for private sector employees and 
businesses.107 Restaurants, day cares, cafes, and gyms were all shut down, gatherings of more than 
10 people were banned, and borders were closed to almost all foreigners with few exceptions.108 
These lockdown measures were extended until April 15th, after which restrictions began easing in 
hopes of preventing Denmark from falling into a deep recession.109  
As a result of these lockdown measures, the Danish economy contracted by 2.1% in quarter 
one, followed by a 6.9% decline in quarter two that rebounded by 4.9% in quarter three. Quarter 
one and quarter two’s economic performance was driven by low private consumption resulting 
from containment measures, as well as low government spending due to school closures and drops 
in exports and imports.110 In the third quarter, easing of lockdown restrictions contributed to 
overall growth and the strongest quarterly growth rate on record. With the exception of the first 
quarter, overall, Denmark has outperformed Sweden economically in both the second and third 
quarters.  
Although Denmark has the second highest infection and death rate among the four 
Scandinavian countries, its numbers are several times smaller than Sweden’s at 100,489 total 
infections and 918 total deaths as of December 8th, 2020, compared to Sweden’s 304,793 infections 
and 7,296 deaths.111 Danes embrace a culture of trust like the Swedes, and adhered to the strict 
lockdown measures in March. As such, the country was able to ease some lockdown measure in 
April after having controlled the initial surge in COVID-19 infections. In June, the Danish 
government launched a COVID-19 infection tracing app that was downloaded more than 660,000 
times, totaling approximately 12 percent of the Danish population, by July. The app allows citizens 
to self-report diagnosis and notifies them when they have been in close proximity to an infected. 
As a result of these measures, public approval for the Danish government’s handling of the 
pandemic at 95% was higher than each of the other 13 countries surveyed in August.112  
 
Norway  
A country of 5.3 million citizens and Sweden’s neighbor directly to the west, Norway 
implemented strict lockdown measures in the beginning of the pandemic as well. On March 12th, 
2020, the government closed daycare centers, schools, and universities, as well as restaurants, 
gyms, and other businesses. Borders were closed to almost all foreigners, with few exceptions. 
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Social distancing requirements were also in place.113 These measures were extended through April, 
before the government started easing restrictions in May.114  
Norway saw similar economic performance as its neighbors who implemented strict 
lockdown procedures, with quarter one GDP contracting by 1.7%,115 quarter two dropping further 
by 5.1%116, the steepest decline ever recorded, and recovering in quarter three by 4.6%.117 Key 
factors of poor economic performance in the first two quarters include low private consumption, 
low government consumption, and drop in exports and imports respectively.118 In quarter three, 
with the easing of restrictions, domestic demands and private consumption grew along with 
government consumption and exports and imports of goods and services, leading to economic 
recovery.119 
Norway has the third highest infection rate and lowest death rate in Scandinavia, with a 
total of 39,524 infections120 and 382 total deaths121 as of December 8th. In June, the Norwegian 
Prime Minister Erna Solberg admitted that its lockdown measures may have been too tough, as 
evidence had shown that the disease did not spread as quickly as authorities previously 
predicted.122 The COVID-19 tracing app that was successfully launched in Denmark was shut 
down weeks after its launch in Norway due to privacy concerns.123 Nonetheless, Solberg’s 
conservative party received a surge in public support for its handling of coronavirus, pushing it 
into the lead for the second month running. Widespread public support for the government’s 
handling of the pandemic deprived the opposition bloc of a majority for the first time in more than 
a year.124 Norway is also the only country to have been able to maintain a stable number of 
infections since the beginning of the second wave in November.125  
 
Finland   
Finland borders Sweden to the northwest, Russia to the east, and has a population of 5.5 
million people. Like its Scandinavian neighbors, Finland implemented strict lockdown procedures 
by declaring a state of emergency in the beginning of March and enforcing physical distancing 
measures, leading to a slow reopening of society a few months later in May.126 However, one big 
distinction between Finland and all other European countries is its focus on preparedness and how 
to act in national emergencies, born out of its collective experience during the Winter War in 1939-
40 against the Soviet Union. Its law on preparedness explicitly mentions pandemics and was 
triggered for the first time since the second world war while its emergency stockpiles of medical 
and protective equipment were the envy of the continent amid shortages elsewhere.127 
Although its economy similarly contracted by 0.9% in the first quarter and 4.5% in the 
second quarter, it grew by a record-best amount, 3.3%, in the third quarter.128 Although the Finnish 
economy took a dive in the second quarter due to its strict lockdown measures and decreased 
consumption and trade, the country was able to keep its COVID-19 infection rates at a record low 
level.129 As of December 8th, Finland reported a mere total of 29,572 cases, the lowest among all 
continental European countries, and a total death count of 442. Finnish Prime Minister Sanna 
Marin has enjoyed high approval ratings of 85% for her government’s handling of the pandemic.130 
 
Is it Too Little Too Late for a Success Story? 
Sweden seems to have been able to escape some of the harshest economic consequences 
that many states around the world experienced as their economies were rocked by shutdowns. As 
the government begins to reevaluate its strategy going forward, there is an undeniable reckoning 
occurring as Sweden must accept its vulnerability to a globalized world. The Swedish 
government fallaciously relied on individual responsibility to prevent the spread of a virus 
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wreaking havoc all over the world.  Measures taken to slow transmission while accounting for 
efforts to preserve the economy did not come close to achieving their medical goal, but whether 
refraining from a shutdown was enough to save the economy in a significant way is not as clear. 
 What is clear is that as the situation in Sweden fluctuates, those who are on either side of 
the debate on Sweden’s COVID-19 strategy have found themselves at some point in time 
seemingly vindicated by the data and events unfolding at that same time frame. 
Sweden attempted to be exceptional in its efforts to contain COVID-19 as well as 
preserve its economy and may have wound up successful in neither pursuit. As Prime Minister 
Löfven works with his government to take greater action on a national level that parallels more 
conventional COVID-19 containment strategies and Anders Tegnell finds himself less relevant 
and revered, Sweden must come to face with the reality that it may have to do just what it 
















Exhibit 1: The Swedish Healthcare Governance Structure  
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Source:   Kavaliunas, Andrius, Pauline Ocaya, Jim Mumper, Isis Lindfeldt, and Mattias Kyhlstedt. 
“Swedish Policy Analysis for Covid 19.” Health policy and technology. Fellowship of 
Postgraduate Medicine. Published by Elsevier Ltd., August 29, 2020. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7455549/. 
 
Exhibit 2: Swedish Public Health Agency’s Guidance to Protecting Oneself  
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Exhibit 3: Timeline of Swedish Policy Interventions  
 
Source:   Kavaliunas, et. al., “Swedish Policy Analysis for Covid 19.”  
 
Exhibit 4a: Dec 2019 Unemployment Rates           
 
Source: “The Swedish Economy December 2019.” konj.se. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
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Exhibit 4b: Dec 2019 Household and Business Confidence Indicator  
 
Source: “The Swedish Economy December 2019.” konj.se. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH. 
  
Exhibit 4c: Dec 2019 Export Orders in Manufacturing  
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Exhibit 5: Sweden Unemployment Rates  
 
Source: “Sweden Unemployment Rate1980-2020 Data: 2021-2022 Forecast: Calendar: 
Historical.” Sweden Unemployment Rate | 1980-2020 Data | 2021-2022 Forecast | 
Calendar | Historical. Accessed December 16, 2020. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/sweden/unemployment-rate. 
 
Exhibit 6a: Swedish Daily Coronavirus  
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Exhibit 6b: Swedish Daily Coronavirus Death  
 
Source:  “Sweden Coronavirus Figures.” Worldometer. Worldmeter, December 11, 2020. 
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/sweden/. 
 
Exhibit 7: Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation on March 22, 2020  
This evening, I would like to speak directly to you, the Swedish people. The COVID-19 virus is 
testing our country, our society and all of us as fellow human beings. Every person now needs to 
mentally prepare for what is coming. 
In Sweden, the COVID-19 virus is now spreading in the community. Lives, health and jobs are at 
risk. More people will get the disease, more people will have to say a final farewell to a loved one. 
The only way to manage this crisis is to face it as a society, with everyone taking responsibility 
for themselves, for each other and for our country. 
I know that many of you are worried. Worried about how our society will manage this crisis. 
Worried about yourself, about someone you love who is in an at-risk group, or that your job will 
disappear. I understand this. The coming months will be trying. But our society is strong. Our 
government agencies are working hard day and night. Our health care and education professionals 
and many, many other people in critical jobs are keeping our country going. 
I, as Prime Minister, and the Government I lead, will take every decision that is necessary to protect 
the lives, health and jobs of as many people as we possibly can. 
In Sweden, public gatherings of more than 500 people have been banned, and upper secondary 
school and university education is now conducted online. I want you to be prepared for the 
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possibility of further far-reaching decisions, sometimes at short notice, sometimes disrupting our 
everyday lives even more. 
The aim of the Government’s work is to limit the spread of infection, to prevent too many people 
becoming seriously ill at the same time. But also to secure health care resources, and at this difficult 
time lessen the impact for those of you who work and for businesses. Be prepared for this to 
continue for a long time. Be ready for the situation to change rapidly. But you should also know 
that we as a society are tackling this crisis with our collective strength. Now we all have a great 
personal responsibility. 
There are a few critical times in life when you must make sacrifices, not just for your own sake, 
but also for those around you, for your fellow human beings, and for our country. That time is 
now. That day has come. And the duty is everyone’s. Each and every one of us has a responsibility 
to prevent the spread of infection, to protect older people and those in other vulnerable groups. 
None of us should risk it. None of us should go to work with symptoms of illness. Young, old, 
rich, poor – it doesn’t matter, everyone must play their part. This also applies to those of you who 
are 70 or older, or who belong to other at-risk groups. I understand that it is frustrating to have to 
restrict your life, your social interactions, but right now it is necessary. For the sake of your own 
health of course, but also to protect other people and give the health care system a chance to 
manage the situation. 
And the adults among us must now behave like adults. Not spread panic or rumours. No one is 
facing this crisis alone, but everyone bears a huge responsibility. Each and every one of us. I know 
that the demands are huge. But this is the only way we can hold back the spread of infection. I 
know that some restrictions are trying. But this is how we can make sure that the health care system 
can manage the crisis. I know that the situation feels tough. But following the advice of the 
authorities is every person’s duty. Yours – and mine. 
Many of you are taking your responsibility as fellow human beings. You are helping your 
neighbours with their shopping, you are supporting your local restaurant by buying a takeaway 
lunch, you are not visiting your grandmother – but you are ringing her every day for a chat instead. 
This is solidarity in practice. I am proud to be Sweden’s Prime Minister when I see what so many 
people are doing for their fellow human beings. 
You are showing that when things are at their toughest, our solidarity is strongest. I am sure that 
every one of you in Sweden will take your personal responsibility and do your utmost to safeguard 
other people’s health and help each other. And that you will be able to look back on this crisis and 
be proud of your role, your contributions for your fellow human beings, for our society and for 
Sweden. 
Thank you 
Source: “Prime Minister's Address to the Nation, 22 March 2020.” Regeringskansliet. 
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Exhibit 8: Public Opinion Surveys on Sweden’s COVID - 19 Strategy 
 
 
Source: Erik Wengström Professor. “Coronavirus: Survey Reveals What Swedish People Really 
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Exhibit 9: 2018 Swedish General Election Results  
Source: “POLITICO Poll of Polls - Swedish Polls, Trends and Election News for Sweden.” 
POLITICO. Accessed December 17, 2020. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-
polls/sweden/.  
Exhibit 10: Percent Change in Trade in Export Goods, Q3 2019 – Q3 2020  
 
Source:  “International Trade - Trade in Goods - OECD Data.” the OECD. OECD, October 31, 
2020. https://data.oecd.org/trade/trade-in-goods.htm. 
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Exhibit 11: Percent Change in GDP Previous Quarter (Data Up to Date to include 2020 Q3)  
 
Source:  “GDP (1993–), Percent Change from Previous Quarter.” Statistiska Centralbyrån. 




Exhibit 12: Sweden Stock Market Performance, Jan 2020 - Dec 2020 
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Source: “Sweden Stock Market (OMX 30)1986-2020 Data: 2021-2022 Forecast: Quote: Chart.” 
Sweden Stock Market (OMX 30) | 1986-2020 Data | 2021-2022 Forecast | Quote | Chart. 
Accessed December 13, 2020. https://tradingeconomics.com/sweden/stock-market 
Exhibit 13: Progression of Strictness of National COVID-19 Policies  
 
Source:  Laurent, Lionel. “COVID Second Wave: Sweden Offers Hard Reality Check Ahead of 
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Exhibit 14: Cultural Map of the World 
 
Source: “World Values Survey Association.” WVS Database. Accessed December 16, 2020. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
Exhibit 15: Swedish GDP Change Relative to Other European Countries, Q1 & Q2 2020  
 
Source:  Savage, Maddy. “Coronavirus: Sweden's Economy Hit Less Hard by Pandemic.” BBC 
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Exhibit 16a: Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index for Sweden, Q1 and Q2 2020 
 
Source: oecd.org. OECD, March 2020. https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/OECD-
economic-surveys-sweden-2019-overview.pdf. 
 
Exhibit 16b: Services Purchasing Managers Index for Sweden, Q1 and Q2 2020 
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Exhibit 16c: Composite Purchasing Managers Index for Sweden, Q1 2019 to Q3 2020 
 
Source: “Sweden Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), Composite, October, 2020 - Data, Chart.” 
TheGlobalEconomy.com, October 31, 2020. 
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sweden/pmi_composite/. 
Exhibit 17: Swedish GDP  
 
Source: “Sweden Economic Growth - Data, Chart.” TheGlobalEconomy.com. Accessed 
December 16, 2020. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Sweden/Economic_growth/. 
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Exhibit 18: GDP Growth Rates in Q3, 2020, in the EU and Euro Area  
 
Sources: “GDP up by 12.5% and Employment up by 1.0% in the Euro Area.” eurostat.com. 
Eurostat, December 8, 2020. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/10662330/2-08122020-AP-EN.pdf. 
Exhibit 19: Attitudes Toward EU in Times of COVID-19 
 
Source:  Dennison, Susi, Claire Busse, Daniel Mainwaring, Franziska Brantner, Gustav Gressel, 
Goran Buldioski, and Theodore Murphy. “Together in Trauma: Europeans and the World 
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The Radicalization of the Far-Right in Germany and Regional 





Princeton University  
 
ABSTRACT: The radicalization of far-right political groups is becoming an increasingly 
dangerous problem in German politics. While Germany may be viewed as a fervent ally for liberal 
thought in Europe, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is gaining substantial traction 
in national politics. Interestingly, the AfD has grown disproportionately by region, drawing more 
support from East Germany than West. The underpinnings of this trend hinge upon increased 
asylum being granted to Muslim immigrants and the long-held disdane by the East for the West’s 
economic successes. An understanding of the AfD’s popularity is integral to combating intolerance 
and radicalization within Germany as well as the threat of its spread throughout Europe.  
 
Introduction 
The radicalization and political success of Germany’s far-right party, the Alternative for 
Germany or AfD, could pose a threat to Germany’s role as the defender of a liberal and tolerant 
Europe. The AfD’s negative attitudes towards immigration and Islam have fueled its most recent 
political advancements in the national parliament — the party won 12.6% of the national vote in 
the 2017 federal elections as well as making significant electoral gains in regional state 
governments (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019). In the state elections in the fall of 2019, Thuringia, 
Brandenburg and Saxony experienced large advances by the AfD — the party is currently the 
second largest party in these state governments, representing dramatic increases in the AfD’s vote 
share since the party’s establishment in 2013 (Chase and Goldenberg, 2019). It is also important 
to note that the AfD has veered sharply to the right since 2013. While it was founded as a 
conservative free-market protest party against the Greek bailout and the euro, it is now defined by 
its nationalist, anti-immigrant stance with elements of right-wing populism, racism, and neo-
Nazism (Bennhold and Eddy, 2019). The AfD’s support also varies significantly among 
Germany’s states, as AfD support is much more prominent in the former East than in the former 
West (Goerres et al, 2018). In the elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the AfD received 
11% of the vote — better than its 2014 outcome but worse than the 2017 elections — and managed 
to beat Angela Merkel’s center-right CDU to first place in two east German states. Currently, the 
AfD still comprises the largest opposition party in the German government ahead of the 2021 
federal election, with polls predicting the AfD to win about 10% of the vote. 
This paper seeks to understand why the AfD has radicalized and grown in prominence in 
recent years and, especially, why the regional differences in far-right support between the East and 
West exist. I argue that the recent rise of the AfD is the result of the recent spike in Muslim 
migrants seeking asylum in Germany and the fervent feelings of nationalism and xenophobia 
which it sparked, notably in the East. Secondly, I will argue that the greater support for the AfD in 
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the East is the result of long-existing feelings of disillusionment and resentment with the economic 
successes of the West as well as the socio-cultural differences that prevail today as a result of 
Germany’s divided history. 
 Germany is the symbolic leader of liberal democracy and tolerance in the E.U. and, as a 
result, the radicalization of the far-right in Germany poses a risk to liberal democracy everywhere. 
The analysis of the far-right also extends beyond Germany’s borders — in the last 10 years, we’ve 
seen tremendous advancements made by populist radical-right leaders and parties all over the 
world, and especially in Europe. The trend of such rising radical right anti-immigrant nationalist 
parties poses a serious threat to the survival of liberal democracy. The fact that the radical far-right 
is succeeding in Germany, a country with a history of Nazism that experienced the worst of what 
the far-right is capable of, is shocking and alarming. This paper will initially seek to understand 
why the far-right is radicalizing and succeeding in Germany and will focus on exploring the root 
of the regional differences in the AfD’s electoral base.  
 I have structured this paper in various sections for the purpose of clarity and organization. 
I will begin the paper with a literature review which will establish a scholarly foundation of what 
has already been said regarding the rise of populist radical right parties and regarding explanations 
for the regional split in AfD support. Next, I will present my hypotheses which provide the logic 
behind my argument, and then introduce my argument which aims to synthesize different strands 
of the academic literature. I argue that scholars have oversimplified the explanation for why the 
AfD is more successful in the former East than in the West and that a combination of political-
cultural and social-economic factors as well as historical legacies have united in this specific 
context to facilitate the stark regional divide. The research design section establishes how I intend 
to go about gathering and analyzing the evidence I will use to answer the research question. Lastly, 
I include my findings and analysis which confirms that a confluence of variables has enabled the 
regional divide in support for the AfD to emerge. 
 
Literature Review 
What Sort of Party is the AfD? 
The party was initially established in the context of the euro-crisis, and it stood for market-
liberalism and Euroscepticism. The AfD advocated for the end of Germany’s participation with 
the euro and for the reintroduction of the ‘Deutsche Mark’, Germany’s former currency. While the 
AfD already had a nationalist element, it was restricted mainly to economics. Already in 2014, 
internal disputes within the party led to the emergence of two factions: one Eurosceptic market-
liberal faction and one national-conservative faction that focused on immigration (Goerres et al, 
2018). As the refugee crisis began severely impacting Germany in 2015, the AfD shifted in the 
radical-right direction in its adoption of an anti-immigrant, xenophobic and nationalist stance. One 
common element however remained present throughout the entire party’s history: a distinctly 
populist theme, either pitting the common people against an undemocratic elite or pitting German 
nationals against immigrants and asylum seekers (Goerres et al, 2018).  
This paper will use the description of a ‘populist radical right party’, or PRRP (Goerres et 
al, 2018) – to describe the nature of the AfD. The PRRP class of political parties includes aspects 
of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, as defined by Mudde (2007). Other far-right parties 
in Europe include Hungary’s Fidesz led by Viktor Orban and France’s National Rally led by 
Marine Le Pen. According to Mudde, nationalism strives to achieve a monocultural state, driven 
by ideas of internal homogenization and external exclusiveness. Nativism, as a subtype of 
nationalism, is an ideology that finds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of 
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the native group, and that nonnative persons and ideas are fundamentally threatening to the 
homogeneous nation-state. Authoritarianism is defined as the belief in a strictly ordered society in 
which infringements of authority are severely punished; the third feature, populism, is understood 
as an ideology that pits society into two groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite. Given 
Mudde’s categorization of a party’s ideological stance, the AfD seems to fall well within the 
PRRPs, and has been accepted as such by multiple political scholars in recent years. 
 
Demand-Side & Contextual Factors in the AfD’s Recent Success 
The demand-side explores the reasons behind electoral support: cultural, economic and 
political factors as well as the changing political context that influences people to vote AfD. The 
literature has mainly focused on the rise of the modern political radical right, but not so much on 
the specific upsurge in support for the AfD or on the disparities between former Eastern and 
Western Germany. A popular explanatory approach is the cultural backlash thesis: “People who 
feel left behind or those who stand in conflict with more liberal views on topics such as family, 
sexuality, or national identity mobilize as a form of cultural countermovement against liberal and 
cosmopolitan value orientations” (Richter and Quent, 2019: 44). In the case of the AfD, supporters 
tend to share some key cultural-political attitudes – namely their rejection of immigration and their 
authoritarian, anti-democratic and chauvinistic attitudes (Richter and Quent, 2019: 44). In terms 
of the historical East-West and its cultural-political implications today, Richter and Quent 
examined how the East German disappointment  after German reunification, which stemmed from 
mass closures of East German businesses, high unemployment rates and the feeling of being 
second-class citizens, helped conjure an “East German identity” which relied on depreciating the 
‘other’ and those perceived as ‘weaker’ (2019: 46). Scholars have coined the term “East 
Deprivation” to describe the perception of personal and collective discrimination felt in the former 
East and have connected this perception of frustration and victimization to far-right extremist 
support in former East Germany (Richter and Quent, 2019: 47). 
Hansen and Olsen found that AfD voters in 2017 were driven solely by two factors: their 
attitudes towards refugees and anti-establishment sentiments with democracy (2019). Between 
2015 and 2018 Germany accepted an unprecedented 1.4 million, primarily Muslim, refugees from 
the Middle East and Africa. This was by far the most of any country in Europe (Statista.com, 
2018). Germany is a country with a large Christian population; thus, xenophobia and anti-
immigrant sentiments began to grow in parts of the country, especially in the East. The result of 
such a significant influx of migrants into a predominantly Christian country was the rise of 
xenophobia, racism, and ethno-pluralism – the belief that unique national cultures can only be 
preserved if they are kept separate - especially in the East (Goerres et al, 2018: 251). Such cultural 
sentiments seem to be a major motivation in Germany’s support for the AfD. 
The literature has also examined socioeconomic explanations for divergence in regional 
support for the AfD. Such explanations are typically referred to as “losers of modernization” 
theories: “real or feared economic deprivation leads to disappointment and anger, which manifests 
itself in a turning away from established parties and towards the alleged solutions offered by 
populist and extremist parties” (Richter and Quent, 2019: 43). Most scholars agree that economic 
motivation exercises only a slight role in gauging support for the far-right since nationalist 
ideology remains the primary motive of PRRPs. However, in the case of former East and West 
Germany, where an economic gap stemming from the post-war divide remains to this day, the 
economic factor is worth exploring. Economic disillusionment in the former East could be a 
potential factor causing higher support for the AfD compared to the more economically successful 
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former West. Goerres et al. find that economic motivations do indeed drive PRRP success — 
laissez-faire policies aimed at less economic redistribution, lower taxation, reduced welfare 
expenditure and welfare chauvinism are crucial elements of the typical PRRP platform (2018). 
Goerres et al. additionally find that PRRP supporters are driven by three economic motivations: 
welfare chauvinist attitudes, high criticism of programs they suspect to disproportionately benefit 
immigrants, and support for social insurance programs believed to benefit the more ‘deserving’ 
rather than the poor and unemployed. When considering the former East and West, the East lags 
behind the West on multiple fronts — the former East has a higher unemployment rate, less 
disposable income, a lower per capita GDP, and a lower quality of living (PewResearch.org, 2019). 
Since the AfD earns disproportionately higher support in the former East, the economic variable 
is not to be discounted.  
Another aspect of the scholarly literature regarding the rise of far-right radical parties is 
the contact theory argument which argues that increased contact with members of diverse ethnic 
groups will reduce prejudice and xenophobia as first-hand information about the out-group 
becomes available (Goerres et al, 2018: 253). The fact that there are disproportionately fewer 
migrants in the former East might correlate with what the contact theory would predict. Since the 
East Germans have less contact with the immigrants, this theory predicts that they would hold 
more xenophobic and racist attitudes.  
Lastly, scholars have discussed the political history of Germany with regards to regional 
support for previous far-right parties as an explanatory variable. Goerres et al. find a significant 
correlation between current support for the AfD and the electoral base of Die Republikaner, 
Germany’s radical-right party in the 1994 German Bundestag elections. Additionally, Richter and 
Quent find that 360 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands or National Democratic Party of 
Germany (NPD) elected officials are presently strongly rooted in Eastern communities. The NPD 
is Germany’s far-right and ultranationalist party founded in 1964 as a successor to the German 
Reich Party (2019: 44). Richter and Quent find that …  
In such areas, where far-right extremist issues supported by the NPD have found resonance 
in the social discourse for a long time, we may assume that processes of normalization and 
relativization go hand in hand with lowered resistance to far-right extremist positions 
within daily political discourse to a much greater degree (2019: 44). 
Such results indicate that there may be specific local regions where extreme and radical-right 
voting is more common and more socially acceptable, and that these regions have historically been 
in the former East.  
 
Supply-Side Factors in the AfD’s Recent Success 
The characteristics and evolution of the AfD party presents another aspect in explaining 
the rise of the far-right in Germany. Much of why the AfD has become successful in recent years 
is because it began as a market-liberal Eurocentric party, not a radical-right extremist party based 
on nationalist ideology, because given Germany’s history with right-wing extremism, no overtly 
radical right party has entered the government since the end of the Second World War. As the 
party evolved with the influx of immigrants in 2015, the AfD channeled feelings of resentment or 
anger into a nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-immigrant platform. Betz and Johnson explore the 
nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right — the far-right draws on feelings of 
resentment, unfairness and injustice and channels it against mainstream politicians whom they 
frame as the ‘self-serving corrupt political elite’ which pursues its own agenda without concern 
for ordinary citizens (2004). Thus, the party created the issue of a ‘perceived’ ethnic threat to 
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mobilize the electorate on a strong cause – that of restricting immigration in an effort to preserve 
the ‘pure, national and traditional’ culture. Ultimately, the AfD’s strategic shift to the far right with 
their anti-immigrant focus guaranteed the party the political support necessary to advance. The 
party justifies its racist and nativist rhetoric by claiming that exclusion of non-native groups is 
necessary to preserve the identity of the group, whose very ‘purity’ makes it sacred (Betz and 
Johnson, 2006).  
 Another supply-side aspect that might explain the rise of the AfD is the fact that the 
established parties were not satisfying the electorate on the key issue of immigration, providing a 
perfect opening for the far-right. Chou et al. refer to this as the ‘collective action dilemma’ — 
unless all established parties coordinate on proposing tougher immigration policies, the far right 
will remain a potent electoral force since they provide the sole channel of true representation for 
parts of the population (2018). Thus, support for the AfD remains stable and growing because 
other established parties fail to meet the people’s preferences on their most prioritized issue: 
immigration (Chou et al., 2018: 3). A key component of the AfD’s rhetoric is therefore anti-
establishment, putting forth the argument that elites and political leadership have not been listening 
to the ‘real’ German people (Betz & Johnson, 2006). The AfD was able to gain voters who 
previously supported one of the five main established parties through the immigration issue. 
Hansen and Olsen characterize the AfD as a ‘protest party’ for those dissatisfied with the current 
state of politics in Germany, arguing that the success of the AfD might be a signal of the failure of 
the established parties in Germany’s current political system. Arzheimer and Berning see German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to temporarily suspend the Dublin Regulation to allow 
hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers into Germany as the catalyst for the growth of the 
populist radical right in Germany (2019). The resulting ideological shift of the AfD in 2015, which 
framed migrants as a threat to German identity and success, induced German citizens to vote on 
the basis of their attitudes on immigration. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1.  Why would the AfD be radicalizing now? It seems that the political contextual changes in 
the past few years have been paramount in shaping the electoral base of the AfD. The rapid influx 
of refugees from the Middle East and Africa – foreigners, ethnically and religiously, to Germans 
– seems to have sparked a xenophobic backlash. The AfD was able to shift its policy platform to 
reflect the sentiments of parts of the German population with extreme anti-immigrant attitudes. 
The AfD’s success is contingent upon feelings that the German national identity is being 
threatened and that immigrants from countries like Syria and Afghanistan are the cause of this 
threat because of the perceived danger associated with Muslim migrants. It is interesting that when 
Turkish immigrants arrived in Germany in the 1970s, there was no extreme backlash in the form 
of a nationalist anti-immigrant political party as there is today with the AfD’s explicit anti-
immigrant agenda. The reason might be that Germany officially invited Turkish people to emigrate 
to help with their labor crisis: thus, they were labeled “Gastarbeiter”, or ‘guest workers’, and 
provided cheap labor for German benefit (Prevezanos, 2011). The Turkish migrants were not seen 
as threatening since they were initially expected to stay only for a few years, and their place in 
society was clearly subordinate to any German citizen. While opposition to Turkish immigrants 
did gradually take hold in the 1970s and 80s, it never amounted to the formation of a strong far-
right anti-immigrant party.  
Now, the situation is quite different. The migrants entering Germany are flocking in larger 
numbers and are not providing cheap labor, but are becoming recipients of Germany’s generous 
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social welfare system. In the eyes of the AfD and their supporters, the Muslim migrants are coming 
to Germany in the hopes of benefitting economically and therefore do not positively contribute to 
society. The large number of migrants from the Muslim world sparks more of a racist nationalistic 
backlash today because of these various factors. Thus, I propose that the root of the radicalization 
of the far-right party in Germany is the spike in Muslim immigration in 2015 which induced a 
threat to German national identity and wellbeing. 
 
H2.  The second question this paper will attempt to answer is why there is such a strong regional 
discrepancy in support for the AfD between the former East and West of Germany. In the 2017 
German Federal Election, the AfD received 20.5% of the vote in former Eastern Germany, while 
in the former West, the AfD received 10.7% – about half (Hansen & Olson, 2019: 12). While many 
factors might be contributing to the larger far-right sentiment in the East, I propose the hypothesis 
that the regional discrepancies are due to the cultural and economic differences that prevail today 
as a result of the post-war period in which Germany was divided. Eastern Germans remain more 
culturally traditional and are thus more susceptible to xenophobic and nationalist sentiment, while 
the West is more culturally progressive and modern as well as more economically advanced than 
the East.  
The logic here has to do with the continuing implications of the geographic and ideological 
split of East and West Germany after World War II. After the war, the goal of West Germany was 
to become a modern liberal democracy. Therefore, West German interests subjugated to the larger 
interest of ensuring the success of a post-war Europe. East Germany, on the other hand, was led 
by Soviet communists, cut off from the modern liberal world — nationalist sentiments were able 
to flourish as emphasis was put only on the success of communism in East Germany. There was 
little movement in or out of East Germany, thus ensuring the homogeneity of the East German 
population. On the economic front, the East still lags behind the West considerably, fueling 
feelings of resentment and frustration with both the West and the political establishment. In recent 
years, this resentment has grown to target Muslim migrants who they claim are threatening their 
economic and cultural livelihood. In an interview done by the New York Times, a retired 
hairdresser in former East Germany who voted for the AfD said she was fed up with how had not 
ensured her a good pension or enough teachers for schools but had somehow found money to 
integrate migrants: “I can barely pay for basics, while the newcomers are given so much. That isn’t 
right. It makes people really angry” (Bennhold and Eddy, 2019).  
Therefore, nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric thrives much more in the East. The AfD 
taps into such feelings of resentment and redirects them towards foreigners whom the AfD claims 
are threats to Germans and the German national identity. The combination of the cultural and 
economic disparities that exist between the East and West of Germany today help explain why the 
AfD has disproportionately higher support in the East than in the West. 
 
Argument 
Part 1: Why did Germany’s far-right party radicalize in recent years, and what explains their 
success?  
The radicalization of the AfD in Germany stems from the spike in immigration from the 
Arab world in 2015 and the evolving implications of the mass migration of Muslims into Germany. 
Coinciding with the global right-wing populist wave – as seen in the United States, Great Britain 
and France as well as many other countries – the rise in migration threatened German wellbeing 
and national identity. The AfD shifted to become a more radical right-wing, nationalist, 
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xenophobic party as the influx of Muslim migrants began in around 2015. As this is not such a 
contested phenomenon, I plan to focus my research and discussion on the second part of the 
argument. 
 
Part 2: Why is the AfD so much more successful in the former East Germany than in the former 
West? 
While much of the scholarship has focused on separating politico-cultural and socio-
economic factors, I will argue that it is the confluence of all of these factors that have converged 
in this particular time and context. Many political scientists have advantaged one unidimensional 
explanation at the expense of others, and I believe that this is not the right approach because the 
current specific context of Germany has allowed all of these factors to unite in a way that has 
brought about the success of the AfD particularly in the former East. All dimensions overlap and 
interact with one another. Nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric thrive much more in the East 
because of cultural and economic differences that stem from the West-East divide which lasted 
from 1945 until 1989. The legacy of separation stemming from the post-war time has resulted in 
cultural and economic differences that prevail today, and these differences have allowed the AfD's 
rhetoric to resound more in the East than in the West. In the former East, the AfD is able to tap 
into feelings of resentment towards the West and towards the political establishment and redirect 
such anger toward Muslim migrants and foreigners whom the AfD claim are threats to Germany 
and to the German national identity.  
The AfD is successfully using East Germans’ feelings of resentment and disillusionment 
to form a nationalist coalition that stands against globalization and immigration. Some of the 
factors I will explore are the legacy of communism and authoritarianism in the East today and how 
this historical legacy has engendered stronger feelings of nationalism and xenophobia in the East. 
Additionally, economic disparities that stem from the East-West divide have allowed the West to 
economically succeed at higher rates and achieve higher levels of education. I intend to analyze 
how the combination of the cultural and economic disparities that exist between the East and West 
today as a result of Germany’s history of separation help explain why the AfD has 
disproportionately higher support in the East than in the West. 
 
Research Design  
To test my two hypotheses, I use a two-part research design. The first part addresses the 
question of why the AfD is radicalizing now. I will do a qualitative analysis to develop a thorough 
explanation for why the AfD has become more successful in recent years. I identify a link between 
increased immigration from Muslim countries and higher support for the AfD and therefore 
propose that the spike in immigration caused a right-wing nationalist populist backlash because of 
the perceived threat to German national identity the migrants caused. I will explain the correlation 
between increased migration and increased support for the AfD through a qualitative analysis: why 
did people begin harboring such extreme anti-immigrant feelings, and how did the AfD’s platform 
evolve to explicitly adopt an anti-immigrant program? The qualitative nature of my research will 
seek to determine what exactly the causal mechanism is behind increased immigration and higher 
support for the AfD. I will analyze national and local news sources, the evolution of party 
platforms, and already-existing interviews with both members and supporters of the AfD. The 
mechanism I am trying to isolate is changing opinion toward immigration(essentially a measure 
of changing xenophobic and nationalist sentiment) as well as the changing character and policy 
platform of the AfD from a free-market party to an anti-immigrant right-wing populist party. 
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The second part of the research design will address the regional split in support for the AfD 
– in essence, why former East Germany has significantly higher support for the AfD than the 
former West. I will determine what factors are motivating support for the AfD and look at 
differences between West and East Germany as well as overall trends in the former West compared 
to the East. In order to identify the mechanism for why political-cultural and social-economic 
factors influence whether individuals hold anti-immigrant or radical right beliefs, I will do 
qualitative analysis through analyzing news sources, available online interviews, and various AfD 
official online platforms. This will reveal why former East Germans feel more inclined than former 
West Germans to vote for the AfD. I expect to find higher perceptions of threat as a result of 
Muslim migrants in the East, for which I will present evidence of political-cultural, social-
economic and historical factors in influencing such anti-immigrant feelings. While the economic 
factor might be prevalent, I foresee that the social-cultural and historical variables will be more 
significant in influencing higher AfD support in the former East.  
Through analyzing news sources, interviews and AfD online platforms, I draw the 
connection between stronger negative feelings and racism towards Muslim migrants in the East 
because of the threat they pose to East German economic advancement as well as the perceived 
ethnic threat as a result of stronger feelings of racism in the East. I find evidence that resentment 
towards the West already exists in the East, as I explore deeper through qualitative analysis of 
local newspapers and existing online interviews. The qualitative analysis will reveal that the AfD 
redirects already existing resentments in the East – economic, social and cultural – and frames the 
migrants as dangerous intruders that will keep East Germans behind and threaten the traditional 
German identity to which East Germans cling.  
In an effort to get at the root of the AfD’s recent success and regional disparities within 
Germany, I have considered multiple avenues to come up with qualitative data. First, I analyze 
AfD online discourse in the form of Facebook and Twitter posts, AfD campaign posters, and 
comments made by AfD party members and leaders found from interviews conducted by reputable 
German news and media organizations. Second, I consider what AfD supporters are saying through 
analyzing interviews conducted by news and media organizations. Third, I delve into Germany’s 
divided history to provide insight into why West and East Germans still think and act so differently 
after thirty years of reunification.   
 
Findings & Analysis 
I have structured this section in three categories. I begin with my findings about the AfD 
as a party, analyzing the party’s public image and rhetoric, then move onto what is motivating AfD 
supporters to vote for the party, and lastly consider how Germany’s divided history has affected 
the regional split in far-right support. My findings reveal that the essence of the AfD as a party is 
their vehement anti-Islam and anti-refugee stance, and that this resounds well with East Germans 
because of their fear of ‘Islamization’ and of being left behind, culturally and economically which 
stemsfrom the East’s unique historical legacy.  
 
The AfD’s Public Image 
The online social media content of the AfD centers around anti-immigration rhetoric. 
Serrano et al. analyzed the AfD’s social media platforms to find that the AfD was limiting their 
online content related to the economy while focusing on delivering provocative content related to 
immigration topics (2019: 222). Serrano et al. analyzed 12,912 Facebook posts and 30,437,991 
tweets, using topic modelling to compare the AfD’s official party platform manifesto with their 
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social media content. Due to a of lack of time and data analysis capabilities, I rely on their data 
and subsequent conclusions to support my analysis of the AfD’s social media discourse. While the 
AfD’s actual manifesto discusses the economy in 21% of the documents and immigration in 
19.2%, on Facebook the economy is mentioned 4.5% of the time and immigration 16.1% and 
Twitter, posts regarding the economy make up 4.7% of the total while immigration make up 21.8% 
(Serrano et al., 2019: 222). The AfD is utilizing the power of social media to spread its more 
provocative anti-migration agenda, playing to those who hold xenophobic attitudes and who rely 
on social media as their news source. In fact, multiple studies have confirmed the fact that AfD 
supporters prefer to obtain information from social media platforms, stemming from their 
disenchantment with already established communication channels (Serrano et al., 2019: 215). 
Additionally, the AfD is the most active political party on Facebook with far more comments, likes 
and shares than any other German political party (Serrano et al., 2019: 2018). The AfD appears to 
be using social media as a direct means with which to get their more confrontational and 
inflammatory anti-immigrant messages across to their pool of frustrated voters. 
The AfD’s campaign posters carry an obvious and garish tone of anti-Islamist and anti-
Muslim rhetoric, suggesting that the Muslim religion does not belong in Germany. A simple 
Google search allowed me to find a selection of Islamophobic slogans on AfD posters: “Stop 
Islamization”, “Islam-Free Schools!”, “’New Germans?’ – We’ll do it ourselves.”, "End asylum 
fraud! Vote AfD", and “’Burkas?’ We like bikinis.”. While the ‘Stop Islamization’ is an image of 
three Muslim women wearing burkas, the rest of the posters mainly depict pretty, white and young 
women. The rhetoric is clearly anti-Muslim – explicitly and negatively targeting an entire religious 
group – insinuating that asylum-seekers from the Arab world have no place in Germany and, 
contrary to Merkel’s open refugee policy, are not welcome.  
Many AfD posters have been defaced, vandalized, or torn down. Therefore, campaign 
posters are mainly hung at night to avoid the public eye, and high enough to be out of reach to 
those without a ladder. Such an approach to campaigning reveals that the AfD are aware that their 
rhetoric is incendiary and thus use tactics to prevent outright opposition and public confrontation. 
Hanging the poster so high that it is out of reach allows the poster to exist in a higher dimension – 
the people have no say or right to oppose what the poster is suggesting, and such a tactic might 
even be accused as being undemocratic for this reason. The AfD’s decision to focus on such 
imagery and derogatory slogans in their campaign posters reflects the kind of image they want to 
disseminate to the German public, and by doing so, shifts the frame of acceptable public discourse 
to the right. 
 
AfD Party Member Rhetoric 
In analyzing interviews with AfD party members and speeches given, it becomes clear that 
some of their words and phrases are “confusingly similar to those used by the Nazis” (Hänel, 
2020). Björn Höcke – the leader of the AfD’s far-right faction in Thuringia has been notoriously 
designated as a fascist by the courts, partly because he wrote a book so extreme that AfD 
lawmakers were not able to distinguish between Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Höcke when 
presented with excerpts which were all from Höcke’s book (Huetlin, 2020). Giving a speech in 
Dresden in January 2017, Höcke referred to Germans as being the “only people in the world to 
plant a monument of shame in the heart of its capital”, referring to the Memorial to the Murdered 
Jews of Europe in Berlin, and went on to call for a “180 degree change” in their commemoration 
policy (Taub and Fisher, 2017). Höcke’s inflammatory language does not end with belittling the 
Holocaust — he also utilizes racial stereotypes, making comments such as “thousands of German 
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youths experience school as a fearful place, because African thugs mob, terrorize and beat them 
there” (Hänel, 2020). While Höcke represents the more extremist members  of the AfD, it is 
estimated that around 40% of AfD party members identify themselves with the Höcke-led 
extremist wing. Additionally, the more radical far-right contingency dominates in the Eastern 
states such as Thuringia while in the West, support is substantially lower and much more moderate 
(Hänel, 2020).  
AfD leaders have been known for their offensive remarks, inciting public response and 
sparking debates around their racist, fascist and highly offensive rhetoric. Alexander Gauland, co-
chairman of the AfD, spoke about German national soccer team's defender Jerome Boateng, a 
Ghanaian German – asserting that despite his skills on the field, people would not want “someone 
like Boateng as a neighbor.” Gauland continued to say that “Germany should close its borders” 
and, referring to an image showing a drowned refugee child, claimed “We can't be blackmailed by 
children's eyes” (Hänel, 2020). In 2016, former co-chair of the AfD Frauke Petry condoned 
shooting at refugees attempting to enter Germany illegally, marking herself as the first German 
politician to condone shooting at the border since Communist East German leader Erich Honecker 
(Hänel, 2020). Further incendiary remarks came from Andrew Wendt, member of Parliament in 
the Eastern state of Saxony, who inquired into how far the state covers the cost of sterilizing 
unaccompanied refugee minors (Hänel, 2020). Andre Poggenburg, head of the AfD in Saxony, 
urged lawmakers in the state parliament to “get rid of, once and for all, this rank growth on the 
German racial corpus” – using phrases clearly reminiscent of Nazi terminology (Hänel, 2020). 
Lastly, Andreas Kalbitz, AfD chief of the Eastern state of Brandenburg, admitted to attending a 
2007 rally in Greece at which a swastika flag was raised, releasing a statement in 2019 that claimed 
he took part “out of curiosity” (Hänel, 2020). AfD leaders, especially those in power in the East, 
have proven to be capable of truly remarkable horrid discourse. Most of these offensive comments 
are extremely racist, ultranationalist and highly aggressive at their essence.  
What motivates all of these comments, though, is a nostalgia for a white and traditional 
Germany – a vision which is being threatened by western values of multiculturalism and 
globalization and the political establishment’s failure to acknowledge the fears and the anger of 
those in the East. Angela Merkel’s ‘Willkommenspolitik’, or ‘Welcome Politics’, that resulted in 
the mass migration of around one million asylum-seekers from the Middle East in 2015 and 2016 
is portrayed as the catalyst for the breakdown of German society and culture. Central to the AfD’s 
narrative is that “the east is where Germany is still Germany and where men are still men”, evoking 
a narrative reminiscent of “gallic villages in the eastern countryside” (Bennhold and Eddy, 2019). 
The AfD thus promises to fight for the Germany that the East yearns for – giving them the attention 
that was lacking from the mainstream political establishment.  
 
Voting AfD in Protest 
Having analyzed the supply-side, the AfD’s public image and rhetoric, I will now go on to 
analyze the demand-side: how are AfD supporters receiving the AfD and what do they think about 
the party? In interviews with AfD party supporters found on Der Spiegel TV, findings seem to 
indicate that they view the party as a protest party. Der Spiegel TV reveals that many supporters 
are not familiar with the party platform but claimed they would vote for the AfD anyway, as a 
protest vote (Der Spiegel, 2016). Others referred to a time when they were ‘robbed by foreigners’ 
and conveyed that they understood the AfD to be a party for the older generation and those who 
hold resentments (Der Spiegel, 2016). Another claims that he views the party as a real alternative 
that has the capacity to deliver on promises of security and freedom (Der Spiegel, 2016). East 
100
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/9
The Radicalization of the Far-Right in Germany and Regional Disparities in Support 
 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 4 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
101 
Germans seem to vote for the AfD as a  protest against  the current establishment, Merkel’s open 
refugee policy, the perceived lack of understanding and attention given to them, and the fact that 
East Germans are being forced to accept asylum-seekers whom they view as intruding on and 
threatening the traditional German way of life. 
 ‘Der Spiegel TV’ also includes various images distributed by the AfD – all of which portray 
Angela Merkel and refugees in a negative light. One image portrays Angela Merkel smiling in 
front of a decimated bleak scene of a destroyed city, with the slogan “Terror, Bombs, Migration: 
Mommy says, ‘You will make it!’” (Der Spiegel, 2016). An image disseminated by a young 
offshoot of the AfD – the ‘Young Alternatives’ – shows a wooden box containing an ax and a 
sledgehammer with the slogan, “Refugee-Starter kit” (Der Spiegel, 2016). In the interview, Young 
Alternative member David Eckert, a 24-year old right-wing thinker, says that “it is clear that a 
youth organization will be more provocative than the mother organization”, and when prompted 
to speak about the “Refugee-Starter kit” image, he replied that it can of course be interpreted as 
the fact that Germany is giving refugees the tools with which to start a new life in Germany. The 
interviewer responds by saying that it also is a very obvious reference to refugee ax-terrorism, to 
which Eckert remarks “but it is you that made that connection” (Der Spiegel, 2016). Eckert 
continues to say that the Young Alternatives seek to get rid of German citizenship for the many 
Turkish people living in Germany, claiming that there are problems with their loyalty to Germany, 
that the term ‘Turkish guest worker’ is a myth, and that they should all leave and move back to 
Turkey. Additionally, the youth organization’s platform contains the fact that Germany needs more 
children – essentially that it isn’t the answer to accept people from outside of Germany to constitute 
the new generation. Eckert finds that ‘Germany needs to move to the right’ and that he wants to 
see ‘eventual assimilation’ (Der Spiegel, 2016). Weronika Zimnik, a 15-year old member of the 
Young Alternatives, looks up to Björn Höcke – the leader of the AfD’s far-right faction – and says, 
“We don’t want to have the refugees. We don’t want the Western values here in East Germany” 
(Der Spiegel, 2016). Such findings indicate that the AfD focuses on portraying xenophobic 
narratives aimed at Germans who feel frustrated with Merkel and her refugee policy and who are 
nostalgic for and yearn for a culturally homogenous, traditional and white Germany. 
 
Voting AfD Out of Fear and Resentment 
 AfD supporters also tend to be fearful about ‘Islamization and terrorism’ and saddened by 
their perceived ‘erosion of traditional family values’ (Hill, 2017). A cheerful blonde woman in her 
60s who supports the AfD interviewed by the BBC said: “The old people don't dare leave the house 
after six o'clock … I live in such a beautiful place but when I open the door, the first thing I see is 
headscarves and then I go to the tram and I see the groups of young men” (Hill, 2017). Such voters 
are angry with Angela Merkel for having opened Germany’s doors to a million Muslim migrants, 
which they perceive as threatening local populations and the German national identity. Another 
interviewee voiced opinion: “The refugees come here but they don't plan to ever go back to their 
countries when the war is over. All along they planned to stay and replace the local population. 
More and more people are realizing that” (Hill, 2017). BBC journalist Jenny Hill finds that the 
East Germans are disappointed and resentful about feeling left behind: 
They’re saddened by what they see as the erosion of traditional family values. And they're 
angry. Their fury is directed at the mainstream political parties which, they feel, don't care 
about them. But the main force of their ire is directed at Angela Merkel and her decision 
to open Germany's doors to a million migrants (Hill, 2017).  
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What is clear after examining the AfD’s public discourse is that the main factor attracting 
support is their utter insistence that Islam does not belong in Germany and that Merkel’s 
welcoming refugee policy has threatened the wellbeing of the German nation and identity. There 
are manifold reasons why people in the East sympathize with the AfD, but a key component is that 
they feel ignored and left behind by the modernizing forces of the West which are making decisions 
that they perceive to be harmful to Germany. What remains interesting is that far fewer asylum-
seekers arrive in the East; the majority of refugees actually reside in the West. This fact 
substantiates the contact-theory argument mentioned in the literature review – namely that 
increased contact with a certain outgroup softens opposition to that outgroup. With minimal 
contact with asylum-seekers in the East, unsubstantiated myths and awful stereotypes flourish 
much quicker, leading to much more ardent negative attitudes towards that outgroup. It is clear 
that AfD supporters are attracted to the party because of its outright insistence that Islam does not 
belong in Germany. The AfD prides itself on being the right party to challenge the mainstream 
parties like the CDU and SPD which they perceive have led Germany astray. 
 
A Divided History 
 Since the end of World War II, the East and West of Germany have had drastically different 
histories — from 1945 until 1989, East Germany or the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was 
under communist rule while West Germany was a federal republic – a democratic form of 
government. While reunification occurred over thirty years ago and was a positive event in 
Germany’s history, it had serious ramifications for the East, some of which are still being felt to 
this day. On the economic front, East Germany has remained about 30% lower than West Germany 
in regard to all important macroeconomic indicators since 1996 (Land, 2013:109). Additionally, 
East German unemployment has recently been up to twice as high as in the West, hitting a high 
point of more than 20% in 2005 (Land, 2013: 109). Further, in 2009, GDP per capita in the East 
was almost a third below that in the West (Ibid: 109). Such a persevering economic divide may 
have contributed to an increased sense of economic discontent, frustration with the West and of 
being ‘left behind’ for East Germans in an increasingly global and multicultural world.  
 In addition to the economic aspect, the legacy of an authoritarian communist regime also 
cannot be discounted in evaluating why the AfD’s radical platform is received more positively in 
the East than the West. Up until the end, the East German Communist Party “saw ‘the people’ as 
a homogeneous mass that shared the party’s views” (Bösch and Gieseke, 2018: 47). During this 
time, East Germans lived in a homogenous society that prided itself on social equality and order. 
Perhaps this history of racial and cultural homogeneity has engendered an ideal vision of a purely 
white and traditional German society with ‘law and order’ that subconsciously influences how East 
Germans perceive asylum-seekers from the Arab world seeking refuge in Germany. The West was 
opened to the idea of democracy decades before the East, where ideas of cultural, societal and 
political heterogeneity were allowed to flourish much earlier.  
This article seeks to understand why the AfD is so much more successful in the East than 
in the West. I argue that Germany’s split history has resulted in legacies that undeniably influence 
how Germans perceive themselves today and how they perceive the recent rise in immigration. 
While not only economically frustrated and resentful of the West, East Germans also have a 
dramatically different history that has influenced who they are and how they think. The AfD has 
managed to become a party that voices the concerns that matter most to East Germans in today’s 
world: immigration, globalization and the corrupt political establishment run by ‘Western’ values.  
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The majority of the AfD’s rhetoric is focused on refugees and asylum-seekers, clearly 
playing on German xenophobic sentiments. However, the AfD utilizes the economic grievances 
and frustration of those in the East who feel ‘left behind’ not only economically but also socially 
and culturally. The AfD gives attention to such grievances and blames their current frustrations 
and anger on the mainstream political establishment who have facilitated the arrival of Muslim 
foreigners from the Middle East. Thus, the AfD’s rhetoric center on outright xenophobia while 
using economic and cultural grievances to mobilize voters and to convince them that the recent 
spike in Muslim migrants is the cause of their discontent.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the existing literature has oversimplified the question of why the AfD is 
more successful in the former East than in the West. Scholars often name one factor as the cause 
of regional divides in political attitudes, but I have synthesized the various arguments to come up 
with a more nuanced and holistic understanding of the complex issue of populist radical far-right 
support. Through my analysis of the AfD as a party, of the attitudes of AfD supporters in the East, 
and of Germany’s historical legacies, the paper has developed the argument that a combination of 
political-cultural, social-economic and historical factors have united in this specific context to 
facilitate the stark regional divide in AfD support.  
This article adds to the existing literature on the radical far-right in a few ways. First, it is 
an examination of the rise of the far-right in Germany specifically. Most existing scholarly 
literature is focused on Western Europe or even the world more generally, but this research project 
delves into explaining, specifically, the success of Germany’s far-right party, Alternative for 
Germany, or the AfD. Additionally, while there has been literature dedicated to the rise of the far-
right in Germany, this paper hopes to shed light on the reasons for the strong regional divide in 
support for the AfD in the former East and West of Germany, for which little literature currently 
exists. This information might provide crucial information for those interested or involved in 
German politics, as comprehending the reasons an electorate votes and thinks the way it does is 
especially significant in the field of politics. 
 One limitation of this paper is that public sentiment and opinion regarding the AfD is 
rapidly evolving, and the success of the AfD varies in every election and in every German state. 
Thus, it is difficult to test a hypothesis about regional differences if the data changes when the next 
election cycle occurs. An additional limitation is that it would have been extremely helpful to 
actually talk to AfD voters in Germany to find out what’s truly behind their decision, both in the 
West and the East. Since conducting interviews was not feasible for me, this presents a limitation 
to the project. However, while the results might change slightly, I do not think they would discount 
my central argument. The decades of resentment and discontent felt in the East would not 
disappear, nor would their strongly felt attitudes of xenophobia and anti-Islamist fears that have 
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ABSTRACT: China’s recent history as a Communist stronghold-turned-economic-powerhouse has 
garnered widespread scholarly and popular attention, as its government seeks to marry economic 
liberalization with one-party rule, propping up the private sector while retaining the preeminence 
of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). As its economy continues to grow at astounding rates and 
the state begins to take a more forward position on the world stage, many have deemed it an 
impending threat to Western hegemony. Yet focusing on China’s outward positioning obscures the 
many peculiarities bubbling within it. On the ground, the landscape of the country has been 
fundamentally transformed within a relatively short time frame. The geography produced by the 
quick one-eighty from state-sponsored communism to state-sponsored capitalism is fascinating, 
providing us with an insightful counterpoint to processes more familiar to us in the West. The rapid 
urbanization that has accompanied the onset of market reforms has led to urban forms and 
characteristics hitherto unseen. 
 
I. Introduction 
China’s recent history as a Communist stronghold-turned-economic-powerhouse has garnered 
widespread scholarly and popular attention, as its government seeks to marry economic 
liberalization with one-party rule, propping up the private sector while retaining the preeminence 
of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). As its economy continues to grow at astounding rates and 
the state begins to take a more forward position on the world stage, many have deemed it an 
impending threat to Western hegemony. Yet focusing on China’s outward positioning obscures 
the many peculiarities bubbling within it. On the ground, the landscape of the country has been 
fundamentally transformed within a relatively short time frame. The geography produced by the 
quick one-eighty from state-sponsored communism to state-sponsored capitalism is fascinating, 
providing us with an insightful counterpoint to processes more familiar to us in the West. The rapid 
urbanization that has accompanied the onset of market reforms has led to urban forms and 
characteristics hitherto unseen. 
This paper will focus on one specific peculiarity: the prevalence of urban villages within 
many of China’s megacities. This is a phenomenon that has not yet reached the public 
consciousness in the West but that provides a remarkable contrast to our notions of the urban-rural 
divide and class tensions ubiquitous in large cities. As urban sprawl collides with rural 
collectivized land, urban villages develop. They subvert traditional understandings of what makes 
a city and what makes a village and cause us to reconsider our preestablished notions of urban 
space, how it is produced, and who produces it. Classical theories of spatial production may not 
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be appropriate for explaining the dynamics within urban villages, and conversely. urban villages 
may shed light on aspects of the urban experience that these same theories overlook.  
In this paper, I will explore these processes in relation to Henri Lefebvre’s framework of 
spatial production and Harvey’s theory of the “right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1974; Harvey, 2008). 
I argue that urban villages are atypical in that the interactions between the forces fighting for 
control over the production of space in these environments differ from the conventional 
relationships described in Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s works. Instead of a classic Marxist struggle 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, urban villages present a tripartite relationship in which 
one actor, the village collective, acts as both dominator and dominated. They are simultaneously a 
victim of capitalist exploitation and a perpetrator of it, and through this role they subvert many of 
our critical understandings of urban socioeconomic positionality. Additionally, they do this while 
still under a system of collectivized ownership, further casting doubt on the proposed socialist 
solution advanced by both Lefebvre and Harvey.  
In making my argument, I am not attempting to delegitimize these theories – rather, I intend 
to build on them by revealing their blind spots and what they fail to account for. I will construct 
my argument by first providing some historical context on urban villages and how they came to 
be. I will then describe what they look like now amidst the processes presently ongoing. Next, I 
will introduce the three main actors central to my analysis – the government, the villagers, and the 
migrants – all of whom have a different stake in urban villages and play a role in shaping the space. 
Then, I will dive a little deeper into the theoretical background of this paper by describing the 
arguments put forth by Lefebvre and Harvey. After all of this necessary contextualization, I will 
begin my analysis, examining how the dynamics present within urban villages contradict 
Lefebvre’s and Harveys’ theories, which are often used liberally and universally to apply to most 
contexts. I will explain how there are many elements of urban villages that are in line with what 
Lefebvre and Harvey have argued, but there are also many processes that either run counter to or 
complicate what the theorists predicted. Finally, I will describe the wider implications of my 
analysis on conventional spatial theories of urbanization and capitalism and their limitations.  
I am also well aware that urban villages are not homogenous. Keeping in mind the high 
levels of variation amongst China’s urban villages, I will only be examining urban villages in 
Guangdong province – though I acknowledge that even within this province there is still a 
significant (though lesser) degree of variation.   
 
II. Historical Background 
To understand the development of urban villages, it is first necessary to understand the history of 
land ownership and land reform in China through the latter half of the 20 th century. During the 
1950s, Maoism was the dominant ideology in China, and as such the concept of land ownership 
was heavily shaped by Communist principles. Land was designated as urban land or rural land, 
each implying its own type of ownership. Urban land was nationalized and legally owned by 
municipal governments, and rural land was collectivized and jointly owned by the village (Wang 
& Wang, 2014). Collective ownership meant that the land was not owned by households or 
individuals, but instead by the commune itself, overseen by “a community body that is seen as the 
legitimate entity representing the interests of all its constituents.” (Yep, 2015, p. 535). In other 
words, at the village-level, a council had to be designated to serve as representatives of the 
community. They were charged with managing and coordinating the resources within the 
community, a responsibility that included allocating land and labor and setting redistribution rules, 
among other things. The resultant redistribution held these collectives together. Any goods 
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produced or revenue earned would go not to those who produced or earned it, but rather to these 
representative councils (termed ‘production brigades’), who would decide how much of the surplus 
should be distributed to each household. This gave everyone a shared stake in both production and 
the profits of production. This system, however, put a great deal of power in the hands of the 
brigades, creating a hierarchical relationship between themselves and other members of the village 
collective (Kan, 2016). 
This system continued until the 1980s, when it was dismantled as the state pivoted to open 
up to the free market, bringing with it a policy of decollectivization. Production brigades were 
abolished, and individual households were allocated plots of land to produce on and profit from. 
Yet, despite these processes, the ownership of the land still remained in the hands of the village 
collective – it did not become individually owned, even as other types of private property began 
to accumulate. Brigades were replaced by ‘administrative villages’, localized units of rural 
administration which essentially came to serve the same function as the brigades. Thus, the notion 
of ‘collective property’ remained, and the rural land stayed in the hands of the village collective 
(Kan, 2016, p. 591). 
 In the same sense, post-economic liberalization, urban land also remained under the 
ownership of the state. Thus, the government had jurisdiction over how land use rights were 
transferred or leased to users (companies, individuals, other municipal governments) in exchange 
for payment (Song, 2007). The government was able to establish a market for private property via 
this process of leasing out blocks of land, which was crucial to the regime’s objective of bolstering 
the nation’s economy. This initiative went hand-in-hand with the state’s desire to grow its urban 
areas, jumpstarting a process of urbanization that quickly took off. Cities began rapidly expanding, 
stimulated by the government buying up the land surrounding metropolitan areas to construct new 
development after new development and accelerate urban growth (Geng et al, 2020). Economic 
activity became increasingly concentrated in these cities, fueling waves of migration that 
subsequently increased the demand for new developments, creating a positive feedback loop that 
encouraged the buying up of more and more of the adjacent land.  
However, the state ran into a problem when it began infringing on land owned by the 
village collective. To continue their expansion, cities had to expropriate this land, buying it up 
from collectives to then lease and develop on the private market. But oftentimes collectives were 
unwilling to sell their land or wanted to negotiate higher sums. Due to the complex and poorly 
understood processes of land reform that accompanied decollectivization, it was unclear exactly 
what the land was valued at, and therefore compensation payment offers were arbitrary and 
unstandardized (Wang & Wang, 2014). As a result, governments would often requisition farmland 
(as this was generally cheaper to expropriate) and leave existing residential areas under the 
ownership of the collectives (Lin et al, 2011). This left small chunks of collective-owned land 
amidst large plots bought up by the state. For example, in Liede, a village in Guangzhou, the village 
retained only 50 hectares of reserved residential land after expropriation. As compensation, the 
village (collectively) received 450 million yuan for lost land and 380 million yuan for lost crops 
(Kan, 2016).  
As cities continued to expand and more and more of the surrounding villages were 
swallowed up by this process, these still-collectively owned residential areas ended up at the 
centers of cities. Skyscrapers, gated communities, and commercial centers sprang up around them 
in areas that the state had privately developed, while these village enclaves – called cheng zhong 
cun, literally “village in a city” in Mandarin Chinese – followed their own independent 
development trajectory (Geng et al, 2020, p. 182). The resulting geography presents sets of dense, 
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poorly maintained, run-down neighborhoods of tightly packed apartments, surrounded by seas of 
glimmery high-rises and shiny new developments. 
This process began several decades ago and continues to this day, as China’s major cities 
– now termed megacities – continue to grow. Guangdong province has achieved an urbanization 
level of 63%, a result of flourishing economic activity in its two megacities Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen (Wang & Wang, 2014). Consequently, these two cities also have a high concentration 
of urban villages – in 2018, Guangzhou was reported to host 272 urban villages, while Shenzhen 
in 2000 reported 241. The villages in Shenzhen are said to accommodate approximately 2.15 
million people (Geng et al, 2020).  
 
 
         (Weng, 2016) 
Figure 1: Aerial view of Xiancun Village, in Guangzhou, China. 
 
 
       (Geng et al, 2020) 
Figure 2: Google Earth photo of Shipai Village, in Guangzhou, China. 
109
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue III 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
Spatial Relations and Power Dynamics of China’s Urban Villages 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 5 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
110 
 
Urban villages are primarily composed of migrants and local villagers. The former will 
typically only spend a few years living in the village, while the latter are usually permanently 
settled. As a result, villagers are far more entrenched and able to participate in the village 
collectives that give them access to land ownership and use rights. Taking advantage of the 
popularity of their neighborhoods, they have learned to develop their houses (often illegally) and 
rent them out to incoming migrants needing homes. For these migrants, urban villages are often 
their first home upon moving to a city. Their central locations and relatively cheap prices make 
them appear enticing to migrants who prioritize accessibility and proximity to employment 
opportunities (Chung, 2017).  
As more and more migrants settled in these urban villages, they developed a community 
network, thereby attracting more migrants and so on and so forth (Chung, 2017). Now, though 
local villagers possess vastly more social and financial capital, the number of migrants greatly 
outnumber their local counterparts. This relationship will be further elaborated on in later sections, 
but first I will provide a closer look into what urban villages look like on the ground.  
Let us consider the case of Xiaocun village, an urban village in Guangzhou. Over the last 
twenty years, Xiaocun has seen its population swell from two thousand to over fifty thousand 
(Geng et al, 2020). Migrants account for 90% of the total population and are squeezed into only 
390 houses total, spread over an area of 49,600 square meters (Chung, 2017). In some areas, the 
population density can reach up to 2400 persons per hectare (Lin et al, 2011). Other urban villages 
have similar stories.   
 
        (Zhou, 2014) 
Figure 3: Baishizhou Village, in Shenzhen, China. 
 
Thus, these urban villages are incredibly overcrowded and congested. This, combined with 
poor maintenance and a lack of official oversight, means that residences are deteriorating with 
little upkeep, infrastructure (such as roads and sewers) is outdated, and public security issues run 
rampant (Yamaguchi & Shinya, n.d.). Facilities inside the residences are even worse. Examining 
the housing conditions inside urban villages in Shenzhen, Wang et al. notes:  
 
37 per cent of migrants do not have exclusive use of a toilet, bathroom or kitchen; 35 per 
cent do not have exclusive use of a water tap; over 40 per cent do not have showers. 
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Moreover, even though a gas supply has become the norm in Shenzhen, many migrants 
still use coal as their main source of fuel. Some migrants put coal-fired stoves or gas 
cookers inside their bedrooms, which could be a fire hazard and an uncomfortable source 
of heat in the very hot summer. (Wang et al, 2010, p. 89)  
 
In this sense, the material conditions of these urban villages are dismal, and this is especially 
apparent when juxtaposed with the glitzy new developments rising up around them. This fact also 
provides ample ammunition for local governments to attack these villages, citing health and safety 
hazards as the justification for requisitioning the land and developing it formally (Geng et al, 
2020). This rhetoric is becoming more and more prevalent as the state begins to use terms like 
‘urban renewal’ and ‘urban clean-up’ to legitimize their initiatives to commandeer, demolish, and 
rebuild urban villages. For the purposes of this paper, I will not delve too deeply into these 
proceedings (beyond discussing the general nature of negotiations currently taking place between 
collectives and municipal officials). Each local government’s treatment of each urban village is so 
inconsistent that attempting to identify overall trends would paint an erroneous picture of where 
and what redevelopment is actually occurring. I will instead stick to understanding urban villages 
as they are right now and leave the question of what is to happen to them going forward to other 
work.  
 
III. The Three Actors 
Next, it is necessary to elucidate the three main actors whose interactions 
compose the narrative I am constructing about spatial production in urban villages. These actors 
are the government, the villagers, and the migrants. The government’s actions and incentives are 
relatively straightforward. They function similarly to the state and/or the elite in many other cities, 
in that their primary incentive is to maximize the profitability of the land itself. When expropriating 
land, their objective is to pay as little as they can in compensation, and eventually resell the land 
to whichever private company is most likely to increase its value the most. They do not prioritize 
the lives or well-being of either the local villagers or the migrants, and only seek to acquire more 
land for redevelopment. They view urban villages as “unsightly and congested settlements that 
occupy premium land in the city.” (Kan, 2016, p. 596). In their eyes, urban villages are problem 
areas for two reasons. First of all, they occupy highly-desirable space and “waste” it, and second 
of all, their unseemliness may drive down the demand for surrounding developments. In this sense, 
the government, like the capitalists in conventional urbanization and gentrification literature, seeks 
to take advantage of the realization of the ‘rent gap’ underutilized under the current land use regime 
(Stein 2019; Kan 2016, 596).  
 This aspiration is, however, complicated by the unwillingness of village collectives to give 
up their land, and negotiations between these two actors add a layer of complexity to the dynamics 
within urban villages. The village collective coalition possesses a unique set of actions and 
incentives and represents the second actor central to our analysis. While these coalitions are made 
up of several different groups, they share the common trait that they are all indigenous to the 
village and have likely been for several generations. The land, therefore, has been passed down 
through families for decades, and it is likely that the relatives of present villagers were the peasants 
that originally participated in the village communes during the Mao era (Chung, 2017). Hence, 
most come from farming, working-class backgrounds, with their main asset being that they have 
a claim to the land they reside on. As the city expanded around them, most villagers stayed on 
these lands, even as the state began to push to buy it up. Many villagers resisted these efforts, 
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unhappy with the value of compensation payments or simply unwilling to leave their ancestral 
homes. Yet, seeing how high demand was for land they already owned, many also realized the 
lucrative financial opportunity that had presented itself (Kan, 2016). 
 They found that they could invest in their properties and develop them as rental units, 
renting them out to migrants flooding the cities and making large profits off of the rental income. 
Though the land was managed by the ‘administrative villages’, each household (through long-term 
local residency) already had a predetermined stake in it through the structure of collectivized 
ownership. Thus, this structure turned former peasants into quasi-shareholders, with the 
administrative village serving as central management. Shareholding worked as a distributive 
mechanism which pooled the rental revenue generated by each unit and converted it into shares. 
These shares were then distributed out to individuals and households in the form of dividend 
payments (Kan, 2016). These dividends cultivated a sense of mutual support and trust in the 
collective, as each shared a financial stake in its continued success. For some villagers, dividends 
from rent became their primary source of income, especially as many were undereducated and 
unable to obtain employment in the urban economy (Kan, 2016). In an effort to bolster the amount 
of rental income obtained, villagers began to further develop their properties, soon becoming quite 
a stable fixture in the residential real estate market. However, these developments often bordered 
on – or were blatantly – illegal, as they violated health and safety codes or construction regulations. 
In the hopes of raising rental income by stuffing more and more people into limited spaces, 
villagers extended frames of old homes or constructed entirely new buildings on-site. As long as 
there was more demand for housing (which, as these cities continued growing, there always was), 
villagers would keep building (Geng et al, 2020). Yet this enthusiasm for development did not 
extend to a willingness to maintain these residencies, leading directly to the overcrowded but 
shoddy conditions described earlier. 
 This process only reinforced the frustration of the state, which acknowledged that the 
continued financial success experienced by villagers as landlords would make them even less 
likely to sell their land, but also had a heightened incentive to acquire the land as settlements 
became more crowded and unsightly. They have, as a result, redoubled their efforts to expropriate 
urban village land, though the success of these efforts varies case-by-case (Crawford & Wu, 
2014).  
The third set of actors crucial to the spatial production of urban villages are the migrants, 
who make up the bulk of renters in these neighborhoods. It is difficult, of course, to make 
generalizations covering such a large group of people, as there is undoubtedly significant variation 
in the backgrounds, preferences, and motivations of those who fall under this category. That being 
said, previous literature has found that the majority of migrants move to a new city in pursuit of 
economic opportunities, often coming from rural areas in the central and western regions of the 
country and migrating to urban areas in the coastal regions (Goodkind & West 2002). They are 
often referred to as the “floating” population, or liudong renkou, due to high rates of residential 
and employment mobility and short settlement durations (Zhu, 2007, p. 65). 
Much of migrant life is the product of household registration. The household registration 
system, or hukou, is another legacy of China’s socialist era, historically acting as a form of 
migration control to disincentivize individuals from permanently moving their place of residence. 
Essentially, the system provides individuals with a form of local citizenship: it registers one’s 
residence in one, and only one, region. Citizens are usually registered at their place of birth and 
must give up their registration if they are to move permanently outside of that locale and reregister 
elsewhere. However, an official reregistration and change of hukou is exceedingly difficult to 
112
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/9
Katlyn Zhao 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 5 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
113 
obtain. In addition, local permanent registration is necessary for obtaining many social benefits – 
without it, migrants are unable to access social services like public schools, state sector jobs, or 
welfare programs (Wu, 2004). Hence, though migration itself is legal, the barriers to social living 
conferred by the hukou system disadvantage migrants in whatever region they migrate to and 
isolate them from the native population. 
Household registration is also the primary reason why so many migrants choose to live in 
urban villages despite poor conditions. Without hukou, migrants are barred from accessing low-
cost public housing built and subsidized by the state. Additionally, lacking hukou creates barriers 
to finding decently-paid permanent employment, meaning that migrants cannot afford to find 
better housing on the formal commercial market either (Lin et al, 2011). Both of these factors, in 
combination with urban villages’ convenient locations, mean that urban villages are usually the 
most cost-effective – if not the only – option for the majority of migrants. In that sense, migrants 
are essentially forced to put up with the crowded, subpar living conditions put upon them by hostile 
and profiteering villagers, who see migrants as an entirely different class of people. Villagers are 
known for treating migrants poorly, looking down on them and excluding them from local social 
networks. Migrants have described the feeling of ‘otherness’ that permeates their life in urban 
villages, as indigenous residents barely acknowledge or make contact with them beyond standard 
landlord-tenant interactions (Chung, 2017, p. 2255). Many migrants cope with this by forming 
connections and communities amongst themselves, especially with others who have migrated from 
similar regions (Chung, 2017). 
Thus, these three actors – the state, the villagers, and the migrants – constitute the forces 
working to shape urban villages. Their positionality in relation to one another is a direct result of 
the evolution of China’s social and economic policies over the last few decades, and their 
interactions shape the process of spatial production, as well as the product of that process. I will 
now dive into a theoretical analysis of these relationships. 
 
IV. Theoretical Background 
As we will be analyzing the case of Guangdong’s urban villages through the lens of Lefebvre’s 
and Harvey’s theories of spatial production, I will now address exactly what these theories consist 
of. We can understand Harvey’s theory of “the right to the city” as an extension of Lefebvre’s 
seminal work on understanding the production of space, and so I will present them as separate but 
connected concepts.  
Lefebvre’s theory of spatial production is grounded in a Marxist conception of capitalism 
and class relations. He interprets space as serving three purposes: acting as a means of production, 
in that particular spatial organizations can increase productive forces; serving as an object of 
consumption, in that space itself is consumed for production; and functioning as a political 
instrument, in that it can be used by the state to control hierarchy and homogeneity (Lefebvre, 
1979). In that sense, he sees space as not only supported by social relations, but also as both 
producing and being produced by social relations (Lefebvre, 1979). He posits that capitalism 
specifically has appropriated this process by creating an abstract space of domination wherein 
capitalism is and can be the only producer of space. This space is oppressive, conforming all within 
it to its own conceptualization of space as a tool to extract surplus value (Lefebvre, 1979). At the 
same time, the space produced by capitalism is contradictory and chaotic, necessarily giving rise 
to those that question the capitalist exploitation of space (Lefebvre, 1979).  
Lefebvre uses this as a background to advance what he sees as a solution – a shift towards 
a socialist production of space. To him, socialist space implies the end of private property and the 
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state’s domination of space, and the reprioritization of use value of space over exchange value 
(Lefebvre, 1979). This socialist space must be managed by a collective, democratic base, and must 
abolish the system of private ownership of land and resources while still maintaining an 
individual’s right to space (Lefebvre, 1979). To get there, a fundamental transformation of our 
understanding of space is necessary. While difficult, this reorientation is crucial to eliminating the 
deleterious and exploitative effects of capitalist space. 
This theorization of space as both a sociopolitical tool and product is given a more concrete 
application in Harvey’s piece, “The Right to the City”. He bases his argument on Lefebvre’s 
conception of space but ties it explicitly to processes of urbanization under capitalism. In his view, 
urbanization is a social and spatial process that is accelerated by capitalism, as both require the 
production and reproduction of surplus value to sustain themselves. Urbanization occurs as that 
surplus is mobilized, a process that can only be driven by capital’s determination to expand and 
coopt more resources in a zero-sum system of exchange (Harvey, 2008). To do this, capital has to 
gain command of the entire urban process, thus giving it the “right to the city”. At its most 
fundamental level, the right to the city “is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, 
moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends 
upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization.” (Harvey, 2008, 
p. 23). Capital, however, has made it such that the right to the city is stolen from all citizens, 
leaving capitalist forces the sole controllers of that collective power, and ergo the sole producers 
of urban space, able to shape it into whatever they desire. Within this process lies a system of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’, wherein capitalists’ preferred form of urban development 
involves the systematic displacement of low-income populations by the state or the economic elite 
in order to extract value from their land (Harvey, 2008, p. 34). Thus, capital’s domination over 
urban space almost always involves a class dimension that privileges the elite over the poor, 
underprivileged, and marginalized.  
Given this, he suggests a solution similar to the conclusion Lefebvre had come to. He 
advocates for the democratization of the right to the city; or, in other words, broad collective 
control over the production and utilization of the urban surplus that has heretofore only been 
controlled by the capitalist elite. He believes that once the worker and the common folk have 
reclaimed the right to the city, they will have the ability to redefine the city as they see fit, therefore 
breaking up the monopolistic power of capital (Harvey, 2008). In this world, urbanization can take 
on new forms and dimensions, and the dispossessed can reassert agency over their place in the city 
– something that they have long been denied.  
 
V. Analysis 
Understanding urban villages through the lens of Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s theories of spatial 
production will necessarily involve quite a bit of nuance. I will start by describing the features of 
urban villages that do fit into the conventional interpretations of space. Firstly, the character and 
impact of capital are consistent, in that capital prospers by coopting more and more space for itself. 
Urban villages exist due to capital’s continuous consumption of space, as the onset of capitalism 
catalyzed urban growth and caused cities to engulf more and more of the surrounding countryside. 
In “The Right to the City”, Harvey describes this process exactly, citing how capitalist production 
requires the attainment of more and more profitable terrains to absorb and appropriate for surplus 
production (Harvey, 2008). We see this process manifest in China as it does in many regions 
around the world, with urban sprawl continuing to infringe upon the lives of previously agrarian 
peoples.  
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As in many other regions, this process also often leads to large-scale displacement. Village 
lands bought off by the government are usually developed to house China’s nouveau-riche, a 
category that previous residents – peasants and migrants – seldom fall into. As a result, the selling 
of such lands leads to a diaspora where households are forced to find new housing, often away 
from communities they have been a part of for years. This process is even more difficult for 
migrants, who, due to their registration status, have a hard time finding alternative housing outside 
urban villages. They are forced to relocate farther away from their employment and may even have 
to move to another city due to the limited options available (Geng et al, 2020). This perfectly 
exemplifies Harvey’s idea of “accumulation by dispossession”, as valuable land is forcefully 
captured from lower-income populations who have long occupied the space. In his piece, Harvey 
even uses the PRC as an example of this process, describing how, “it is often populations on the 
rural margins who are displaced, illustrating the significance of Lefebvre’s argument…that the 
clear distinction which once existed between the urban and the rural is gradually fading into a set 
of porous spaces of uneven geographical development, under the hegemonic command of capital 
and the state.” (Harvey, 2008, p. 36). This quote accurately encapsulates how capitalism has 
corroded the stability of those living at the intersection of urban and rural.  
What Harvey fails to include in this narrative, however, are the complex dynamics 
occurring under the surface. He describes how some of those displaced by the state are sent on 
their way with small compensation payments, while others are forcefully removed by brutal 
repression (Harvey, 2008). Yet he does not mention those who successfully lobby to stay – and 
end up becoming instruments and beneficiaries of capitalism themselves. This tension is the 
primary way in which urban villages diverge from Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s theories. Though the 
nature of capitalism is the same, the agents of capital are different. Lefebvre primarily framed the 
conflict over the control of urban spatial production as a Marxist class struggle, wherein the 
political and economic elite are positioned against the general public or the working class 
(Lefebvre, 1974). He draws a strong connection between the state and capitalism, in that the state 
has been a major player in “the maintenance and management of capitalist growth at all spatial 
scales.” (Brenner & Elden, 2009, p. 369). Harvey reinforces this idea, citing that the political and 
economic elite exert complete control over urban production at the expense of the public (Harvey, 
2008). In other words, capitalist growth depends on state support, and simultaneously the state 
uses capitalism as an instrument of growth.  
Yet, in the urban village case, while the state is in fact the main arbiter of capitalism, these 
efforts are emulated not only by the private sector developers with whom they contract (the 
‘economic elite’) but by the working class itself. The village collectives, acting as landlords, 
dominate the vulnerable migrant population, essentially reproducing the same spatial dynamics 
propagated by the state on a smaller scale. Instead of seeing their urban village space as occupied 
by residents, the village collectives see it as a means of production in that it can produce surplus 
value for them to extract, and an object of consumption in that it can be consumed for that 
production. In that sense, they treat the space almost identically to how the state does. In fact, the 
very reason that many villagers refuse to sell their land is that they believe renting it out will be 
more profitable in the long term than a one-time compensation payment (Wang & Wang, 2014). 
These villagers are rent-seeking and acting capitalistically in every sense of the word, yet, as 
former peasants, they cannot be mistaken for a new ‘urban bourgeoisie’. As most are 
undereducated and unskilled, they share a majority of traits with the working class. They also 
occupy a unique position in that they are both exploited and exploiter; they are, on the one hand, 
being pushed off their own land by the state and private developers, but they also act abusively to 
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migrants and achieve power through this relationship. This dual dynamic is not even mentioned in 
Harvey’s piece, but it highlights the complexity of urban social and spatial relations. In occupying 
multiple positions at once, village collectives contradict the standard upper-class capitalist against 
lower-class worker framework put forward by the theories. 
Additionally, the central solution advanced by Lefebvre and Harvey to counter the ills of 
capitalism is actualized in urban villages, yet still fails to achieve the objectives they outline. In 
their pieces, both authors argue for a shift towards a socialist urban space, wherein a democratic 
base owns control over the urban surplus and private ownership is abolished (Lefebvre, 1979; 
Harvey, 2008). This ideal of collectivized ownership is realized in urban villages, as all land is 
owned and managed by a collective made up of various shareholders. All households have a stake 
in the land, but none have sole ownership over any of it. Yet what we witness is not a harmonious 
society in which all receive an equal slice of the pie, but rather a system where even this collective 
ownership has been weaponized against those excluded from the collective. The power amassed 
by the ‘democratic base’ is leveraged to exploit those on the outside – the base has acquired “the 
right to the city” and has consciously chosen to recreate exactly what the state did before it. In that 
sense, many of the harmful effects of capitalism are not ameliorated by the presence of collective 
ownership. 
This points to the simplicity and misplaced idealism with which Lefebvre and Harvey 
conceptualize the solution to the capitalist domination of space. Capitalism is far more deeply 
entrenched in our societies than what may be evident, and thus even if individual capitalist desires 
are curbed, the overall orientation of a society towards profit cannot easily be undone. Even those 
eager to share spoils with neighbors and community members may still seek profit-making 
opportunities that occur at the expense of others. This reveals something about the human spirit, 
which is at its heart preferential. Individuals discriminate, and though many may be willing to 
quell their own selfish desires to benefit those they feel a kinship with, this generosity does not 
necessarily extend to all members of society. The fact that this is true even in a country like China, 
where the culture heavily emphasizes communitarianism over individualism and capitalism is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, is deeply troubling for the efficacy of the proposed socialist 
solution.  
That being said, this does not indicate that all hope is lost. Clearly, capitalism’s effect on 
attitudes towards profit accumulation is strong and very contagious. But this merely indicates that 
Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s solutions are oversimplified, not off base. They should be amended to 
account for the pervasiveness of capitalist thought and target the overall system instead of urban 
spaces as independent entities. The interconnectedness of spatial relations under capitalism 
precludes the possibility of a socialist community successfully operating outside of the capitalist 
system sans total isolation, and therefore social movements seeking to socialize one metropolis at 
a time will be unsustainable. There is also danger in regarding the ‘public’ as a monolith, and not 
accounting for the ways in which the relative positions of different groups can result in divergent 
behavior. Communities that thrive off of a strong affinity with each other often source loyalty from 
mutual characteristics that are not shared with the rest of the population, which, when combined 
with an unequal distribution of power, can create opportunities for ‘othering’ practices that may 
become exploitative. Thus, a reimagined socialist solution must account for all of these factors in 
its initial structural design, or there is a danger of it devolving into a replica of the very practices 
it was created to solve.  
 
VI. Wider Ramifications  
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Given all of the above, the question then turns to what this may mean for our understanding of 
these theories of spatial production. The evidence above does not serve to discredit the importance 
of these theories, but it does prompt us to rethink our broader conceptual understandings of spatial 
relations. The reality of spatial existence is never as simple as the elite versus the people dichotomy 
that is often pointed to in the literature, and it is important to understand relationships within – and 
also with – space as multi-faceted and multi-positional. Space is relative and constantly changing, 
and one’s place within it shifts depending on who they are interacting with at any given time. In 
that sense, we cannot simply conceive of spatial power as flowing in one direction – from the 
powerful to the powerless – for the dynamics on the ground are often more complicated than that.   
My argument also points out several limitations in the theories themselves. Often, these 
theories are regarded as universally applicable and explanatory. Yet there are several crucial 
elements of urban villages in China that they fail to capture. To understand these omittances, we 
must acknowledge that these theories were developed by Westerners, crafted with mostly Western 
spaces in mind. But the development of capitalism and urbanization in the West is not mirrored all 
over the world, and thus divergent trajectories should be expected in regions where it differs. The 
production of space is heavily influenced by historical legacies and cultural factors, and as such in 
many cases alternative frameworks will be necessary to truly understand how society interacts 
with the spaces it inhabits. Future work should examine how theories of spatial production can be 
amended and expanded to take into account these nuances, instead of taking Western 
characteristics as given and applying them to any and all contexts.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
In sum, this paper has analyzed urban villages in Guangdong, China, through the lens of Lefebvre’s 
theory of the production of space, and, relatedly, Harvey’s theory of the right to the city. In doing 
so, I have addressed several aspects of urban villages that the theories either take for granted or 
fail to take into account at all. This may shine a light on their limited applicability to non-Western 
contexts. That being said, there is still plenty of room for these theories to be adjusted to understand 
these non-Western realities, a process that I hope I have begun here. More work is needed, of 
course, to truly unpack how to marry these theories with complex realities. Crucial next steps 
involve identifying and analyzing urban phenomena occurring elsewhere that may present similar 
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ABSTRACT: Margot Walström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on 
Sexual Violence defines sexual violence as a "way of demonstrating power and control. It 
inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and 
silent weapon with a long-lasting effect on every society.” Despite the universal damage 
of sexual violence throughout history, international law did not begin to develop a response 
to such crimes until the 1990s. Worldwide fear and shame associated with atrocities of 
sexual violence, difficulty defining it across cultures, challenges to accurate data collection, 
and lack of collective action all contribute to the international community’s silence. This 
paper analyzes how sexual violence has been defined in international law through its 
integration into the international justice system: first, as torture by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and second, as genocide by the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, and third, how the Rome Statute criminalized sexual 
violence in its establishment of the International Criminal Court. Additionally, this paper 
discusses how sex trafficking has been acknowledged by international law, primarily 
through the United Nations’ development of soft law. Finally, this essay examines how 
United Nations peacekeeping missions and other international institutions continually 
undermine the international community’s efforts to tackle sexual violence and trafficking. 
 
Introduction 
Margot Walström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict, defines it best: "[Sexual violence] is a way of demonstrating power and 
control. It inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and 
silent weapon with a long-lasting effect on every society."1 Despite the universal damage of sexual 
violence throughout history, international law did not begin to develop a response to such crimes 
until the 1990s. Worldwide fear and shame associated with atrocities of sexual violence, difficulty 
defining it across cultures, challenges to accurate data collection, and lack of collective action all 
contribute to the international community’s silence. Nevertheless, state actors and international 
organizations have taken steps to acknowledge sexual violence as a crime against humanity 
through meticulous integration into case law of ad hoc tribunals, soft law, and foundations for 
enforcement mechanisms. All the while, the number of victims from developing and developed 
nations alike continues to rise.  
This paper analyzes how sexual violence has been defined in international law through its 
integration into the international justice system: first, as torture by the International Criminal 
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and second, as genocide by the International Criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda, and third, how the Rome Statute criminalized sexual violence in its 
establishment of the International Criminal Court. Additionally, this paper discusses how sex 
trafficking has been acknowledged by international law, primarily through the United Nations’ 
development of soft law. Finally, this essay examines how United Nations peacekeeping missions 
and other international institutions continually undermine the international community’s efforts to 
tackle sexual violence and trafficking.  
International law generally refers to the public law which governs relations between 
independent states, the operations of international institutions, and how states treat individuals, 
corporations, or other private entities. Although international law recognizes states as sovereign 
actors, international institutions and international tribunals can create “binding” law, although 
individual states accept a large portion of international law as self-enforcing norms. These norms 
shift over time if the majority of states change their views on a certain issue. For example, over 
the course of several centuries, states shifted from accepting slavery to considering it a serious 
violation of international law. The primary source of enforcement for international law comes from 
the pressure independent states place on one another to maintain international stability. Although 
states often break international law, states recognize the benefits they receive from a coherent 
international system. The international institutions that make up this system provide global 
solutions by creating a common standard, minimizing the incentive to free riding, providing 
international cooperation, and establishing enforcement mechanisms. For this reason, states accept 
enforcement from bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court 
because these institutions provide a source of the international cooperation and stability 
independent states otherwise cannot accomplish.  
Due to a long cumulation of feminist pressure, in 2000, the UN Security Council adopted 
the landmark Resolution 1325, formally recognizing gender-based violence, especially sexual 
violence, in the context of war.2 A later resolution adopted in 2008, UNSC Resolution 1820, went 
even further to clarify “rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime 
against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.” 3 which made the additional 
request of the Security General, “to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all 
peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel deployed by the United Nations.” This transition shows 
clear progress in the acknowledgement of sexual violence as a war crime and efforts by the UN to 
self-regulate its own perpetration of such crimes; nevertheless, the war against sexual violence and 
trafficking is far from won. The recognition of these crimes, while substantial, does not translate 
easily into enforceable mechanisms, so countless victims have yet to reap the benefits of the 
progress the international community has made.  
 
Defining Sexual Violence in International Law 
 Victims and their advocates have demanded increased attention to sexual violence as a war 
crime for the last three decades, yet the international community has been traditionally apathetic 
to these crimes. The international community responded with silence to crimes of a sexual nature 
before the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.4 Furthermore, the creation of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
gave little consideration to these crimes.5 The case law of these tribunals and subsequent ad hoc 
tribunals of a similar nature continue to establish the characterization of sexual violence as a 
legitimate human rights violation. The primary influence of these tribunals in relation to sexual 
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violence has been through a process of establishing precedent which results in treaty-making, 
affecting later decisions. 
 Although this process has been a relatively slow one, in general, the few norms, that are 
accepted by the international community and that have graduated to the status of jus cogens, 
become legally binding and enforceable under international law. For example, the decisions of the 
ICTY and ICTR resulted in provisions to the Rome Statute and decisions made in the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.6 This accumulation of international prosecution establishes a “norms 
cascade” which builds the foundation for the illegality of rape and sex trafficking.7 Crimes of jus 
cogens status don’t require ratification of a treaty, but rather crimes can be prosecuted by any state 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction.8 With the codification of the Rome Statute in 1998, the 
international community groundbreakingly criminalized the acts of sex trafficking, sexual 
violence, and forced pregnancy clearly advancing this “norms cascade.”9 With continued attention 
and acceptance of sexual violence as an international crime, these crimes receive the same status 
as violations such as genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery and torture. 
 
Rape Prosecuted as Torture 
Historically not recognized as a war crime, opposing sides often viewed sexual violence a 
as simply a misfortunate consequence of war. Therefore, to achieve recognition in international 
law, sexual violence was first attached to pre-established international crimes. As of now, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, as well as the International Criminal Court have successfully integrated sexual violence 
into the definition of war crimes, officially establishing jus cogens status.10 Yet, the first 
acknowledgment of sexual violence by the ICTY had to be made by characterizing it as a 
mechanism of torture. The Tribunal relied primarily on the UN Torture Convention and its 
definition:  
The 1984 UN Torture Convention defines torture as any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.11 
 
The ICTY emphasized the importance of specifying what qualified as torture and  
the definition was revised to include the following:  
(i) This act or omission must be intentional; (ii) It must aim at obtaining information 
or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third 
person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person; (iii) It 
must be linked to an armed conflict; and (iv) At least one of the persons involved must be 
a public official or must at any rate act in non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of 
a State or any other authority-wielding entity.12 
 
This revision clarifies the act of torture as first, intentional and second, linked to the will of a public 
official or perpetrated on account of non-private persons. This clarification allows the crime to 
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supersede domestic jurisdiction and be viewed as an international crime committed by or in 
association with a state, thus providing ICTY jurisdiction. At that time, the Tribunal realized the 
prosecution of rape as torture had far more basis in international law, thus it expanded the 
definition of torture to include rape rather than prosecute it independently.  
 The ICTY notably considered rape as torture during the Čelebići Trial Judgment.13 In the 
prosecution of one of the deputy commanders of the Čelebići prison camp, Delalic was charged 
under Articles 2(b) and 3.14 The Trial Chamber found that Delalic raped his victim in an effort to 
intimidate her into revealing information about her husband, to punish her on account of her 
husband's actions, and to instill fear and helplessness.15 In this case, the ICTY relied specifically 
on the 1992 Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture presented to the Commission on Human 
Rights where the Trial Chamber described “the rape of any person to be a despicable act which 
strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity.”16 With these conclusions the Trial 
Chamber finally attested to the serious repercussions of rape and sexual violence, solidifying its 
validity in the international law. Additionally, the Tribunal referred to the case law of its 
counterpart in Rwanda and its Akayesu decision discussed further later on.17 The prosecution of 
this particular rape as torture, relied on proof that the defendant’s sexual violence against the victim 
was fully motivated by “obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating, 
humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against 
the victim or a third person.”18 In addition, the Tribunal found in under the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-
like Practices during Armed Conflict, “the discrimination prong of the definition of torture in the 
Torture Convention provides an additional basis for prosecuting rape and sexual violence as 
torture.”19 Further, the “violence inflicted upon her (namely rape) was due to the fact that she was 
a woman;” this form of discrimination comprises a prohibited purpose for the offense of torture.20 
Thus, the Trial Chamber accounts for Delalic’s rape as torture by intimidation, punishment, and 
discrimination among other reasons. At the time of the case, no official “checklist” for offenses of 
rape existed, so the ICTY relied on the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to establish what acts 
might qualify.21 In this way, the Court constructed its own basis to judge the prosecution of rape 
as torture by “special procedures,” provided by the UN Torture Statute, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, 
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, and other case precedent. 
 
Rape Prosecuted as Genocide 
 More recently international criminal law has also prosecuted rape as genocide under the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The international 
community took note of ICTR’s unique approach to incorporating international human rights 
provisions in criminal trials, especially in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu case.22 This case 
represented the first conviction of sexual violence in the history of international law as a crime 
against humanity or genocide.23Although the original indictments did not include rape charges, 
prosecutors amended the complaint due to criticism from the New York-based International 
Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic; the Center for Constitutional Rights; and Navanethem Pillay, 
a female judge from South Africa; among other activists.24 Witness accounts of horrific 
widespread sexual violence, including rape with foreign objects, gang rape, forced miscarriage, 
and forced prostitution strongly backed these efforts.25  
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 Lacking previous relevant provisions, the ICTR relied primarily on the UN Genocide 
Convention of 1948 and its travaux préparatoires. Enumerated in Article 2 of the Statute, the 
Tribunal decided that the actus reus of the crime comprised offenses relevant to this case.26  
According the 1948 Genocide Convention, Article II, genocide is: 
 
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) killing members of the group; 
(b) causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 27 
 
 “The mens rea of the crime, which makes the crime especially difficult to prove, is a 
specific intent to ‘wholly or partly destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.’” 28 
Consequently, similar to the ICTY in the Čelebići case, the proof of intent presents a roadblock 
for the prosecution in Rwanda.29  
 After the application of genocide to the case, the Court focused on defining sexual violence 
within genocidal activtity specifically in regard to the Akayesu case.30 
The ICTR found that acts of sexual violence constitute genocide: 
in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such…Sexual 
violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting 
Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction 
of the Tutsi group as a whole...This sexualized representation of ethnic identity 
graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because 
they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the 
Tutsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.31 
 
The court emphasizes the destructive nature of this sexual violence against Tutsi women 
as being the pure motive of the sexual violence perpetrated and therefore within the definition of 
genocide as “a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part.”32 Marochkin notes that when the 
ICTR decided what constitutes “serious bodily harm,” the emphasized acts of sexual violence and 
rape fully qualified.33 This officially included rape and sexual violence afflicted against Tutsi 
women by Akayesu on account of the intent behind the systematic rape, the constitution of rape as 
“serious bodily harm,” and the rape’s “destructive” nature.  
In Prosecutor v. Musema, the Chamber discussed offenses of sexual violence that 
prevented births of a victimized group.34 For example, sexual mutilation, forced sterilization, 
forced birth control, forced separation of males and females, and prohibition of marriages, all 
sought to limit new births of the victims’ ethnicity and therefore fell within the crime of genocide. 
The Court clarified that in a patriarchal Rwandan society, the identity of the father determines 
group membership.35 An example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the 
case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another 
group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its 
mother's group.” 36 Hence, in the case of the atrocities committed against the Tutsis,’ Hutu rapists, 
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such as Musema or Akayesu, could be motivated by the fact that consequential births would result 
in more children identified as Hutu, at least within the context of Rwanda culture.  
Thus, both Tribunals creatively addressed issues of sexual violence and rape by 
categorizing these offenses under the more explicit and widely recognized crimes that were easily 
as prosecuted war crimes of torture and genocide. Both the ICTY and the ICTR found themselves 
incredibly limited by outdated, abstract, or nonexistent sources of international law. After 
interpreting the limited number of relevant Statutes, the Tribunals referred to a range of pre-
existing soft law, such as treaties on human rights, conclusions from previous human rights cases, 
and other human rights bodies. From which, the Tribunals creatively filled the gaps in the present 
international law to adequately address rape as a distinguishable and punishable international 
crime.  
While the Rome Statute adopts similar language of sexual violence and trafficking from 
both the ITCY and ICTR Statutes, its efforts to criminalize gender-based violence supersedes its 
predecessors.37 The original purpose behind the creation of the ICC was to simply codify existing 
international law, but nearly exclusive male participation in the establishment of international law 
up to that point resulted in a lack of adequate attention to women’s issues.38 Due to pressure from 
international feminist non-profit organizations, female-friendly language was added to the draft of 
the Rome Statute to include specific forms of gender-based violence, prosecutive and investigative 
mechanisms, and fair representation of women within ICC staff.39 This pressure resulted in the 
specific recognition of gender-based violence as crime against humanity in Article 7 and as war 
crimes under Article 8.40 The Rome Statute listed rape as both a crime against humanity and a war 
crime, allowing the prosecution more flexibility.41 A war crime is easier to prove than a crime 
against humanity, my considering the prosecution only need to prove the rape was part of a “plan 
or policy,” rather than a “widespread or systematic attack.”42 Unfortunately, while the inclusion of 
these articles is monumental, the ICC has had limited success in the investigation and prosecution 
of these crimes.43 The ICC’s first conviction of sexual slavery incredibly did not occur until July 
2019.44 As the Court’s fourth conviction overall, Ntaganda was unanimously sentenced to 30 years 
in prison.45  
 
Defining Sex Trafficking in International Law 
 Modern slavery works similarly to other forms of trafficking of drugs or arms, except these 
traffickers transport individuals. Such individuals, in search of better opportunities especially when 
they hope to cross into better developed countries such as the United States, may be ensnared by 
trafficking institutions.46 Involuntary trafficking on the other hand, entails the abduction of 
individuals transported to a foreign country and forced into various forms of servitude including 
sex work.47 The overlap between issues of migration, modern slavery, and smuggling consequently 
complicate both the identifying and criminalizing of sex trafficking on the whole.48 Although 
apparent discrepancies exist in how different governments, academics, and activists characterize 
sex trafficking, both voluntary and involuntary modes entail transportation of individuals across 
borders for the purpose of exploiting their labor and therefore, encompass trafficking.  
Although sex trafficking was widely recognized as an issue well before the 21st century, 
the lack of a formal definition hindered any effort of the international community to combat it.  
 This definition was finally established in 2000 with the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) in Article 3, 
Section (a): 
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(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs;”49 
 
Later reinforced in Article 6, the Protocol obligates states to criminalize trafficking as 
defined.50  
The Palermo Protocol represented the first contemporary initiative to combat sex 
trafficking at the international level.51 Of the 192 states of the UN, 172 have signed and ratified 
the Protocol, none of which included reservations specifically regarding the definition provided in 
Article 3.52 Article 5 obligates states to "adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in Article 3 of this Protocol.” 53 
Yet despite this mandatory measure, states failed to criminalize sex trafficking by defining it to a 
limited scope of conduct.54 For example, the US State Department’s narrow definition exemplifies 
this failure, decisively ignoring extra-legal migration.55 In this way, although many states were 
quick to adopt the Protocol into domestic law, the resulting domestic law applied to more limited 
circumstances than what the international law had originally called for. States additionally lacked 
the readiness to actually enforce even the inadequate law they adopted.56 
 This absence of a clear definition in domestic criminal law exists in multiple states, despite 
their being obligated to incorporate such under Article 5.57 For this reason, the United Nations has 
installed several mechanisms: under the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention and its 
Protocols, the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime (Conference of the Parties) to monitor states’ compliance.58 In 2006, the 
Conference of Parties underwent a survey of definitions provided by obligated states.59 The survey 
asked how states defined trafficking in persons in their domestic law in accordance with Article 
3.60 Many states’ responses claimed to be in full compliance with the definition provided in Article 
3 and obligations in Article 5, but basic analysis of their domestic laws’ definition of human 
trafficking showed clear noncompliance.61 Nonetheless, some states, such as Turkey, copied the 
definition of human trafficking from Article 3 verbatim into their own domestic law, but these 
states are in the minority.62 According to Dempsey, Hoyle, and Bosworth, gaps could be due to a 
state’s lack of technical expertise in drafting effective criminal codes, the absence of a competent 
international enforcement mechanism, pressure from economic crisis, or possibly, the inherent 
vagueness of the Article 3 definition.63 Whatever cause creates gaps in the states’ definitions, other 
actors can interfere, effectively making change more likely. In this case, as the authoritative 
regulatory party, the Conference of Parties has the responsibility for holding noncompliant states 
accountable.64 If the Conference of Parties drew enough attention to states’ neglect of human 
trafficking, states would eventually adapt in order to protect their reputations.65 
Aside from narrowing the definition of human trafficking, states hesitate to collect data on 
sex trafficking within their territories.66 Due to the intimate and traumatic nature of the crime, sex 
trafficking, already extremely underreported, results in often inaccurate data. Due to public 
appearances, states want to keep hidden even those underreported numbers.67 Still aside from 
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acknowledgement of United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto, the US made additional efforts to regulate foreign states’ efforts to combat 
human trafficking.68 The US Trafficking Victims Protection Act mandated that the US State 
Department report efforts of foreign states to regulate trafficking.69 This mandate has influence 
over states who rely on US foreign aid, and for this reason, has proven in some ways more effective 
than international law established by the UN.70 Although representing significant progress in 
providing accountability, the US TVPA encourages dependent states to underreport the severity 
of trafficking within their borders to preserve humanitarian and military aid from the US.71 
Ironically, the US did not evaluate its own practices until a decade after the US TVPA was 
passed.72 When it did finally perform self-evaluation, the US concluded itself a leading crusader 
against human trafficking on the world stage.73 This contradiction presents a conflict of interest: 
how can the international community avoid global super powers, such as the US, from acting as 
an international police force and producing biased promotions of their own efforts? This conflict 
only further shows the politicized nature of human trafficking reporting and the ensuing possibility 
of corruption. Therefore, while both international law and domestic law have made notable efforts 
to respond to human trafficking, both ultimately fall short of collecting dependable data and 
painting a representative portrait of illegal trafficking practices abroad. Thus, despite the clear 
establishment of laws against trafficking, these laws largely lack enforcement priorities.  
 Subsequently, the lack of protection and assistance of victims of trafficking weakens 
international law.74 In the rare instances of successful prosecution, human traffickers are usually 
prosecuted under immigration violations, not under human rights abuse, resulting in little to no 
acknowledgement of victims.75 Because hard international law encroaches on state sovereignty, 
the international sphere has primarily implemented soft law to aid victims.76 For example, the 
Palermo Protocol and other efforts by the UN largely support this prosecution-focused approach, 
but use vague language regarding assistance and pathways for justice of victims.77 In addition, in 
2002, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights adopted the Recommended Principles and 
Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking.78 Although soft law, the Recommended 
Principles and Guidelines deter policies that unfairly prosecute trafficking victims as illegal 
migrants.79  Even if successful, scholars and policy makers understand that focusing on punishment 
would not effectively deter sex trafficking, thus activists favor a more proactive human rights 
approach centered on protecting victims.80 
 Activists in the drafting of the Rome Statute played a key role in establishing protection 
for witnesses and victims of sexual violence and trafficking, primarily in Article 65.81 The first 
case in the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, should have been easily won.82 Unfortunately, the 
prosecution was forced to drop rape charges against Tadic because the last witness refused to 
testify under threats to herself and family.83 Lehr-Lehnardt argues that this case likely influenced 
the drafters of the Rome Statute to include witness anonymity and protection until a witness 
protection plan can be enacted.84 The Rome Statute also created a Victims and Witnesses Unit 
specifically tasked to provide protection, counseling for trauma caused by sexual violence, and 
other necessary assistance.85 In summary, the Rome Statute takes progressive steps to recognize 
the needs of witnesses and victims in the ICC that previously caused prosecution failure in the 
ICTY. Furthermore, the Rome Statute took specific caution to identify the trafficking of women 
and children as a crime against humanity and therefore highly prosecutable in the ICC.86  
 
Development of International Law with Regard to Peacekeeping Operations 
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Although the international community has made a notable effort to address sex trafficking 
through the development of law, its institutions simultaneously escalate human trafficking issues 
as exemplified by UN peacekeeping missions. For the past three decades, victims continually bring 
allegations against peacekeepers for sexual misconduct against the people they were sent to 
protect. Dating back to the early 1990s, the first accusations to gain international attention 
originated from Cambodia and Somalia, shortly followed by similar allegations in Sierra Leone in 
2003 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004. Many more allegations of sexual abuse 
of humanitarian aid workers have surfaced since the early 2000s. This year sex scandals erupted 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo where humanitarian workers were sent in response to the 
Ebola crisis and in Uganda where aid workers respond to food shortages due to extreme drought 
throughout the region. Aside from allegations brought specifically against UN peacekeepers, in 
general, peacekeeping missions have been instrumental in reinforcing local trafficking systems. 
Shortly after the Cold War, the United Nations took on more ambitious peacekeeping missions, 
enlisting forces of less experienced and less capable states; ergo, questions arose of mission 
effectiveness and, all too often, the conduct of the peacekeepers involved.87 Peacekeeping mission 
units are assembled from a wide range of cultures and ideologies. This reality alone makes 
managing and communicating accurately within units challenging but preventing misconduct even 
more difficult.  
 Therefore, as state governments and UN bureaucrats fight for the legitimacy of global anti-
trafficking policy, such as the Palermo Protocol, corrupt UN peacekeepers in crisis zones around 
the globe undermine their efforts.88 The first specific effort made by the UN to recognize the 
misconduct of peacekeepers didn’t occur until 2005 with the release of the Zeid Report.89 The 
report found that in the DRC “typical forms of sexual exploitation and abuse...included the 
exchange of sex for money, food, or jobs; what some young girls interviewed by the commission 
described as ‘rape disguised as prostitution.’”90 Similar reports “from missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor‐Leste in the 1990s and in West Africa in the early 
2000s, and called for uniform, binding standards of conduct for peacekeepers.”91 
 Trafficking crime thrives within well-developed states, such as the US, despite genuine 
preventative measures taken to stamp out its existence. In less-developed states, human trafficking 
has substantially fewer hoops to jump through, already embedded into local communities in crisis 
well before the arrival of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the mere presence of a large 
number of male peacekeepers further drives the local sex industry.92 Unchecked, operations 
heighten demand for women, resulting in the increased establishment of brothels, strip clubs, and 
bars.93 Furthermore, through their inherent authority, peacekeepers contribute to systematic 
“transactional sex,” trading much-needed resources for sex with locals.94 Since peacekeeping 
missions were first introduced in 1957, demand for humanitarian intervention has increased, 
leading to less vetting. When forces became increasingly diversified, accountability decreased, 
driving up illegal activity. 
 Slowed by collective action problems, the development of international law in response to 
these atrocities has rendered little progress in the realistic prevention of misconduct by UN 
peacekeepers. With the Zeid Report in 2005, the UN made an official effort to combat the sexual 
misconduct of peacekeepers.95 Prior to the release of the Zeid Report, the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged there was strong evidence of peacekeeper missions 
involvement in trafficking, with the release of a policy paper in 2004.96 This paper, “Human 
Trafficking and United Nations Peacekeeping,”  outlined two main objectives: (a) in support of 
the Secretary General’s “zero-tolerance” policy proposal, the UN will establish a system by which 
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peacekeeping forces will be monitored, investigated, and punished on account of involvement in 
trafficking practices, and (b) upon request, have the mechanisms capable of supporting national 
efforts made by international member states in curbing human trafficking, especially within post-
conflict states.97 Since this proposal, limited advances have been made in terms of enacting these 
proposals, but the UN successfully created the Conduct and Discipline Unit within the Department 
of Peace Operations in 2005 and the deployment of Conduct and Discipline Teams to DPKO’s 
beginning in 2007.98 Such measures secured the UN’s responsibility to conduct training, spread 
awareness, and collect allegations of misconduct.99 Additionally, other operations, such as the UN 
Office of Internal Oversight Services, have offices in a few of the most abuse‐prone PKO host 
countries, which facilitate investigations into peacekeeping operations independent of the 
DPKO.100 Yet, these regulatory mechanisms lack effectiveness without the additional action to vet 
peacekeepers.101 The source of peacekeepers’ misconduct is their functional immunity, which 
protects individuals when currently engaging in mission efforts.102 The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), an agreement between a troop-contributing country (TCC) and the UN, 
essentially dictates only TCCs have the power to prosecute military members of its nationality for 
crimes committed in the context of a peacekeeping mission (usually internally, within the TCC’s 
military justice system). These peacekeepers are never subject to the host state’s jurisdiction, but 
rather the military justice systems of the TCC, even for serious allegations.103 Automatically, 
peacekeepers' cases fall within the jurisdiction of the domestic court from which they originate. 
On the other hand, the UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016) gives the Secretary-General 
the power to repatriate military and form police units “when there is credible evidence of 
widespread or systematic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit,” and “requests the Secretary-
General to repatriate all military or formed police units of TCCs that systematically fail their 
accountability obligations, from the country where the allegations have arisen.”104 Jennings 
clarifies that immunity is not waived in these cases, but even if the Secretary-General exercises 
authority to repatriate units, the peacekeepers involved are still only subject to the authority of 
their home country, not the host country.105 
While the Rome Statute takes a clear stance on trafficking and sexual violence by an 
perpetrator, due to its “complementary” jurisdiction, the ICC faces similar blocks to the UN.106 In 
order for ICC jurisdiction to apply, a peacekeeper must first commit an international war crime, 
genocide, or crime against humanity.107 Second, the TCC must be determined “unwilling” to 
adequately investigate and prosecute this crime in a “meaningful manner and without good 
reason.”108 Ultimately, the ICC was created to prosecute those guilty of  “the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole.”109 Arguably, the ICC should be reserved 
for large scale international crime of which the transgressions of peacekeepers would not usually 
qualify, except in extreme cases.110 Thus, the ICC may not represent the path to prosecution of 
these crimes. Since the states in which these crimes occur usually have ineffective or polluted 
justice systems, prosecution becomes the responsibility of the domestic courts of criminal 
peacekeepers. 
As a preventative measure, the counterintuitive activities available to peacekeepers where 
they are stationed could be replaced by extracurriculars that are beneficial to community 
development.111 The UN outlined multiple crime prevention strategies in crisis zones: the social 
development approach which promotes prosocial behavior through social, economic, health and 
educational measures; community-based prevention, which focuses on altering the conditions in 
communities that encourage victimization; situational crime prevention aimed at reducing crime 
opportunity; and reintegration and assistance programs.112 All of these indirectly reduce the sex 
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trafficking systems built into the societies before the peacekeepers arrive. Cumulatively, these 
mechanisms work to not only hold peacekeepers accountable, but prevent misconduct before it 
occurs`.  
Before any opposition from conflict-ridden states would be unheard of, but with a growing 
transnational advocacy network, this opposition has a much louder voice. This voice continues to 
draw attention to allegations against peacekeepers, especially when they detail the atrocities of 
sexual violence and trafficking. This rising pressure undoubtedly forces the international 
community to turn inward and deal with the sexual violence its institutions protect and promote.  
 
Conclusion 
 Throughout this paper, one can observe that although ad hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY 
and ICTR, have successfully integrated the prosecution of sexual violence as a war crime, the 
international community refrained from establishing hard law on the issue of sexual violence and 
sex trafficking. While the language of the Rome Statute has allowed the prosecution of sexual 
violence and human trafficking a much clearer path to conviction, both of these crimes have 
already been largely recognized under customary international law, resulting in little to no 
implementation in the ICC.113 The established soft law can be easily manipulated by perpetrators, 
such as UN peacekeepers who commit sexual misconduct in crisis zones. Although genuine efforts 
have been made by policymakers to combat sexual violence and sex trafficking, the lack of hard 
law and adequate enforcement mechanisms limit real change both externally across the globe and 
internally by their own peacekeeping operations and humanitarian personnel.  
 Reports made by the UN Secretary General on women, peace, and security, first started in 
2002, upon request of the UNSC resolution 1325.114 This resolution marked a formal recognition 
by the UNSC to assess the impact of war conflict on gender-based violence, especially in regard 
to sexual violence.115 In 2002, the Secretary General reported that in times of war, “women and 
girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation, 
including torture, rape, mass rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and 
trafficking.”116 Since 2002, the Secretary General has published 34 reports, establishing a steady 
increase in measures taken by the UN to combat sexual violence.117 The report from November 
24, 2010, showed progress implemented over a 2-year span through Resolutions 1820 and 1888 
with “measures to improve the collection of information and recommendations aimed at enhanced 
response.”118 In the latest report, issued June 3, the Secretary General recognizes the year of 2020 
as a pivotal moment in the fight against sexual violence, marking the 25th anniversary of the 
adoption of the resolution 1325.119  
As summarized by the Secretary General:  
Despite important progress on the policy and operational fronts, we face an 
increasingly complex global security environment in which sexual violence 
remains a cruel tactic of war, torture, terror and political repression, and a brutally 
effective tool of displacement and dehumanization. We have yet to adequately 
invest in tackling the structural root causes that drive and perpetuate this violence, 
including gender inequality, which is exacerbated by conflict and militarization. 
Survivor-centred, rights-based response aims to create a safe and participatory 
environment, including through contextualized solutions that build resilience and 
address the diverse experiences of all survivors.This approach is critical to ensuring 
that no one is left behind or excluded from the dividends of peace and 
development.120 
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 This statement indicates both the difficult path ahead, and the adoption of a new approach: 
the proactive, victims-centered method advocated by Dinan and other activists.121 This paper gives 
an account of the development of policy in regard to sexual violence and the failure of the 
international community to adequately report and prosecute such crimes. Yet, as the Secretary 
General notes, to adequately solve the issue of sexual violence and sex trafficking, the international 
community must attack the root from which these crimes stem, gender inequality. This inequality 
has orchestrated every transgression taken against women on account of their gender and continues 
to influence even the most well-developed nations where women continue to fight for their rights. 
In reality, international law developed in regard to sexual violence cannot function fully until 
gender inequality is truly eradicated, a development that could take centuries. In the meantime, the 
international community can take advantage of its influence, prosecuting the few cases of sexual 
violence within its jurisdiction, and establishing enforcement mechanisms which effectively apply 
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ABSTRACT: Climate change is quickly becoming one of the biggest threats faced by the 
international community and has the capacity to greatly impact global security. The relationship 
between climate change and conflict is still unraveling; however, worsening climatic events have 
contributed to political instability around the world. As climate change implications become more 
apparent, water is less abundant due to worsening droughts and less precipitation, allowing it to 
become a target for groups seeking to control territory or populations. This paper examines the 
impact of climate change in shifting the power dynamic between states and violent non-state actors 
within their borders. More specifically, focusing on the use of water weaponization by the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The water weaponization of ISIL in Iraq and Syria shows the 
ability of water resources to be manipulated in a water scarce and politically unstable environment 
to strengthen the role of violent non-state actors. This research creates a chronology of water 
weaponization to track acts of water weaponization by ISIL from 2012, as they gained power in 
Iraq and Syria, until 2019 following the ‘defeat’ of their caliphate. Succeeding the chronology, acts 
of water weaponization are tracked using the Institute for the Study of War’s ISIS Sanctuary maps 
and Situation Reports to find the connection between acts of water weaponization and the strength 
of their caliphate through territory held. Through identifying fourteen water weaponization acts by 
ISIL from 2012-2019, a connection is found between the acquisition of a water resource, or an 
attack weaponizing water, and the territorial shifts of the caliphate over time. In doing so, this 
research hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between climate change 




As the effects of climate change become more visible, there is intensifying discussion of the nexus 
between climate change and conflict. In 2014, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
dedicated a report, the first of its kind, addressing the human security dimensions of climate 
change.1 Increased droughts in arid and semi-arid regions are one of the most frequent ways in 
which climate change might increase conflict, one of the most affected regions being the Middle 
East.2 The Middle East has experienced ten out of twelve of its’ driest winters since 1902 within 
the last 20 years, with climate change being one of the key factors for this increase in drying.3 In 
relation to this prediction, this research seeks to explore the connection between climate change 
and conflict in the Middle East.  
The drought between 2006 and 2010 in the Levant region was a major factor in the 2011 
uprising in Syria.4 It was estimated that 1.3 million Syrians experienced or were affected by 
agricultural failures due to the drought.5 Wheat and barley prices dropped 47% and 67% 
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respectively and approximately 800,000 inhabitants lost their livelihoods.6 This major agricultural 
failure led to a widespread migration of up to 1.5 million Syrians from rural to urban centers.7 In 
September 2008, the first UN drought appeal claimed that migration from rural areas during 2007 
and 2008 was 20 to 30% higher than during previous years.8 A subsequent UN report estimated 
the drought migration at 65,000 families in that time period, although a UN Special Reporter once 
claimed 600,000 people had emigrated.9 De Châtel (2014) notes that the Northeast region of Syria 
had been declining since 2000 due to the agricultural practice shifts and mismanagement of water 
and land resources; however, continued mishandling of climatic events and a weak socio-political 
atmosphere exacerbated existing instability.  
Water management in Iraq has been poor throughout continued conflicts in the past 
decades. The first and second Gulf wars led to a major breakdown of an already crumbling water 
management system.10 The 2006-2010 drought interacted with the poor socio-economic system 
following the geopolitical upheavals in Iraq following the Gulf wars and the 2003 US invasion and 
continued insurgency.11 Namely, the drought intensified grievances and stress on the Iraqi society 
through the effects of migration and agricultural losses (King, 2015). Between 2008 and 2009, 
Iraqi crop yields plummeted 45% leading to a sharp increase in food prices and food insecurity.12 
This event led to over 10,000 farmers abandoning their fields along the Euphrates to emigrate to 
already struggling urban centers, which increased tensions with the Iraqi government who failed 
to provide adequate services.13 These conditions allowed the Syrian conflict to spill across the 
border into North-Western Iraq.14  
In areas where climate disasters weakened central government authority, new areas opened 
that not only provided a safe haven to violent non-state terror actors, but also served as an incubator 
where these groups could increase their numbers and gain momentum.15 The Northern provinces 
of Syria, which produced two-thirds of Syria’s crop yields, were some of the most impacted by the 
drought.16 These same regions are the ones that ISIL has maintained steady control of since the 
beginning of the conflict.17 Due to the political instability in Iraq and Syria, exacerbated by the 
drought and weak water management systems, dams overwhelmingly became a focal point of 
struggle, and a weapon in war.18 ISIL captured strategic natural resources and weaponized them 
to accomplish political, economic, and military aims.19 It is these actions that showcase ISIL’s goal 
of establishing a caliphate that intends to assume many of the attributes of statehood, including 
control of territory and providing municipal services to its population. Through apprehending 
water resources or manipulating them to control the local population, ISIL shifts the power 
dynamic away from the established state by decreasing state sovereignty and maintaining control 
over key resources such as food, water, energy and employment. 
This paper first explores the existing literature on the relationship between climate change 
and conflict, water weaponization and the weakening of nation-states. In order to explore the 
connections between these concepts, a water weaponization chronology of fourteen water 
weaponization acts by ISIL is produced, along with subsequent state actions against these acts, 
from November 2012 through June 2018 using information from a variety of news sources, the 
Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site and the Global Terrorism Database. Following the 
chronology, the Institute for the Study of War’s ISIS Sanctuary Maps and Campaign Tracker are 
utilized to map these water weaponization acts coinciding with the caliphate’s territorial activity 
in Iraq and Syria until March 2019 with the announcement of the caliphate’s defeat. The analysis 
of the chronology and territorial shifts shows a connection between the acquisition of water 
resources or manipulation of water with the gaining and loss of territory by ISIL over this time 
period. 
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The weakening of the nation-state as the primary security actor has caused great concern among 
the international community. Recent technological, economic, and social developments have 
posed serious challenges to the capacity of a nation to fulfill their traditional functions of security, 
welfare, and identity, which has allowed for a greater playing field for violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs) including terror organizations.20,21 A report by the US National Intelligence Council 
explains that challenges such as water shortages, poor water quality, and floods increase the risk 
of instability and state failure and elevate interstate tensions.22 
Of increased interest is the degree to which climate change might exacerbate both water 
insecurity and political instability, causing opportunity for these violent non-state actors. Climate 
change is often classified as a ‘threat multiplier’, meaning that it triggers, accelerates and 
intensifies current instabilities.23 Scholarly research has primarily explored the MENA region, 
Africa and Southeast Asia. Climate change has enflamed water stress in these areas due to 
increased droughts, less precipitation and natural disasters combined with weak governments and 
powerful non-state combatants.24 When extreme poverty is exacerbated by climate threats and the 
presence of terrorist organizations, climate change can expand the role and recruiting of these 
organizations.25 Climate change impacts elicit the occupation of vital water infrastructure, or the 
targeting of essential water sources, which make the local population rely on the occupying group 
for vital resources.26 The developed world will be far better prepared to tackle the effects of climate 
change compared to developing nations; therefore, the gap between developed and under-
developed countries can potentially provide an opening for extremist ideologies and create the 
conditions for terrorism.27 In relation to anticipated climate change effects, increased poverty and 
reduced state capacity may contribute to the creation or preservation of functional space which 
may allow terrorist groups to flourish.28 Of this discussion, the most frequently sought connection 
between climate change and terrorism within these regions is through water. 
In order to conceptualize water as a strategic resource utilized by these terror actors, 
scholars studying water in security studies focus on water scarcity combined with other factors as 
a determinant of intra-state conflict.29,30 Violent non-state actors such as terrorist organizations 
pose a significant threat to nation-states as they are engaging states in “asymmetric wars,” in which 
there are no rules to warfare enabling the expansion of tactics used.31 For instance, under the 1977 
Protocols to the Geneva Convention it is prohibited to “attack, destroy or render useless objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population”, including water.32 While states must abide 
by social norms of war including international law, non-state actors do not, which has increased 
the direct targeting of strategic resources, such as water, to achieve their goals.33 
Some classify water weaponization in the concept of “hydro-terrorism.”34 VNSAs 
destabilize governments through violent and coercive acts using resources like water as a target, a 
weapon, a leveraging tool, and a nation-building strategy as well as a motive for violent response.35 
King provides a detailed clarification on types of water weaponization used by these groups. In his 
assessment of water weaponization, King defines strategic, tactical, psychological terrorism, 
extortion or incentivization, and unintentional weaponization.36 He outlines strategic 
weaponization as “the use of water to virtually or actually control large or important land areas or 
facilities to fulfill the vision of sovereignty, and…an asset to fund activities, such as administration 
and weapons acquisition, of a ‘state.’”37 Tactical weaponization is primarily the “use of water as a 
weapon on the battlefield in direct or instant support of military operations or against targets of 
military value.”38 Psychological terrorism encompasses “creating fear among non-combatants or 
137
Editorial Board: DUJPEW Issue III 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
Annika Cole 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 7 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
138 
the denial of access or contamination of the water supply.”39 Extortion or incentivization involves 
the “use of the water weapon to establish credibility as a governing authority or to reward support 
from the local population.”40 Lastly, unintentional weaponization describes when the “use of water 
as a weapon causes collateral damage to civilians or the ecological environment.”41 This 
classification is the most detailed of water weaponization and is useful to separate the multiple 
utilizations of this strategy. 
Additional definitions are utilized to encompass the use of water weaponization. Von 
Lossow (2016) describes weaponized water as “water resources directly used as an instrument of 
war in order to achieve strategic political and tactical military goals through targeting the 
population, addressing the opponent’s political leadership and confronting the opposing 
military.”42 Von Lossow’s definition is an all-encompassing definition to describe the strategy 
rather than separate the different types of weaponization and primarily combines King’s tactical 
and strategic water weaponization classifications.43 Daoudy (2020) rather splits it into categories 
including: domination and legitimacy, the control over resources and infrastructures; attack and 
capture of large infrastructures (a military target and goal); cutting off water, intentional flooding 
and defensive fortification (a military tool); and delivery or refusal of basic infrastructure-
produced services (a tool of cooperation). This paper utilizes Daoudy’s (2020) definition as it is 
primarily interested in the ways in which water weaponization is used to shift the power dynamic 
between the nation-state and VNSAs and the four classifications seen in this definition are the 
most aligned with the types of weaponization used by ISIL to accomplish this.  
Water weaponization is also covered in the context of environmental terrorism– distinct 
from ‘hydro-terrorism’. Gleick (2006) defines the term “environmental terrorism” as referring to 
the “unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems with the intent to harm 
individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social 
objective.”44 Although environmental terrorism encompasses any environmental resources, water 
is damaged by rendering water unusable, or destroying purification and supply infrastructure, 
harming local populations.45 For this research, the classification of acts of water weaponization is 
not utilized; however, this discussion is useful to clarify the meaning of the term and how scholars 
have previously identified these acts. 
The degree to which water is able to be weaponized relies on its value to the state, which 
makes regions of the world more prone to water scarcity exacerbated by climate change greater 
targets. Von Lossow (2016) noted that the effect of water as a weapon depends on the regional 
hydrological and political context. A resource is more strategically appealing and destructive based 
on its potential impact in a specific environment.46 Sofuoğlu et al. (2019) show support for a 
general causal pattern between climate change and political instability within 16 countries, and 
conflict in 15 countries, in the Middle East and North Africa region (out of 18 analyzed over the 
time period of 1985-2016). In arid or semiarid regions like the Middle East and North Africa where 
water is already scarce, combatants use water to provide robust leverage over their opposition as 
a militarized target.47 ISIL in Syria and Iraq has employed the most frequent use of water as a 
strategic resource in gaining control of territory.48 ISIL has distinguished itself from other terror 
organizations through its vision of a caliphate that will assume many of the attributes of statehood, 
including territorial dominance and provision of municipal services to its population.49 Water is a 
key component of this strategy through their ability to both maintain control and gain territory, but 
also as a source of taxation, agriculture, and as a service usually provided by a state.50  
Alternative organizations employing these strategies that scholars have explored include 
Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although less 
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central to their strategy, these groups have all used water as a strategic weapon. Succeeding 
widespread regional droughts in 2011, Al Shabaab cut off liberated cities from their water sources, 
forcing residents from cut-off cities to walk to nearby towns to fetch water, many of which Al 
Shabaab controlled.51 Al Shabaab’s water weaponization was widely unsuccessful in its attempt 
to gain legitimacy or hurt the Somali government forces; however, it led to widespread suffering 
in the population and maintained their presence in the region during the ongoing civil war in 
Somalia.52 Boko Haram was documented weaponizing the limited water resources in Nigeria, 
strategically contaminating water sources such as streams and wells pursued by their enemy, 
capitalizing on the unrest caused by the civil war from 2005-2010.53 Continued water stress and 
intensification of both droughts and flooding in the region impeded the governance capacity of the 
weak Nigerian government, which led to Boko Haram’s violent surge to create an Islamic caliphate 
in 2010.54 In 2017, the Taliban blew up a dam constructed in the Kandahar province of 
Afghanistan, a key irrigation resource to agricultural lands and its destruction sparked panic among 
residents.55 Afghanistan is prone to drought and flooding, which have become more severe as 
climate change impacts have progressed, causing less snow, earlier snow melting, and an extended, 
hotter growing season.56 Additionally, the national government of Afghanistan was not functional 
for much of the past few decades meaning a lack of central governance over water infrastructure.57 
These are additional examples in which states with weak central governments have been unable to 
maintain authority to govern due to environmental crises, allowing VNSAs to manipulate water 
resources as weapons.  
As the above examples of countries in the Middle East and African regions imply the 
vulnerability of states to both climate threats and terrorism hinges on their strength as a state. A 
decrease in state authority often correlates with an increase in non-state terror organization 
occurrence who can use strategic resources to their advantage.58 The provision of goods is a key 
measure indicating the difference between a weak state and a strong state. The state’s primary 
function is to provide security meaning to prevent invasions, territorial loss and to eliminate 
domestic threats or assaults on the national order and social norms.59 Unlike strong states, failed 
states cannot maintain their borders and may lose authority over sections of territory.60 Climate 
change has the capacity to contribute to reduced state capacity, state failure and economic troubles 
fostering an enabling environment for non-state actor terrorist groups.61 In the case of interceding 
climatic disasters, the economic failure and pervasive neglect that is endemic to failed states leads 
to recurring food shortages and widespread hunger furthering political instability and providing 
increased access to VNSAs.62 VNSAs capitalize on the destabilization of weak borders and 
reduced state capacity to provide key resources exacerbated by these climatic events. 
The strength of a violent non-state actor is measured similarly to that of states. Oktav 
(2017) uses characterizations of actorness, powerfulness and effectiveness to demonstrate the 
measure. Actorness includes territoriality and geopolitical codes as well as community building, 
specifically highlighting territorial control for administrative practices and enforcing the idea of 
citizenship. Powerfulness comprises financial resources including territorial control and natural 
resources as well as taxes and confiscations, additionally, recruitment and propaganda. Finally, 
effectiveness encompasses regional engagements including regional territorial control and degree 
of security threat as well as international engagements, legitimacy, level of autonomy and 
counterterrorism actions by the international community. Oktav’s study using the Islamic State as 
an example, highlights viewing territory not only as a shelter but also an opportunity to engage in 
administrative aspects of proto-statehood and community-building practices, as well as its funding 
through the extortion of the population within its territories through taxes, fees, and 
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confiscations.63 These distinctions solidify the importance of territory to measure the influence of 
these actors as an indicator of state-like behavior. As discussed previously, water is identified as a 
key component of the ability to both maintain control and gain territory, but also as a source of 
taxation, agriculture, and resources provided by the state.64 
The connection between the identified weakness and failure of states and the advancement 
of violent non-state actors is of vital importance to examine the role of water in these conflicts. 
Through the capitalization of state weakness, substate actors gain control over areas within the 
state, build up their own local security mechanisms, authorized markets, and can even establish 
attempted forms of international relations.65 VNSAs have particular power in contexts where 
governments demonstrate a lack of capacity to provide the goods commonly associated with 
statehood such as security, infrastructure, and other basic welfare services, such as in the Middle 
East and North Africa region suffering from civil wars and continued unrest.66 Organizations can 
leverage their armed capacity to capture and monopolize access to state-sponsored services; 
specifically, previously existing infrastructure, such as dams, to secure locally dominant status at 
the expense of the state while avoiding costly and time-consuming investment in independent 
welfare systems.67 This strategy ensures the dependency of the local population and demonstrates 
that a militia is capable of running the state after the conflict.68  
The existing literature is primarily concerned with the exploration of ISIL’s water strategy 
rather than the tactic’s use in the deterioration of state sovereignty in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, 
while they focus on the beneficial use of the strategy in expanding ISIL’s caliphate, they neglect 
the effect of the loss of these resources and the eventual defeat in March 2019. My research aims 
to link the environmental issues caused by climate change with terrorism by showing how the 
acquisition or manipulation of water resources illustrates the shifting power dynamic between the 
state and VNSAs. In order to show the complete power shift, this paper will analyze not only the 
attainment or manipulation of these resources, but the effects of their retrieval by the state in the 
weakening of the caliphate to provide a full view of the influence of water weaponization to gain 
legitimacy and power. 
 
Research Design 
The unstable conditions produced by the droughts in Iraq and Syria from 2006-2010 played a 
meaningful relationship in the Syrian uprising and the ensuing spill over into Iraq, a weakness 
capitalized upon by ISIL to set up their caliphate.69 Brewing grievances against the failing 
governments and weakened civil institutions produced a safe haven for ISIL combatants and an 
incubator to recruit and gain momentum.70 In Syria, following the loss of livelihood and 
environmental crisis, ISIL recruited 60 to 70% of its fighters locally; likewise, in Iraq, ISIL 
recruited heavily from disgruntled Sunni Iraqis and prisoners released from Abu Ghraib Prison.71 
The maintenance of municipal service organizations, such as the Islamic Network for Public 
Services, by ISIL provided electricity and transportation greatly supported by the dams captured 
through water weaponizations, and was key to this recruitment.72 For this reason, acts of water 
weaponization are used, primarily the seizing of dams or use of water to control the local 
population, to track ISIL’s rise to power and fall to defeat.  
While other scholars have sought to identify acts of water weaponization to quantify the 
links between climate change and terrorism, the previous studies were finalized before the so-
called ‘defeat’ of the ISIL caliphate in March of 2019, which is of great importance in 
understanding how water resources have contributed to their strength. Additionally, the previous 
studies have been concerned with the exploration of ISIL’s water strategy rather than the strategy’s 
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deterioration of state sovereignty. My research aims to link environmental issues caused by climate 
change with terrorism by showing how the acquisition and manipulation of water resources 
illustrates the shifting power dynamic between the state and VNSAs.  
In order to do this, this paper explores the strategy of water weaponization by ISIL in the 
creation of their caliphate in order to show the power shift from the nation state to the terror group. 
To further explore this, this paper continues to analyze the decline of the caliphate with the loss of 
these key water resources and the eventual defeat of the caliphate to further show the power shift 
back to the nation state. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is used in this case study as their 
use of water weaponization is the strongest identified utilization of this strategy and their 
acquisition of territory to build a caliphate is transferable to tracking territorial power shifted to 
the VNSA group from the state and vice versa.  
A chronology of acts of water weaponization by ISIL throughout Iraq and Syria is produced 
from 2012, as they build their caliphate, eventually announcing in June 2014, through March 2019 
with the announcement of their defeat. The Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site, the Global 
Terrorism Database, news sources, local government and UN reports are employed to locate the 
acts of water weaponization. The Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site is a database tracking 
and categorizing events related to water and conflict. Their database is coded by region, date, 
category of conflict and includes sources confirming the event. The database is sorted through acts 
coded as ‘triggers’, ‘weapons’, and ‘casualty’; however, this was not utilized in my research. When 
the specific timeline of the event was unclear, this research utilized the Global Terrorism 
Database’s incident reports to narrow the specific date.  
This research corroborates these acts through newspapers and reports detailing the events. 
When possible, using both Western73 and regional news sources to detail the events in order to 
verify accurate depictions of the events and obtain both international and local accounts. Although 
multiple sources are used seeking to prevent bias and error, news media reports in conflict areas 
provide both crucial on-the-ground information and areas for uncertainty and misinformation. The 
UN and other international organizations publish reports periodically on the humanitarian situation 
and events in conflict zones, which are sometimes used to verify news reports.  
This chronology is then compared with the regional campaign tracker produced by the 
Institute for the Study of War in order to compare acts of water weaponization with territory 
controlled by the caliphate. The institute provides periodical publications of ISIS Sanctuary Maps 
detailing an assessment of the organization’s control throughout Iraq and Syria. Their publications 
begin in June of 2014 and the most recent was August 2019. To track the territory controlled by 
the ISIL, this research turns to their Syria Situation reports and other campaign tracking reports of 
Iraq and Syria which detail areas controlled by pro-regime forces, ISIL, SDF forces, Iraqi Security 
forces and reconciled opposition terrain.  
By connecting the acquisition and losses of these resources and acts of weaponization 
through the chronology with the tracking of territory controlled within the timeframe, this paper 
aims to show that the rise and decline of the ISIL caliphate in Iraq and Syria corresponds with the 
number of weaponization acts and areas attacked. In doing this, this paper hopes to provide a 
clearer view of how ISIL’s water weaponization coincides with their strength as a group. This 
correspondence will aid in solidifying the link between climate change and terrorism.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Preceding the proclamation of a caliphate by ISIL in June 2014, declaring the Islamic State, the 
insurgent group had already acquired territory and water resources. Figure 1. shows the territory 
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gained by ISIL up until just before the declaration of the caliphate. In a year-long offensive starting 
after the splintering of the group from Al Qaeda in 2013, ISIL sought territorial gains by fracturing 
Iraqi Security Forces starting from Mosul, Iraq.74 From Mosul, the group moved to weaken Iraqi 
government control toward Baghdad, expanding operations South of Mosul to Taji, Kirkuk and 
eventually to Baghdad aiming to lay the ground for an Islamic State.75 ISIL claimed Mosul from 
June 6-9, 2014 after dissolving the security forces and freeing over 3,000 prisoners from Abu 
Ghraib Prison.76 The Ar-Raqqa region of Northern Syria also provided a safe haven and training 
ground for ISIL seeking control of the Kurdish regions of Northern Syria.77  
 
Key. Marking of Weaponization Acts. 
 
   Key. 
 
- Act of water weaponization territorial acquisition 
 
- Loss of water resource previously held 
 
- Attempt of water weaponization (brief territorial acquisition) 
 
- Attempt of water weaponization (no territorial acquisition) 
  
 
Figure 1. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map June 10, 2014 
 
 
In Figure 1. their acquisition of Fallujah, Ba’ath, Tabqa and Tishrin dams are highlighted. 
ISIL captured the Tishrin Dam along the Euphrates in Manbij, Syria on November 16, 2012, their 
first dam seizure while the group was still fragmented and vying for power.78 Tishrin supplied 
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hydroelectricity.79 This attack led to a Syrian government air raid to regain territory and the dam; 
however, ISIL maintained control of the dam and surrounding areas.  
Several months after capturing Tishrin Dam, ISIL seized the neighboring Tabqa Dam in 
February 2013 and a year later, the Ba’ath Dam, both located in Ar-Raqqa, Syria (Figure 1.). This 
acquisition gave much of the countryside to the militant group while government forces struggled 
to retain the cities of Raqqa and Tabqa. ISIL eventually conquered the city of Raqqa in later 
January 2014.80 ISIL leaked that they had controlled the provision of water services after this 
acquisition by threatening the population with significant fines if the local population evaded the 
water taxes or tried to steal electricity.81 Their acquisition of Tabqa Dam, the largest dam in Syria, 
supplying five million people (including Aleppo) with water including irrigation for agricultural 
purposes and several towns with electricity, with a max hydropower capacity of 824 megawatts, 
greatly strengthened their security threat.82 The control over this Dam gave them power over this 
population. The Tabqa Dam is also strategic due to its location on Lake Assad and has been Syria’s 
main source of electricity, in the past making Syria self-sufficient in power generation.83 The 
Ba’ath dam provides less hydropower, a max capacity of 81 megawatts, but supplies 60% of 




Table 2. Chronology of Water Weaponization by the ISIL within Iraq and Syria  
Date Location Description 
November 26, 2012 Manbij, Syria ISIL rebels85 capture Tishrin 
Dam 
February 11, 2012 Raqqa, Syria ISIL rebels capture Tabqa 
Dam 
February, 2013 Raqqa, Syria ISIL rebels capture Ba’ath 
Dam 
January, 2014 Aleppo, Syria ISIL seizes Aleppo Water 
Pumping Station 
April 11, 2014 Nuaimiya, Iraq ISIL rebels capture Fallujah 
Dam 
June, 2014 Qaraqosh, Iraq ISIL blocks water pipes in 
Qaraqosh 
June 25, 2014 Haditha, Iraq ISIL troops advance toward 
Haditha Dam 
August 7, 2014 Mosul, Iraq ISIL captures Mosul Dam 
August 18, 2014 Mosul, Iraq Kurdish troops regain control 
of Mosul Dam 
December, 2014 Salahaddin, Syria ISIL contaminates drinking 
water in Salahaddin 
Governorate 
January, 2015 Mosul, Iraq ISIL attacks Mosul Dam 
April, 2015 Samarra, Iraq ISIL attacks Samarra Dam 
June, 2015 Ramadi, Iraq ISIL shuts off water flows 
below the Ramadi Dam 
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December 23, 2015 Manbij, Syria Syrian Democratic Forces 
regain control of Tishrin Dam 
June 13, 2016 Fallujah, Iraq Iraqi forces regain control of 
Fallujah Dam 
November 29, 2016 Mosul, Iraq ISIL destroys water pipeline 
in Mosul 
December, 2016 Ramadi, Iraq Iraqi officials announce they 
have full control of Ramadi 
February, 2017 Aleppo, Syria ISIL floods fields in Aleppo to 
stop the Syrian Army 
March, 2017 Aleppo, Syria Syrian Regime forces regain 
water pumping station in 
Aleppo 
March-May 2017 Raqqa, Syria US and Syrian forces fight 
ISIL controlling Tabqa Dam 
June, 2017 Raqqa, Syria Syrian Democratic Forces 
Seize Ba’ath Dam 
June, 2018 Raqqa, Syria Syrian Government 
announces reoperation of 
Tabqa and Tishrin Dams 
In January 2014, ISIL rebels seized one of the main water-pumping stations in Aleppo, 
Syria leading to the local population being without water for two months (Figure 1.).86 This site 
had previously been captured by opposition forces in February 2013.87 Their final acquisition 
before the caliphate was the Fallujah Dam in Nuaimiya, Iraq on April 11, 2014 (Figure 1.) which 
helps to distribute water from the Euphrates River as well as provide water for a number of 
irrigation projects throughout the Anbar province.88 ISIL captured Nuaimiya in February and 
closed the gates to the dam one week before (approximately week of April 4) which reduced water 
flow to the rest of Iraq’s Southern provinces.89 Insurgents reopened five gates on April 10 fearing 
that the dam would flood their stronghold in Fallujah (Reuters, April 11, 2014). Iraqi officials 
stated that previous flooding from the dam has already caused families to flee and had prevented 
security troops from retaliating against ISIL.90 Decline of water levels from the dam closure also 
resulted in power outages (decrease from 170 megawatts to 90 megawatts) in Baghdad which 
relied on steam-powered generators.91 By closing the floodgates, they diverted water over an 
irrigation channel, flooding land up to 100 km away, including the city of Abu Ghraib, under up 
to four meters of water.92 More than 10,000 houses and 200 square kilometers of fertile farmland, 
including the annual harvest, were destroyed between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib.93 Over 60,000 
residents in the area were displaced after losing their livelihood to the flood.94 In destroying homes, 
agricultural fields and livelihood, the local population is forced to succumb to the insurgent groups’ 




Figure 2. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map October 30, 2014 
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Institute for the Study of War (2015, August 3). 
 
 In June 2014, following the declaration of the caliphate, ISIL obstructed water pipes to the 
predominantly Christian town of Qaraqosh, Iraq (Figure 2.).95 They took over agricultural lands 
displacing close to 50,000 inhabitants pushing them to arrive in search of safety, food and water 
in Erbil.96 This action followed ISIL’s seizure of the city of Mosul on June 10, 2014 which is 
nearby. The seizure of Mosul attached ISIL’s southern Dier ez-Zour and Anbar system, which was 
the primary goal throughout July.97 ISIL also maintained vast control of territory in Northeast Syria 
in the Ar-Raqqa province and surrounding Aleppo continuing to hold Tishrin, Ba’ath and Tabqa 
dams as well as the Aleppo Pumping Station (Figure 2.).  
Later in June, Iraqi security officials reported that ISIL troops were advancing on the 
Haditha Dam (Figure 2.).98 More than 2,000 Iraqi troops were deployed to the area to protect the 
dam, prepared to open the floodgates if ISIL reached the dam which would cause flooding of the 
town and villages and potential harm to the locals.99 Due to its attachment to Lake Qadisiyah, 
which could be a potential weapon of mass destruction, US rangers seized Haditha Dam during 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein’s forces from destroying it and causing an 
enormous flood.100 ISIL was unable to seize the dam due to Iraqi presence; however, this would 
have been a major gain if they had, as it supplied more than 30% of Iraq’s energy, particularly to 
the city of Baghdad.101  
ISIL captured the key facility of Mosul Dam (Figure 2.) on August 7, 2014 prompting swift 
airstrikes by the Iraqi government, Kurdish and US starting on August 11.102 The head of the 
Kurdistan region’s presidency office noted that ISIL had transitioned from a terrorist organization 
to a terrorist state.103 The dam can produce 1010 megawatts of electricity, 75% of Iraq’s energy 
production capability and holds back 12 billion cubic meters of water which are crucial for the 
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irrigation of local agriculture of the Nineveh province.104 It is estimated that a catastrophic failure 
of Mosul dam could result in a flood wave of 20 meters toward the city of Mosul.105 ISIL’s featured 
their capture in their propaganda campaign and the group placed an Islamic State flag on top of 
the dam declaring their victory shown in Figure 3. The Iraqi government and Kurdish forces 
announced that they have fully regained control of Mosul Dam with the help of US airstrikes on 
August 18, 2014 (Figure 2.).106 US airstrikes commenced on August 8 following ISIL’s capture.107 
These were the first US operations in Iraq since 2011 when they pulled out of the war in Iraq and 
prompted further European involvement against the insurgent group.108  
 
Figure 3. ISIL Propaganda featuring Mosul Dam. 
 
Photos retrieved from UN Security Council CTED Trends Report March 2017 
 
September and October 2014 marked ISIL’s consolidation of control over the Anbar 
province of Iraq, specifically the midpoint of Hit between Ramadi and Haditha.109 This 
corresponded with ISIL’s quest for the Haditha Dam (Figure 2.). The ‘Southwestern Baghdad 
Belts’ had been an ISIL stronghold including Jurf al-Sakhar, Farisiyah, Fadhiliyah, Abu Ghraib, 
and Amiriyat al-Fallujah; however, Iraqi Security forces were struggling to maintain control of 
Amiriyat al-Fallujah which was crucial for their strength.110 Their stronghold in Mosul fell before 
the June attack on Mosul dam, but it is noted that this could have been in order to preserve the 
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Figure 4. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map December 8, 2016 
 
 
Institute for the Study of War (2016, December 6). 
 
In October 2014, ISIL captured the city of Hit between Ramadi and Haditha, as previously 
targeted, and sought to take Ramadi.112 In December 2014, ISIL conducted simultaneous attacks 
on Iraqi Security Forces in Haditha and Ramadi in their widespread ground offensive to capture 
Ramadi.113 In December 2014, the UN reported that ISIL had intentionally contaminated drinking 
water with crude oil in the Governorate of Salahaddin as well as in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa 
(Figure 4.).114 During this time, Kurdish SDF forces pushed ISIL’s presence to the periphery of 
Raqqa; however, ISIL expanded greatly in the Hasaka province and surrounding Damascus in 
Syria near where the Salahaddin contamination took place.115 ISIL also saw losses in Mosul in 
January 2015 and launched another attack on Mosul Dam (Figure 4.); however, the militant group 
was not able to capture the dam.116 Peshmerga soldiers and Sunni tribal groups near Mosul 
prevented this attack leading ISIL to declare new governorates in nearby Jazeera and Zaab in a 
defensive mobilization around Mosul.117  
Iraqi forces conducted a major offensive to take back areas around Tikrit and Baiji from 
November 2014 through March 2015.118 ISIL took partial control of the Samarra dam (also known 
as Al-Thirthar dam) in Samarra, Iraq in late April 2015 (Figure 4.).119 Iraqi forces announced an 
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increased offensive to take back the Anbar province, but this attack majorly decreased their 
progress.120  
ISIL seized Ramadi dam (Figure 4.) in May of 2015 and weaponized this water by cutting 
off pro-government towns downstream on the Euphrates River.121 This followed ISIL’s conquest 
of Ramadi which finally fell on May 27, 2015 after many months of ground attacks against Iraqi 
forces (Martin, 2015). The militants manipulated the dam by only opening two or three of the 
dam’s gates per day rather than the twenty-six possible.122 This lowered the depth of the river 
allowing ISIL soldiers to cross and strike pro-government towns of Husaybah and Khalidiyah, 
most importantly located near the Habbaniya military base.123 Additionally, there were threats to 
cut off drinking and irrigation water to the local population reportedly causing thousands to go 
without drinking water in the height of the summer heat.124 800 Iraqi federal forces were deployed 
to combat ISIL following a major Iraqi government operation tasked to take back the Anbar 
province, of which Ramadi is the capital.125 There were reports of families fleeing the militants’ 
control; however, the reports vary from dozens to 300 families.126  
In September of 2015, Russia began its direct intervention in Syria enabling the Syrian 
regime to mount renewed offensives against the caliphate.127 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
and proxy forces initiated a prolonged offensive on the city of Aleppo.128 US backed SDF forces 
also made major gains along the Syria-Iraq border in Al-Hawl and Sinjar provinces.129 The SDF 
were also advancing toward the Southern Hasaka province seeking to liberate areas of the Ar-
Raqqa province.130 On December 23, 2015 in this SDF offensive to liberate ISIL controlled towns 
along the Euphrates River, the forces regained control of the Tishrin Dam (Figure 4.).131  
ISIL continued to lose terrain in Iraq and Syria throughout the early months of 2016. Iraqi 
Security Forces reseized the city of Hit in the Anbar Province on April 14 as part of continual 
operations to secure the Euphrates River Valley.132 In May, ISIL lost territory in Iraq but claimed 
an attack on Wilayat Sahel, on the Northwestern coast of Syria, located in regime territory.133 ISIL 
combatants initiated complex suicide attacks in deep regime territory in Tartus City and Jableh on 
May 23, 2016 and indicated they were escalating assaults against Alawite communities on the 
coast of Syria in order to aggravate existing sectarian tensions during the month of Ramadan.134 
On June 13, 2016 Iraqi forces regained control of the nearby Fallujah dam (Figure 4.), 
which ISIL took in early 2014, following an Iraqi quest to liberate the city of Fallujah on May 
23.135 ISIL also capitulated the city of Manbij and the town of Al-Rai in Northern Aleppo Province 
in a chain of victories for the US-backed anti-ISIL coalition in July.136 Simultaneously, the Iraqi 
Security Forces sustained conditions for future operations to retake Mosul.137 These areas under 
ISIL control in Mosul, Raqqa and Al-Bab were weakened in October by increasingly strong anti-
ISIL operations.138 In retaliation to the encroaching Iraqi forces, on November 29, 2016 more than 
650,000 Iraqis were without water in Mosul after ISIL struck one of the three major water pipelines 
(Figure 4.).139 It was reported that the militant group cut electricity to the water stations feeding 
neighborhoods where Iraqi troops were advancing in the operations by Iraqi Security forces to 




Figure 5. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map August 19, 2019 
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Institute for the Study of War (2019, October 12). 
 
In late December 2016, Iraqi officials announced that they had control over Ramadi Dam 
and the surrounding town (Figure 5.).141 ISIL initiated offensives in January 2017 against the 
Syrian regime in Deir ez-Zour, the Eastern Homs province, and the Eastern Damascus province, 
capitalizing on the regime’s focus on Aleppo and aiming to offset or redirect regime operations 
near Al-Bab.142 ISIL flooded villages in Deir Hafer Plain in East Aleppo, Syria (Figure 5.) in 
response to a raid by the Syrian Arab Army.143 The militant group pumped water from Assad Lake 
into Al-Jar Channel.144 This advancement by the Syrian Army put them within the ISIL stronghold 
of Deir Hafer for the first time since the creation of the caliphate.145 Regime forces began to chip 
away at ISIL’s territorial gains in Homs province in mid-February and ISIL capitulated additional 
terrain in Mosul, Iraq to the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017.146  
ISIL suffered territorial losses in Iraq and Syria between February 27 and March 9, 2017.147 
Pro-regime forces reseized Palmyra, Syria with reinforcements from Iranian, Russian, and 
Lebanese Hezbollah forces on March 2.148 Pro-regime forces acquired additional towns from ISIL 
in the Northeast Aleppo province between March 7 and March 9.149 Syrian regime forces 
recaptured the key water pumping station in Aleppo, Syria (Figure 5.) after inhabitants had been 
without water for two months since ISIL had cut the pipeline.150 ISIL seized the facility in January, 
2014 (Figure 5.).151  
In May 2017, US-backed forces continued to advance in major ISIL strongholds in Mosul, 
Iraq and Raqqa, Syria.152 Iraqi Security forced encircled the city of Mosul and US-backed SDF 
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forces captured the city of Tabqa.153 The Syrian Democratic Forces and US troops launched an 
offensive in March against ISIL holding Tabqa Dam, a key source of hydroelectricity for the 
caliphate.154 On May 10, 2017 reports indicated that drone footage showed the dam completely 
under SDF control (Figure 5.).155 Both Tabqa and Tishrin Dams were re-operational under the 
Syrian government in June 2018 (Figure 5.).156 NATO leaders also formally negotiated a 
partnership in the Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria during the NATO Summit on May 25 in 
Brussels, announcing that NATO will increase its "airspace management" and aerial refueling 
mission for coalition aircraft and expand its deployment of special forces teams to train local ally 
forces.157 As ISIL within Iraq had largely been defeated, regional actors continued to vie for 
control of post-ISIL Iraqi reconstruction.158  
In June of 2017, US-backed SDF forces regained control of the last dam under ISIL control, 
the Ba’ath Dam (Figure 5.).159 This came within the SDF’s major offensive to take back Raqqa, 
which they achieved in October of that year.160 In September, Syrian pro-regime forces continued 
to attack Deir ez-Zor province with the support of heavy bombardment by the US and Russia and 
also launched offensives to clear out the Iraq-Syrian border.161 This offensive from Deir ez-Zor 
continued down the Euphrates river to continue liberating towns.162 Additionally, the US Anti-
ISIS coalition withdrew from its outpost on the Syrian-Iraqi border near Homs as part of a de-
confliction agreement.163 In July 2017, a de-escalation zone in Southern Syria was brokered by the 
US, Russia and Jordan.164 On October 20, the SDF declared victory over ISIL in the city of Raqqa, 
Syria.165  
In early 2018, Israel announced its support for the new opposition offensive against ISIL 
in Syria entitled “Battle of Conquerors” and reportedly contributed cross border shelling from the 
Golan Heights.166 The coalitions continued offensives against ISIL in the Deir ez-Zor province of 
Syria.167 In May of 2018, Syrian pro-regime forces announced the complete control of Damascus 
after the evacuation of the last remaining pocket in the capital city.168 Additionally, the US-led 
coalition launched Operation Roundup in order to “destroy IS” in Eastern Syria.169 In December 
of 2019, President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of troops from Syria and in January, 
US troops were spotted removing military equipment from Northern Syria.170 This movement 
came after US troops prepared to clear the final pocket of ISIL held territory in the Deir ez-Zor 
province of Syria.171 ISIL lost its last territorial zone in Syria on March 23, 2019 after it was seized 
by SDF forces.172 
Looking forward after the ‘defeat’ of the caliphate, it was estimated that ISIL still had over 
30,000 fighters located within Iraq and Syria in August 2018 based on a report by a defense 
intelligence agency.173 After the widely successful offensives, it was presumed that ISIL 
deliberately pulled back, relocating the majority of combatants and their families from Mosul, 
Raqqa, and other prominent cities into new and previously known support zones in Iraq and 
Syria.174 ISIL forces are now scattered across Iraq and Syria and are still an existing security 
threat.175 ISIL also preserved their global finance network which enabled their ability to transition 
back to an insurgency, additionally, retaining ample weaponry and other resources in alleged 
tunnel systems and other support mechanisms in order to equip its revived insurgent force in the 
future.176 On May 31, 2019, ISIL declared the start of a new global campaign called the ‘Battle of 
Attrition’ instructing their followers to seize terrain temporarily as a way to erode their 
opponents.177 ISIL has also made great strides in its ability to campaign both in Iraq and Syria and 
abroad which enables it new opportunities.178 A successful reestablishment of a physical caliphate 
in Iraq and Syria could yield new surges of ISIL attacks in Europe and give the opportunity for 
legitimization of ISIL’s inevitable long-term victory narrative.179 
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Conclusion 
This paper explored the capacity of climate change to shift the power dynamic between nation-
states and violent non-state actors within their borders. The water weaponization of ISIL in Iraq 
and Syria shows the ability of manipulating water resources in a water scarce and politically 
unstable environment to strengthen the role of violent non-state actors. Fourteen acts of water 
weaponization were identified and chronologized along with any subsequent state actions to 
reconcile these water resources. These acts of water weaponization were mapped in order to 
correlate ISIL’s use of water as a weapon with the acquisition and loss of territory within their 
caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Analysis of these acts showed a swell of weaponization acts before the 
establishment of the caliphate and during its territorial strength from 2012 through 2015 and the 
demise of both the frequency of weaponization acts and the territory held by the caliphate from 
then until 2019.  
These findings show a link between the effects of climate change and the increased 
opportunity for violent non-state actors through the weakening of the nation-state. Furthermore, 
this case shows the vulnerability of states to VNSAs while under environmental and political 
stress. Although the caliphate was ‘defeated’, ISIL remains a continued security threat and the 
strategy of water weaponization could be used to reestablish territorial control over other water 
scarce regions. Similar tactics have been seen throughout Africa, Southeast Asia and other areas 
within the Middle East, and this strategy could become widespread as climate change impacts 
increase. 
The offensives to take back resources acquired by ISIL through water weaponization were 
enabled by the involvement of outside international actors including the US, Russia, NATO, Israel 
and Iran who provided military-training, funding and weaponry to strengthen on the ground forces 
in Iraq and Syria. Following the demise of the caliphate, international support withdrew and 
coincided with a shift towards controlling the reconstruction of post-ISIL Iraq and Syria. The 
success of the reconstruction and strengthening of these states will become a key predictor in 
ISIL’s potential resurgence in the region. Additionally, as climate change effects increase, this 
strategy could become widespread and used by other groups taking the lead of ISIL. The 
strengthening of both central governance and authority over water infrastructure is vital for future 
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ABSTRACT: This paper assesses the impacts of minority representation on judicial decision-
making within three-judge panels on the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals. While much 
of the existing literature regarding this issue has looked at racial and gender minorities in the federal 
judiciary, this paper seeks to identify whether the presence of foreign-born judges on appellate 
panels has an effect on the holdings of immigration-related cases. To address this question, I 
compiled an original database of 200 immigration cases decided between 2016 and 2020. The 
results reaffirm previous findings that panels with at least one female judge or judge of color are 
more likely to vote in favor of immigrant appellants. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, 
the results find that foreign-born judges were not more likely to vote in favor of immigrant 
appellants, signaling that the identity of being an immigrant may not have as strong of a predictive 
value on judicial decision-making as race or gender. This has broad implications for how we 
understand the role of different identities in shaping case outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals. 
 
Introduction 
The judicial branch of the United States government is its most objective.1 Unlike the 
chambers of Congress or the President, federal judges are meant to make decisions independent of 
personal or political pressures; rather than passing laws, their job is to apply the law correctly 
based on the facts of a case.2 However, a growing body of research into judicial decision-making 
suggests that judges do not always vote objectively. Scholars have found that certain factors — 
namely the race and gender of judges within appellate panels — can influence case decisions.3,4 
Controversy over this issue arose in 2016, when then-President Donald Trump claimed that U.S. 
District Judge Gonzalo Curiel should not have presided over a case involving Trump University 
because his Mexican heritage presented an “absolute conflict.”5 Since Trump was advocating to 
build a wall on the U.S.-Mexican border at the time, he asserted that the judge would harbor an 
unfair bias towards him during legal proceedings. In the end, Judge Gonzalo Curiel remained on 
the lawsuit’s panel and would go on to rule in Trump’s favor to stop a lawsuit aimed at blocking 
the border wall’s construction.6 While Trump’s remarks were deemed racist by many, the situation 
begs the question: Do personal identities influence judicial decision-making?  
In this section, I summarize the existing literature surrounding the effects of minority 
representation on the federal bench. Despite criticisms about the objectivity of minority judges, 
researchers have only found persistent differences in case decisions when the identities of minority 
judges substantively relate to the issues at hand. To illustrate this, Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 
(2010) performed a comprehensive analysis of the effect of judges’ gender on case outcomes 
across 13 areas of law. They did not find gender effects in any area of law besides cases of sex 
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discrimination, in which female judges were more likely to side with plaintiffs.7 This suggests that 
a general pro-plaintiff or otherwise liberal attitude among female judges is not driving gender 
differences in voting behaviors, but rather, the content of sex discrimination cases specifically 
elicits different responses in male and female judges.  
Since the focus of this paper is on the U.S. Court of Appeals, my research must properly 
account for its institutional features. While some studies have assessed differences in individual 
voting behaviors between minority and nonminority judges, these individual effects cannot explain 
Court of Appeals outcomes because federal appellate panels do not operate by having judges 
decide cases on their own.8 Instead, judges in the Court of Appeals deliberate together in panels of 
three and must come to a unanimous decision about a case’s holding. Research shows that minority 
representation on appellate panels impacts judicial decisions both at the individual and panel level. 
That is, not only are individual female judges more likely to vote in favor of appellants alleging 
sex discrimination, but panels that include at least one female judge are also more likely to vote in 
favor of these appellants.9,10 Similarly, Black judges and panels with Black judges are more likely 
to vote pro-appellant in cases of racial discrimination and affirmative action.11,12 In discussing 
appellate panels, it is also important to note their institutional norm of consensus. An 
overwhelming majority of cases are decided with consensus; only around 6-8% of cases include a 
dissent opinion from one of the co-panelist judges. 13 However, the low percentage of dissents does 
not fully capture the amount of disagreement within panels — judges do not always dissent when 
they disagree with their co-panelists because there are costs associated with doing so.14 For 
example, dissenting can undermine the federal judiciary’s sense of legitimacy and perceived 
objectivity. Additionally, writing a dissent can ostracize a judge from their colleagues and create 
a fruitless workload for them. Therefore, judges in disagreement are often compelled to align 
themselves with the majority opinion and vote differently than they might otherwise have, making 
it difficult to determine whether judges voted in accordance with their true views.  
Most of the scholarship on judicial decision-making in the Court of Appeals has been 
concerned with race and gender. As a result, previous studies have mainly looked at the effects of 
minority representation on cases of sex and race discrimination. By contrast, very few studies have 
examined the influence of minority judge characteristics on cases related to immigration. One such 
study on immigration cases from 1999-2009 explored whether panels with judges of color and 
female judges systematically voted more pro-immigrant. The researchers found that consistent 
with previous studies, panels with at least one female judge voted more pro-immigrant than their 
all-male counterparts.15 However, the same study also found that panels with at least one judge of 
color were more anti-immigration than their all-white counterparts. The authors suggest that this 
finding could have arisen because judges of color were less sympathetic to “claims made by people 
who have entered the country illegally” or because “they are cognizant of the scrutiny they are 
under in deciding these cases.”16 In my view, this also suggests that immigration cases are not 
substantively related to the racial identities of minority judges, so I turn my focus instead to 
foreign-born judges, whose relationship to immigration cases parallels that of female judges and 
judges of color to sex and race discrimination cases. 
Taken together, the literature on judicial diversity suggests that panels with racial and 
gender minority judges increase the likelihood of a case outcome being pro-appellant. However, 
in reviewing these studies, I found that there was a dearth of research into the panel effects of 
foreign-born judges in the Court of Appeals. Part of this problem is likely due to the fact that 
foreign-born judges are underrepresented in the circuit courts. Currently, the U.S. is home to 
roughly 44.7 million immigrants or around 13.7% of the national population.17 In states covered 
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by the Ninth Circuit, the immigrant population is even higher than the national average because 
they harbor some of the nation’s most popular airports and immigrants tend to concentrate near 
gateway ports of entry in their cities.18 By contrast, only 2 out of the 29 sitting judges (6.8%) on 
the Ninth Circuit court are foreign-born.19* The underrepresentation of immigrant judges has 
especially worrisome implications in the Ninth Circuit, since around 40% of all cases heard in its 
courts are related to immigration.20 Women, people of color, LGBTQ+ people, and religious 
minorities are also underrepresented in the Court of Appeals compared to their representation in 
the U.S. population, and this issue has increased with the recent judicial appointees.21 For example, 
women comprise 30% of circuit court seats although they are 50.52% of the U.S. population; 
Hispanics comprise 7% of seats although they are 13% of the population; Blacks comprise 11% 
of seats although they are 13% of the population; etc.22 In discussing diversity in the federal 
judiciary, I must highlight the difference between the descriptive representation that I have just 
described and substantive representation.23 Descriptive representation relates to being represented 
by judges who have the same demographic characteristics as the population. On the other hand, 
substantive representation relates to being represented by judges who hold the same opinions and 
views as the population. While these terms have some overlap in that judges who share 
demographic characteristics with a population may hold the same beliefs as them, minorities are 
certainly not a monolith and cannot be assumed to have one set of views, even in areas of law that 
are salient to their identities.  
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s diversity has gone through a shift in recent years. During 
Trump’s presidency, he filled 10 vacancies in the Ninth Circuit court alone. 24 This effectively 
flipped the composition of the court, which had long been hailed for its commitment to diversity 
ever since Jimmy Carter’s 1970 initiative to appoint minority judges to the federal judiciary.25 As 
of January 2021, a third of the 29 sitting judges on the nation’s traditionally most liberal court 
were right leaning Trump appointees. Of Trump’s picks, there were 2 Asian men, one of whom 
was born outside of the U.S., and 2 White women. The rest were White men. 
In response both to the gap in the literature and the pressing need for more representation 
of foreign-born judges in the federal judiciary, I narrowed the focus of my research to answer the 
following question: Do Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panels with at least one foreign-born judge 
vote differently from panels with all U.S.-born judges on immigration cases? Although the existing 
literature affirms that minority panel effects are present, scholars have struggled to ascertain why. 
The next section covers theoretical expectations in an attempt to identify potential causal 
mechanisms that may be driving these effects on the federal bench.  
 
Theoretical Expectations 
In order to properly interpret my research, it is crucial to understand why previous studies 
find that panels with minority judges vote differently than those without. In this section, I discuss 
three theoretical explanations, which provide psychological insight into the impact of diversity on 
judicial decision-making. They help provide an account for why we might predict that panels with 
minority judges, specifically foreign-born judges, will vote more pro-appellant in immigration 
cases. 
 
Norm of Consensus 
Fischman (2011) states that due to the collaborative nature of appellate panels, judges do 
not always vote sincerely.26  Rather, they conform to the norm of consensus in the federal judiciary 
by voting against their own views in favor of the views of the majority. Under this logic, the panel-
160
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/9
Bianca Oritz-Miskimen 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 8 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
161 
level effects of judicial diversity may be the result of nonminority judges believing that they will 
not be able to change the vote(s) of their minority co-panelist(s). Thus, they would side with their 
co-panelists in order to preserve unanimity and avoid the minority judge filing a dissent. This 
explanation reflects an endogenous effect because the outcome (vote) for one individual affects 
the outcomes of their co-panelists.27 In this way, we expect that minority judges will shift the range 
for a consensus view and the presence of a minority judge who holds more pro-appellant attitudes 
will predictably increase the likelihood that the panel will hold pro-appellant.28 
 
Learning Through Exposure 
Pursuant to previous literature on learning theories, I submit that as people learn about 
others’ lived experiences, they adjust their own views to incorporate this new information. For 
example, one study showed that pro-White sentiments among White Americans decreased during 
and following the Black Lives Matter Movement in 2018, which the researchers posit was due to 
exposure to media content highlighting Black American stories about being targets of police 
brutality and racism.29 In another study, researchers postulated that male judges with daughters 
vote more pro-feminist because prior to having children, they were unaware of women’s issues 
and better understood those issues when they had a daughter who was experiencing them.30 This 
logic theoretically extends to judicial appellate panels because the first-hand experiences of female 
judges, judges of color, and foreign-born judges can be shared with their white, male U.S.-born 
co-panelists during case deliberation.31 As a result of learning through exposure, this suggests that 
the co-panelists would adopt more pro-appellant attitudes in gender and racial discrimination 
cases, as well as immigration cases. African American D.C. Judge Harry Edwards affirmed this 
idea in 2002, stating that: 
 
“If I bring unique perspectives to judicial problems — perspectives that are mine in whole 
or in part because I am Black — it is a good thing… because it is inevitable that judges’ 
different professional and life experiences have some bearing on how they confront various 
problems that come before them. And in a judicial environment in which collegial 
deliberations are fostered, diversity among the judges makes for better-informed 
discussion.”32  
 
In the context of this study, the literature implies that foreign-born judges who have gone through 
the immigration courts would be able to expose U.S.-born judges to first-hand accounts of the 
immigrant experience and foster more positive attitudes towards immigrant appellants. For 
example, Carlos Bea, a Ninth Circuit judge who was born in Spain, told his story of immigrating 
to America and how he was nearly deported by an immigration court as a young college student. 
In a 2007 address to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), he said: 
 
“Every immigrant has a story. You see before you an immigrant who was once under an 
order of deportation…We are a nation of immigrants and the subject is a vital one for all 
of us. Every time an Albert Einstein invents a theory, an Arnold Schwarzenegger becomes 
a Governor, or a rookie Hispanic judge writes a dissent, I am reminded that immigrants 
aren’t just a previous generation long gone, they are an ever-changing contribution to our 
society, which really is a melting pot.”33 
Moderation 
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Lastly, it is possible that the presence of minority judges on appellate panels causes 
nonminority judges to moderate their anti-appellant views.34 For example, a panel of three U.S.-
born judges may bring up arguments or display attitudes that are anti-immigrant because either 
they believe that their U.S.-born co-panelists will agree with them or they believe that there will 
not be strong opposition associated with expressing their views. However, if an immigrant judge 
were on that same panel, we could expect that a judge who would otherwise express anti-
immigration views might adjust their speech to not incur the social cost of offending a colleague. 
Studies of social psychology bolster this claim, finding that in the case of racial biases, White 
Americans use social tuning in interracial interactions by exhibiting less prejudice in the presence 
of Blacks than in the presence of other Whites.35 Researchers postulate that this is because the 
participants shifted their behaviors in order to not appear biased to those around them. If a judge’s 
anti-appellant views were moderated by the presence of a judge who shares an identity with the 
appellant, then we might expect them to concede the case and side with the minority judge.  
 
Data and Methods 
My data consists of a random sample of 200 immigration-related cases decided in the Ninth 
Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals between 2016-2020. Through Westlaw,36 a legal research 
website, I conducted an advanced search request that narrowed down all Ninth Circuit cases with 
the date range from January 1st of 2016 to September 18th of 2020, which was the day that I began 
collecting my data. Having a date range from the last four years was of particular interest to me 
because of the political climate surrounding President Trump’s immigration policy, as well as the 
shifting composition of the Ninth Circuit court to be more conservative.37  
I chose to only focus on immigration cases because the existing literature suggests that the 
impacts of minority representation on judicial outcomes is found most consistently in cases related 
to an area of law that is relevant to the judges’ identities. Since the novel approach of my paper is 
examining foreign-born judges as minorities in the federal judiciary, I felt that immigration cases 
were most parallel to studies on female judges in sex discrimination cases or Black judges in racial 
discrimination cases. I decided to concentrate my research on cases only within the Ninth Circuit 
because its courts have such a large immigration caseload and a high rate of immigration into its 
states (Montana, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Alaska, Hawaii, and California) 
compared to other circuits.38 Using Westlaw, I further narrowed my search to cases that fall under 
the category of “Aliens, Immigration, and Citizenship.” I manually excluded cases in which the 
U.S. government was one of the litigants. This left all of the cases included in my dataset with the 
two litigants being the case’s immigrant appellant and one of the U.S. Attorneys General as the 
appellee. During my date range, the Attorneys General were William Barr, Jeff Sessions, Loretta 
Lynch, and Matthew Whitaker. After employing the exclusion criteria, there were 285 remaining 
cases, of which I used a random number generator to select 200 cases for analysis.  
My dataset focused on panel-level judicial decisions, as opposed to the voting records of 
individual judges. This decision was made in part because, institutionally, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals has a norm of consensus in which all decisions must be made with approval of all three 
judges on a panel except in cases where one judge dissents. While it is possible to use dissents as 
a proxy for individual votes, my dataset included only 15 dissents out of 200 cases. Since each 
case has three votes — one per panelist — there were 15 dissents out of 600 votes, which was too 
small a sample to be able to perform comprehensive statistical analysis on. This would likely not 
have a strong impact on my research focus because, of the 15 dissent votes, I found only one case 
in which an immigrant judge dissented.39*  
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Using Excel, I coded for 28 distinct variables. The outcome variable for my research 
purposes was the holding of each case, which I coded as a gradient based on how favorable the 
outcome was towards the immigrant appellant. In Court of Appeals cases, the panel may decide in 
favor of the immigrant appellant by affirming their petition to be reconsidered by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), an independent administrative agency. In my codebook, a holding of 
(0) indicates that the appellant’s petition was fully denied or denied in part and dismissed in part 
by the panel; a (1) indicates that the petition was granted in part and denied or dismissed in part; a 
(2) indicates that the petition was fully granted. I used this gradient as opposed to a binary variable 
in order to capture the nuance of the holdings and account for the large number of cases that were 
upheld in part and denied in part. 
My key variable of interest was whether or not each judge on a panel was born in the U.S. 
(U.S.-born = 0; foreign-born = 1). To identify which judges were foreign-born and which were 
U.S.-born, I collected information directly from the Federal Judiciary Center (FJC), which 
provides publicly accessible bios that include the birthplace of every federal judge.40 Further, FJC 
bios include data on the U.S. president that nominated each judge. I used the party of the 
nominating president as a proxy for the partisan affiliations of each judge (Republican = 0; 
Democrat = 1). I collected information on race/ethnicity (White = 0; Hispanic = 1; Asian = 2; 
Black = 3; Middle Eastern = 4; Native American = 5) and gender (Male = 0; Female = 1) based on 
my personal assessment of Google images and the surnames of each judge. Although the accuracy 
of my assessment may have limitations, this method is most often used for judicial research since 
federal judge’s race and gender identities are not explicitly listed on any official websites.  
I also included a variable for the national origin of each immigrant appellant in my dataset.  
There is robust evidence that not all immigrants are treated or viewed the same — Americans have 
for decades viewed immigration from European countries more favorably, especially compared to 
immigration from Latin America and Asia.41 Even in the federal judiciary there are large disparities 
in rates of asylum petitions being granted depending on which country they are from.42 Westlaw 
includes the national origin of the appellant in its case reviews because they are relevant to the 
immigration case proceedings. Using this information, I created a variable to categorize appellants 
based on what region their country of origin is belongs to (Europe = 0; Latin America = 1; East 
Asia = 2; Middle East = 3; Africa = 4).  
After collecting this data, I used RStudio to create dummy variables to catalogue cases 
based on whether the presiding panel had one immigrant judge, two immigrant judges, or no 
immigrant judges, as well as the panels’ number of female judges, judges of color, and Democrat 
judges. I then performed two logistic regression tests of panels’ decisions in immigration cases. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals randomizes assignment of judges to cases, so randomization in my data 
can be assumed.43  
Before discussing my results, it is useful to address the descriptive statistics of my dataset. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of regional origins among immigrant appellants. The majority of 
appellants came from Latin America (61%) with appellants from Europe being the least 
represented group (6%). Figures 2-4 show the distributions of judges’ race, gender and party 
affiliation, respectively. The low representation of panels with three judges of color (1.5%), three 
female judges (1.5%), and three Republican judges (3%) is consistent with the makeup of judges 
in the Ninth Circuit, which is overwhelmingly made up of white male Democrats. Figures 
demonstrating panel composition are more useful to view in the context of my research than the 
composition of all judges included in my dataset, since my research interest is in panel-level 
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effects. A more comprehensive empirical model for different panel composition combinations can 
be found in Appendix Table A1. 
 
Additionally, I found that 24% of immigration cases had at least one foreign-born judge 
presiding. There were only 3 cases in which two foreign-born judges presided (1.5%) and none in 
which three foreign-born judges presided, which I did not include in my analysis or discussion due 
to the small sample size. Furthermore, my data includes 90 unique judges, 29 of whom are sitting 
members of the Ninth Circuit court and 61 of whom are members of other district courts that were 
randomly selected to preside in Ninth Circuit cases. This includes a total of 11 foreign-born judges 
in my dataset, 2 of whom currently serve on the Ninth Circuit and 2 of whom recently retired from 
the Ninth Circuit. All of the foreign-born judges in my dataset are now American citizens. Of the 
11 immigrant judges: 5 were Hispanic, 2 were White, 2 were Asian, and 1 was Black; 5 were 
nominated by a Republican and 6 were nominated by a Democrat; 9 were men and 2 were women. 
Although there are more Democrat-appointed immigrant judges in my data, Republican-appointed 
immigrant judges presided over twice as many cases.  
 
Results 
To answer the central question of this paper — whether panels with at least one immigrant 
judge vote differently from panels with no immigrant judges — I report the voting records of 
panels based on the presence of minority judges. Figure 5 provides a graph of the raw data on total 
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types. Since I coded case outcomes on a gradient with 0 (appeal fully denied) being the most anti-
immigrant and 2 (appeal fully granted) being the most pro-immigrant, this figure shows that 
regardless of panel composition, panels were more likely to vote anti-immigrant.  
 
 
Using the incidence of each holding across different panel-types, Table 1 shows that the 
mean holding in all cases was 0.535, which skews anti-immigrant appellant. Table 1 also 
demonstrates that panels with at least one minority judge voted more pro-immigrant than the 
average. The increase in mean holding for panels with at least one immigrant judge, which was 
my principal interest, is +0.048. By contrast, panels’ mean vote with at least one female judge is 
+0.066 higher than the average and panels with at least one judge of color is highest at +0.106 
higher than the average, meaning that the smallest difference in means was among panels with a 
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Figure 5: Panels' Total Holdings
Denied Denied in part, Granted in Part Granted
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0.535 0.5197 0.387 0.347 
  
To examine the difference in means, I recreated Table 1 using the mean holdings of panels 
with all nonminority judges. Table 2 shows that panels with all nonminority judges had more anti-
immigrant holdings than the average across characteristics. I found that panels with all U.S.-born 
judges had a decrease in mean holding of -0.0153 compared to the average, panels with all male 
judges had a decrease in mean holding of -0.148, and panels with all white judges had a decrease 
in mean holding of -0.188. Parallel to my findings in Table 1, this means that the smallest 
difference in mean holdings was among panels categorized by immigrant status while the greatest 
difference in mean holding was among panels categorized by race. 
Next, I investigate whether these differences in panel voting behaviors can be interpreted 
as the causal effect of panels having minority representation. To do this, I fit two models that 
regressed panels’ votes on multiple panel-level characteristics. Model 1 is a limited regression that 
only looks at whether panels had at least one minority judge based on gender, race, party affiliation, 
and foreign-born judges. Model 2 looks at the effects of having specific numbers of female judges, 
immigrant judges, judges of color, and Democrats presiding in panels. Table 3 shows the results 
of this logit analysis.  
Model 1 demonstrates that having at least one female judge and at least one judge of color 
in immigration cases has panel effects on the case’s holding. That is, panels with at least one racial 
or gender minority were both more likely to hold in favor of the immigrant appellant, making the 
panel effect of racial and gender minorities pro-immigrant. My principal interest was in the effects 
on holding of at least one foreign-born judge. Model 1 shows that panels with immigrant judges 
were slightly more likely to hold in favor of the immigrant appellant than panels with all U.S.-born 
judges, but not at a statistically significant level, so a causal relationship cannot be inferred. Model 
2 reaffirms the finding that the presence of foreign-born judges does not have a causal panel effect 
in immigration cases, as well as the finding that panels with a judge of color are more likely to be 
pro-immigrant. I also find that panels with one Democrat and two Republicans decreases the 
likelihood of granting the petition, making these panels more anti-immigrant and signaling that 
ideology impacts panel outcomes.  
In Appendix Table A2, I performed a logit analysis for the interaction effects between 
foreign-born judges and judges of color, Democrats, and females. This table again demonstrates 
panel effects for panels with at least one judge of color and at least one female judge, confirming 
my results in Table 3, but did not find any significant interaction effects, meaning that neither the 
race, gender, nor party of immigrant judges drove changes in their panels’ holdings. 
Finally, I did another logit analysis to determine whether the regional origin of the appellant 
made a difference in panels’ voting behaviors. I did not find this to be the case because, as is shown 
in Appendix Table A3, there were no statistically significant results. This indicates that the region 
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Table 3: Logit Analysis of Panels’ Voting 
 
 
      Model 1                                   Model 2 
_____________                
___________ 
   
 Panel Composition 
Coefficien
t 
   SE       Coefficient 













At Least One Female Judge 0.625* 0.35
5 
— —   
One Female Judge 
(And Two Male Judges) 
— — 0.591 0.3
74 
  
Two Female Judges 
(And One Male Judge) 
— — 0.147 0.5
07 
  
At Least One Judge of Color 0.816** 0.36
1 
— —   
One Judges of Color 
(And Two White Judges) 
— — 0.878* 0.4
06 
  
Two Judges of Color 
(And One White Judge) 
— — 0.234 0.5
17 
  
At Least One Democrat Judge -0.52 0.91
8 
— —   
One Democrat Judge 
(And Two Republican Judges) 
— — -2.15** 1.0
86 
  
Two Democrat Judges 
(And One Republican Judge) 
— — -0.017 0.9
53 
  
All Democrat Judges — — 0.526 0.9
64 
  
   
N = 200     
         ** denotes p < 0.05, * denotes p < 0.1 
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Discussion  
Despite the theoretical expectation that foreign-born judges would affect panel-level 
decisions, my research did not substantiate this assertion. On the contrary, based on my data, the 
presence of foreign-born judges on panels had no significant pro-immigrant effect on the holdings 
of U.S. Court of Appeals immigration cases. Specifically, although mean holdings were more pro-
immigrant among panels with foreign-born judges compared to all U.S.-born panels, the difference 
in means could not be interpreted as causal (Table 3). Even though this finding is categorized as 
null, as pointed out in previous literature, it is imperative that null findings be highlighted. 44 In 
this study, my null result contributes to our understanding of the influence of minorities in the 
federal judiciary by suggesting that immigrant judges do not introduce pro-appellant preference in 
immigration cases.  
While this paper’s central focus was on foreign-born judges, I also replicated previous 
findings by testing whether gender and race contribute to panel effects. My results show that racial 
and gender minorities do have panel effects on immigration holdings. In particular, I found that 
female judges increased the likelihood that panels would vote pro-immigrant, which is consistent 
with previous findings.45 However, regarding race, the finding that judges of color also increased 
the likelihood of a panel holding pro-immigrant is not consistent with the findings of Williams and 
Law (2012), which found that panels with racial minorities were more anti-immigrant.46 This 
discrepancy could be due to a number of methodological differences including the sample size and 
different date ranges, which I discuss further in my limitations section. 
Taken together, my results suggest that the identity of being foreign-born influences judges 
during voting and deliberation differently than do racial and/or gender identities. This could be 
explained by findings in the literature indicating that immigrants, especially those who have 
become naturalized in their host countries, may tend to hold anti-immigration views.47 In the 
process of acquiring citizenship, immigrants acculturate, increasing their nationalist sentiments.48 
As a result, these naturalized citizens report higher than expected anti-immigration attitudes and 
favor restrictive immigration policies. Thus, although we expect that shared experiences would 
lead naturalized immigrants to have favorable attitudes towards immigration, research shows that 
acculturation into the host country produces more critical views on immigration.49  
Another potential explanation for my null result hinges on the idea that foreign-born judges 
may feel they are under more scrutiny during immigration cases, so they conform their views to 
the majority opinion.50 Furthermore, immigrant judges may also want to avoid being tokenized for 
their identity, which could compel them to not be as vocal as they might otherwise have been 
during deliberations for immigration cases.51 Thus, perceived notions about immigrant judges may 
alter their behavior during deliberation, making them less likely to share pro-immigrant sentiments 
and in turn reducing their panel effects in the Court of Appeals. 
Finally, immigrant judges may have different voting patterns than female judges and judges 
of color due to selection bias, or “systematic differences in how the considered populations were 
put together.”52 As demonstrated in Appendix Table A2, I did not find any interaction effects 
between holdings of panels with at least one immigrant and race, gender, or party affiliation, which 
suggests that these factors are not driving my null result. However, in using the party of the 
President that nominated each judge as a proxy for judge ideology, I did not fully capture their 
political attitudes towards immigration. Further, the fact that all of the foreign-born judges have 
become U.S. citizens and have received a high enough level of education to become a federal judge 
suggests that the immigrant judges in the Court of Appeals are not wholly representative of all 
U.S. immigrants, which may account for the discrepancy in their theoretically expected behaviors. 
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A comprehensive interpretation of my null result takes into account that the sample of 
immigrant judges in the Court of Appeals may (1) have anti-immigrant views independent of their 
political party, (2) are less insistent in immigration cases to avoid scrutiny, and/or (3) have 
experiences with immigration not representative of the average U.S. immigrant. While I believe 
all of these frameworks could in part explain why immigrant judges do not cause panel effects, 
this requires further research. 
 
Limitations & Future Directions 
The external validity of my research is limited in view of a small sample size (N=200). 
With a limited sample size, my dataset only included 15 dissents out of 600 total votes, which is 
insufficient to properly analyze individual-level differences in voting. Further, my dataset included 
only one case in which an immigrant judge dissented, so it cannot be used as a proxy for foreign-
born individual votes. Previous papers with larger databases were able to determine individual 
effects of race and gender, among other variables, because their data included more dissents. As a 
result of being unable to compare individual voting patterns, my research is unable to untangle the 
causal mechanisms driving panel effects. Data on individual voting trends from foreign-born 
judges compared to U.S.-born judges would have allowed me to determine whether judges’ votes 
were endogenously affecting panel outcomes. Future research should focus on strategies to 
uncover casual mechanisms by constructing a larger dataset containing more dissent cases. 
It is also important to note that in this paper I used the terms “immigrant judge” and 
“foreign-born judge” interchangeably. However, the immigrant experience is highly nuanced and 
simply looking at birthplace is not a direct determinant of the personal experiences had by foreign-
born judges. In addition, there is a dearth of information on the paths to citizenship taken by the 
immigrant judges in my dataset, so the nuance of their experiences was not captured in my 
research. Thus, grouping all foreign-born judges together may be an oversimplification. In order 
to increase internal validity and uncover new findings in future studies, researchers should include 
more comprehensive variables regarding judges’ backgrounds and upbringings (e.g., at what age 
the judge immigrated to the U.S., whether their immigration case was ever appealed, whether they 




Despite the limitations of my research, this study advances our understanding on the effects 
of a neglected form of minority representation in the federal judiciary. With the recent emphasis 
on immigration policy and voting patterns of minority judges, it is imperative to continue this line 
of research into panel-level effects of U.S. Court of Appeals cases. The finding that the presence 
of immigrant judges has no effect on the holding of an immigrant appellant importantly contradicts 
notions that immigrant judges cannot be objective in immigration cases. However, the panel effects 
of race and gender that were found in this research should not be taken to mean that minority 
judges are less objective than nonminority judges. Rather, these judges bring a unique and useful 
perspective to panels, making them an essential fixture of the federal bench.         
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 




     Min                Max 
  
Race      
Hispanic Defendant 0.61 0 1   
All White Judges 0.36 0 1   
One Judge of Color 
(And Two White Judges) 
0.42 0 1   
Two Judges of Color 
(And One White Judge) 
0.20
5 
0 1   
All Judges of Color 0.01
5 
0 1   
Immigration      
At Least One Foreign-Born 
Judge 
0.24 0 1   
Gender      
All Male Judges 0.31 0 1   
One Female Judge 
(And Two Male Judges) 
0.5 0 1   
Two Female Judges 
(And One Male Judge) 
0.17
5 
0 1   
All Female Judges 0.01
5 
0 1   
Party Affiliation      
All Republican Judges 0.03 0 1   
One Democrat Judge 
(And Two Republican Judges) 
0.25 0 1   
Two Democrat Judges 
(And One Republican Judge) 
0.36 0 1   
All Democrat Judges 0.36 0 1   
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0 2   
N = 200    









At Least One Immigrant Judge 0.384 
(0.726) 
 
At Least One Judge of Color 0.25* 
(0.133) 
 
At Least One Democrat Judge 0.378 
(0.476) 
 
At Least One Female Judge  0.239* 
(0.144) 
 
Immigrant × Judge of Color  0.413 
(0.459) 
 
Immigrant × Democrat -0.711 
(0.703) 
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At Least One Immigrant Judge 0.384 
(0.726) 
  
At Least One Judge of Color 0.25* 
(0.133) 
 
At Least One Democrat Judge 0.378 
(0.476) 
 
At Least One Female Judge 0.239* 
(0.144) 
 
Immigrant ´ Judge of Color 0.413 
(0.459) 
  
Immigrant ´ Democrat -0.711 
(0.703) 
  







Appendix Table A3: Logit Analysis of Regional Differences in Appeals Court Decisions 
 
   
Region of 
Appellant 
     
Coefficient 
SE p-value 
European -0.336 0.585 0.565 
Latin American -0.418 0.616 0.497 
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East Asian  -0.012 0.696 0.986 
Middle Eastern  0.49 0.807 0.543 
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